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The globalization of economic activity has caused some to declare that 
national borders no longer matter and, therefore, the nation-state has become 
irrelevant.  Others argue that globalization has weakened the nation-state and has 
made it susceptible to the economic interests that control the global economy.  
Regardless, countries have become increasingly integrated into the global 
economy over the past two decades; they have also organized themselves into 
various regional trading blocs.  This study contributes to the debate of how 
globalization and regionalization have affected the sovereignty of the world’s 
nation-states, by investigating the effects of the Central American Common 
Market (CACM) on the national sovereignty of its member countries.  To 
accomplish this goal, the study employed a battery of empirical and qualitative 
analyses to address three primary questions.  First, does the existence of the 
CACM conflict with the nation-state, resulting in the formation of a de facto, 
supra-national boundary?  Second, does the CACM’s legal and institutional 
framework possess the strength to compete and challenge the authority of the 
 vii
nation-state?  And, third, does regional identity or economic integration 
strengthen the CACM in its challenge of the nation state?  To determine the 
existence of a de facto, supra-national CACM boundary, the study employed a 
gravity model to determine its existence and to measure its effect.  To understand 
the ability of the CACM to successfully challenge the authority of its member 
states, the research included interviews of individuals working at Central 
America’s multinational institutions, national governments and organizations 
representing its private-sector.  The findings of the empirical analyses did show, 
from several geographic perspectives, a supra-national CACM boundary between 
1980 and 1997.  However, despite these findings, there was significant evidence 
gathered during the interviewing process to question whether this border actually 
exists.  The Central American countries have been unwilling to give up more than 
the minimal amount of national sovereignty necessary to make the CACM work.  
Therefore, the findings of this research suggest that participation in the Central 
American Common Market agreement has not threatened the national sovereignty 
of its member nation-states. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
While the current period of global integration is not the first the world has 
experienced, it appears to be deeper than those of the past.  The globalization of 
economic activity has caused some to declare that national borders no longer 
matter and, therefore, the nation-state has become irrelevant.  They argue that the 
nation-state is an anachronism, which only seeks to limit the possibilities of the 
global market.  On the other hand, there are many who believe that there is an 
inevitable conflict between the nation-state and global integration.  Globalization 
inherently weakens the nation-state and makes it susceptible to those groups that 
control the global economy.  The purpose of this report is to study how borders 
and, subsequently, the nation-state, have been affected by globalization.   
 The intent of this research is to produce evidence from a case study 
perspective, rather than to argue these concepts abstractly.  The countries of the 
Central American Common Market (CACM) were chosen to be that case study 
and they are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.  
Their efforts to integrate have become a complex series of advancements and 
setbacks over the past four decades.  Since the countries committed themselves to 
integration in the early 1960s, they have: been able to establish a roughly common 
tariff schedule; implemented a migration agreement to make it easier for persons 
to travel, but not immigrate, between Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua; and are negotiating a customs union between these same four 
countries that is scheduled to begin in 2004.  On the other hand, Central 
America’s integration process has also failed to reach many of its goals.  It still 
has not been able to develop a fully harmonized tariff schedule and its failure to 
form a true free trade zone has delayed other aspects of integration, such as the 
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planned customs union and the creation of a monetary union.  As a result, political 
and social integration of the region are still many, many years away.   
This research seeks to answer three primary questions about the CACM 
and, subsequently, how international trade affects national sovereignty.  First, 
does the existence of the CACM conflict with the nation-state, resulting in the 
formation of a de facto, supra-national boundary?  Second, does the CACM’s 
legal and institutional framework possess the strength to compete and challenge 
the authority of the nation-state?  And, third, does regional identity or economic 
integration strengthen the CACM in its challenge of the nation state?  The 
answers to these questions will support the study’s two primary policy objectives:  
first, to measure the success of the CACM countries in their attempt to achieve 
regional economic integration; and second, contribute evidence towards the 
debate on whether nation-states must relinquish a significant amount of their 
national sovereignty to successfully engage in the global economy.     
The following chapters will explore these issues in greater detail and will 
seek to answer the questions posed here through a battery of empirical and 
qualitative analyses.  Chapter Two will review the theoretical foundations of the 
nation, the state, national sovereignty, and international borders.  The chapter will 
also identify the perceived threats to the nation-state, as a result of globalization, 
and outline some of the responses to those concerns.  Chapter Three will 
introduce the reader to the Central American region, with a broad overview of its 
characteristics and trends on a variety of subjects.  Chapter Four will concentrate 
on the Central American Common Market: its history and institutional 
framework.  Chapter Five will introduce the quantitative and qualitative 
techniques that were used for the analysis, as well as describe their data sources.  
Chapter Six will present the research findings and Chapter Seven will discuss 
their policy implications for Central America and suggest topics for future study.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  THE EFFECTS OF TRADE ON NATIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The debate over the globalization and regionalization of trade has revolved 
around a concern that trade has diminished the sovereignty of the nation-state.  
Proponents of this theory list a number of global problems they believe are caused 
or exacerbated by trade: environmental degradation; the relocation of labor and 
poor working conditions; diminishing public safety; multinational institutions and 
transnational corporations (TNCs) directly or indirectly influencing national 
governments; the domination of western culture and values; and so on.  While 
there are occasional, indirect correlations between trade and these problems, 
undeniably trade is responsible for a number of benefits to countries and many 
people, including those who live in the developing world, are concerned that 
opponents to global trade are seeking to eliminate the only realistic options they 
have for addressing these concerns.  More specifically, the proponents of 
globalization believe the best opportunity that developing countries have for 
improving their welfare is to expand their exports and economies by more fully 
participating in the global economy.  But, for those who fear globalization, these 
arguments are typically ignored and they instead blame international trade 
institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and TNCs for being 
the mechanisms that create, reinforce or exacerbate these problems.  They allege 
that developing countries, in particular, cannot exercise effective control over 
their economies because multinational trade institutions and TNCs exploit their 
weaknesses and leave them with no realistic alternatives other than participation 
in the global economy under the terms of the industrialized world.  This argument 
has gained much traction among left-leaning political parties, politicians, and 
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transnational interest groups, who have actively and sometimes violently 
protested the world’s trade structure.  The far-Right argues that multinational 
institutions or agreements, which limit and/or control a nation’s government, have 
the effect of diminishing authority that is rightfully and exclusively held by the 
nation-state.  Despite a widespread acceptance of these “sovereignty” arguments, 
the reasoning that trade does not diminish a nation’s sovereignty is better 
supported from a theoretical framework.  This chapter seeks to clarify the 
essential elements of the trade versus national sovereignty argument by, first, 
discussing the origin of the state and national sovereignty, acknowledging that 
concepts of the state, the nation, borders, and sovereignty are all interrelated.  The 
discussion will also demonstrate that it is equally impossible to separate the 
concepts of national sovereignty and interstate relationships, which frustrates the 
argument that international trade, in fact, inherently diminishes a nation’s 
sovereignty. 
The Nation-State 
FORMATION 
Although human governance has been part of history for millennia, Held 
(1995) contends that the nation-state in its present form did not fully develop until 
the 17th Century.  Prior to its creation, governance was much more complex, in 
the sense that authority was not exercised over a clearly delineated territory as we 
know it today.  In Medieval Europe, for example, it was very common for 
multiple rulers to hold claim to a single territory (Held 1995: 32-33).  Perhaps, the 
first territorial boundaries in the history of human civilization were formed in 
ancient Persia.  Starting around 500 B.C., the Persians developed a system of 
administrative and taxing districts that they called “satrapies”, headed by 
governors who were called “satraps” (Dandamaev and Lukonin, 1989: 97-100).  
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The Romans also created boundaries when the population densities of their 
territories required the separation of settlements.  Upon moving into Gaul, they 
continued the practice and eventually employed it throughout their empire.  When 
ruling their territories, the Romans applied a comprehensive set of laws enforced 
by a hierarchical system of administrators.  It is from the hierarchies developed by 
the Romans [and, previously, the Persians] that Anderson (1996) argues the 
concept of sovereignty, or authority over a region, was derived (Anderson 1996: 
13-14).  
As the Roman Empire faded and the Church took the dominant political 
role in Europe, it inherited the Romans’ hierarchical system of governance and 
created geographic organizations (parishes, dioceses, etc.), along with an 
administrative hierarchy (priests, bishops, Pope, etc), to administer its worldly 
affairs.  The Church’s supremacy over secular governments, following the Roman 
Empire, was legitimated through the accepted idea of universalism, whose core 
tenet was “that some high authority ought to hold sway over the whole of 
mankind or at least the civilized part of it” (Anderson, 1996: 14-17).   
The weakness of secular governments, at this time, was due in part to their 
lack of territorial organization.  The accurate delineation of territories came into 
common practice with the introduction of record keeping, which in England, did 
not happen until the late eleventh-century.  Once the spatial understanding 
necessary for the state took root, rulers were able to identify the territorial limits 
of their realms.  An equally important foundation for the development of state 
sovereignty was accomplished when rulers moved against the supremacy of the 
Church and abandoned their obedience to universalism.  This allowed secular 
governments to take control of a territory’s administrative, judicial, and legal 
systems.  The early modern concept of the State was that the ruling authority had 
supreme control over its territory and was only subject to the direct will of God.  
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This meant that no longer did earthly Church leaders have authority over the state 
(Anderson 1996: 17-19).  
Beginning in the 14th Century, according to Held, European rulers 
exercised their authority in the form of monarchies, which usually fell into one of 
two categories: absolute and constitutional.  It was the practices of the absolute 
monarchies that would later produce the key components of nation building.  
Absolute monarchs incorporated smaller and weaker territories into their existing 
holdings and formed larger, stronger spheres of influence with a single 
overarching ruler who had complete authority over all persons living in the 
territory.  Thus, it was this consolidation of territory and power into a single unit 
that would lead to the development of the nation state (Held 1995: 34-35).   
Once rulers began to claim sole authority over a territory, borders began to 
play an important role in the creation of the nation-state, since nations now had 
absolute power over their territory and no other governments were allowed 
jurisdiction.  The formation of borders also meant that it was no longer one’s right 
to enter a territory at will.  One could only enter a territory with the permission of 
its government, which could impose whatever rules it felt were necessary 
(Anderson 1996: 19).  Thus, the key milestones in the evolution of the European 
nation-state, realized by the 17th Century, were the delineation of territorial 
boundaries, the supremacy of secular governments, and the consolidation of 
authority for a single territorial unit under a single ruler with absolute power.  It 
was also during the 17th Century, Dicken (1992) maintains, that the nation-state 
became the primary actor of international economics and the world economy 
began to act as a series of “interlocking national economies” (Jeffrey 1999: 16).  
The nation-state has continued to evolve since the 17th Century and has 
been viewed by philosophers and theorists in a variety of terms.  Hegel saw the 
state as “the organizing principle of society”, which created a “set of 
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institutionalized norms that regulate social life” (Gómez-Buendía 1995: 29).  Max 
Weber took a more pessimistic, yet practical view of the nation-state, which he 
described as being in “possession of the monopoly of the means of violence 
within a given territory” (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 171).  Guéhenno (1995) 
emphasized that nations represent a common identity, but this common identity is 
one that develops over time and is not based upon the inherent traits of the 
population. 
A nation defines itself first by what it is not; it is not a social group, it is 
not a religious group, and it is not a racial group; in other words, what 
binds together the citizens of a nation is the product of a unique 
combination of historical factors, and can never be reduced to a single 
dimension, whether social, religious, or racial.  (Guéhenno 1995: 4) 
 
Guéhenno elaborated further by saying that nations are defined by their “common 
misfortunes” and “common triumphs”.  Finally, Finer (1975) characterized the 
nation-state by five elements, which also summarize the conclusions of many 
other writers on the matter: 
1. It has a defined territory 
2. It possesses a government that performs civilian and military 
functions 
3. It has mutual recognition and respect from other nation-states 
4. Its population shares its identity with the state 
5. “Its citizens mutually distribute and share duties and benefits” 
(Johnston 1982, 4).   
Finer’s third definition of the nation-state is a very important component of 
national sovereignty, that has been purposely ignored until this point, the 
recognition of a nation-state by other nation-states in the global community.  This 
is a topic that will be discussed shortly in greater detail. 
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STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
The word “sovereignty” can actually be used as an overarching term and 
Newman (1996) posited that several different types of sovereignty have evolved.  
Perhaps the earliest philosophical definition of sovereignty was developed by Jean 
Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, who believed that states should have a single source 
of authority that was free from the influence of external or internal forces 
(Newman 1996: 5).  Both, Bodin and Hobbes, believed that a state’s authority 
must supersede the authority of the Church or other “ancient privileges”, although 
neither of them supported the notion that the state should have absolute power.  
Newman called this the “doctrine of state sovereignty” (Newman 1996: 5-6).  
John Austin (1790-1859) developed the concept of a state’s “legal sovereignty” 
which meant that all the inhabitants of a state are required to obey the laws 
created by its sovereign ruler.  The sovereign ruler has the authority to enforce all 
of its laws on its citizens, but the sovereign is not required to obey the laws of any 
other (Newman 1996: 6).  Although Newman maintains it is not necessary for a 
link to exist between sovereignty and democracy, the concept that sovereignty is 
derived from the populace was one initially advanced by John Locke.  Locke 
believed that a state’s sovereignty resides in the citizens of the state, rather than in 
the state itself.  Newman called this link between democracy and sovereignty the 
“doctrine of popular sovereignty”.  Historically, political philosophers have 
believed that popular sovereignty was a very powerful force and Rousseau argued 
it could even be used to challenge the state.  Despite this, states do not necessarily 
oppose popular sovereignty because it provides a useful tool for legitimizing a 
state’s authority and can also help build a nation’s identity, which Newman calls 
“popular states sovereignty” (Newman 1996: 6-8).  Finally, within a nation-state, 
sovereignty can be shared or split. Shared sovereignty, for example, occurs in 
federalism where there are federal, state, and local governments existing 
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simultaneously within the nation-state.  A states’ sovereignty can also be split, 
such as in the United State’s federal government, which has executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches (Newman 1996: 8). 
Others writers do not consider sovereignty from its historical perspective; 
instead they view it from its current manifestation.  Some believe states have only 
two types of sovereignty: internal and external.  Reinicke (1998) defined internal 
sovereignty as the relationship between the state and its citizens, while external 
sovereignty was defined simply as a nation’s relationship with other nations in the 
international system (Reinicke 1998: 53-54).  Arnon and Weinblatt (2001) posit a 
more direct definition of sovereignty.  They believe that sovereignty “lies in the 
ability to decide and implement decisions” (Arnon and Weinblatt 2001: F304).  
Makler and Ness (2002) define sovereignty as: 
[t]he capability of a state to project and maintain power both domestically 
and internationally.   It involves the authority and control that it exercises 
over its territory and citizens as well as its ability to control transborder 
movements of capital, goods, people, and ideas.  Sovereignty represents 
the self-esteem of a nation.  Without adequate sovereignty a nation feels 
denigrated, without control of its destiny (Makler and Ness 2002: 828). 
 
This is a particularly bold definition of sovereignty, but one that appears grounded 
more in political rhetoric than in political theory.  
Muir (1997) observed that not all states are able to consolidate their 
authority over an entire territory.  This is why, in some nations, there are “holes” 
in national sovereignty, where rivals to the state are capable of successfully 
challenging its control (Storey 2001: 99).  Often, these rivals to the state are 
secessionists, who wish to break away a piece of territory to form a new nation, 
such as the Basques in Spain or the Republicans in Northern Ireland (Storey 2001: 
99).  The driving forces of secessionist movements vary, but many are fueled by 
cultural and religious differences, which include differences of language, as well 
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as socioeconomic disparities between the regions of a nation (Storey 2001: 102-
104).  
Intra-State Relationships 
WESTPHALIAN ORDER 
One of the single most important events in the history of the modern 
nation-state was the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which formally drew the 
Thirty Years War to an end.  The Treaty consisted of several elements, which 
created a system that became known as the “Westphalian Order”.  Specifically, 
the Treaty recognized that each nation-state possesses complete sovereignty 
within it own borders.  This recognition meant that other nation-states accepted a 
state’s authority over its territory and population and that they would not interfere 
with its internal matters (Held 1995: 76-78).  This new, mutual respect was 
something that was extended to even the weakest of nations.  Similarly, Hirst and 
Thompson (1996) said, “…the capacity for [a nation-state’s] sovereignty came 
from without” as much as came from within (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 172).  
This new world order meant that rulers who did not have recognition of their 
authority from other nations really did not have complete sovereignty (Johnston 
1982: 2).  Another important concept created by the Treaty of Westphalia was the 
assertion that countries exist within a global anarchy, so there is no such thing as a 
“rule of nations”.  However, nations could establish a system of order, if they 
were willing to agree upon a set of common rules.  The Treaty set the conditions 
for developing a system of international law that was based upon treaties and 
agreements, but did not have an overarching authority.  This system of 
international law is inherently parsimonious because nations are only willing to 
give up as much sovereignty as they are required to reach a mutually desirable 
goal.  Also, under this new system of international law, nations could use 
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diplomacy to formulate agreements, but could also resort to force when they 
believe it is necessary (Held 1995: 77-79).  “Thus, to a significant degree the 
capacity for sovereignty came from without, through agreements between states 
in the newly emerging society of states” (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 172). 
MULTINATIONAL ORDER 
Many observers contend that the nation-state and world order have entered 
into a new phase of existence with the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 
1945 (Held 1995: 83).  Under the UN charter, relations between the nations 
moved past the Westphalian paradigm of minimal cooperation to a coordinated 
effort of world policy development and implementation (Held 1995: 83-89).  The 
UN charter also sanctioned the deployment of peacekeeping forces in nations, 
which had the affect of creating a multinational institution that could exercise 
authority in place of the state.  In addition to these differences, the UN paradigm 
has led to other significant diversions from Westphalian Order, such as 
recognizing individuals and groups alongside countries (Held 1995: 83) and 
legitimizing the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
other special interest groups in the UN’s multinational policy development and 
implementation process (Barfield 2001:79-81).  
Although the UN has functioned successfully since its origin, recent 
events question the assertion that multinational rule has replaced Westphalian 
order.  Even Held thought this conclusion was premature (Held 1995: 97-98).  
Through their 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States and Great Britain appeared 
to reassert the Westphalian paradigm as their foreign policy framework.  The 
invasion of Iraq was executed without U.N. support or approval and with limited 
international support.  Although the two countries faced considerable resistance to 
the invasion domestically and from many nations, the strongest resistance came 
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from the European countries.  Among the number of reasons that were given for 
why the invasion was not appropriate, the lack of a multilateral consensus was, 
perhaps, the one most frequently cited.  Not surprisingly, an argument that is very 
much in line with Europe’s current multilateral strategy.  But the debate and anger 
that has resulted from this difference of opinion also brings to light a diverging 
view of sovereignty between the United States and Great Britain with the 
remainder of Europe.  The United States and Great Britain have shown they are 
willing to act unilaterally under Westphalian assumptions, while most European 
nations have decided to defer to multinational bodies, like the EU and the UN. 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN NATION-STATES 
The existence of a community of nation-states that are defined by 
territories means that nation-states must lie adjacent.  This close proximity can 
create a variety of interactions that range from violence to economic and political 
integration.  Because national borders represent the interaction of nations, states, 
sovereignty, and international relations, they are an obvious measure for 
determining the strength and vitality of the nation-state and the effects of trade. 
One advantage of studying border regions is that here the interaction 
between economic integration and national sovereignty is often more 
transparent than elsewhere.  In other words, studying border regions can 
help answer the question of what is happening to national sovereignty in 
the face of economic globalization and the emergence of new transnational 
regimes (O’Dowd, Corrigan, and Moore 1995: 273). 
 
Minghi (1969) and Prescott (1978) reviewed a number of early theorists 
who wrote about borders, many of whom held thoughtful ideas on their roles and 
value.    Kristof (1969) wrote what could easily be considered a timeless piece on 
the differences between frontiers and borders, as well as a philosophical argument 
for their existence.  On the other hand, much of the literature was written between 
the turn of the century and the 1940s and, as a result, was strongly influenced by 
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the two world wars and the senses of nationalism that fueled those conflagrations.  
As a consequence, these writers emphasize the militaristic and defensive aspects 
of borders, rather than less conflictual conceptions (Minghi, 1969: 141).  
However, one should criticize these theorists sparingly considering the global 
political environment that existed during the period when they wrote their works, 
which, ironically, reflects the situation of the United States after 2001.  Brief 
summaries of the writings judged to be the most relevant to this discussion are 
provided below.  
One of the earlier border theorists was Ratzel (1897) who, using an 
“organic” paradigm, viewed the state as a living organism with the border akin to 
the organism’s skin.  Borders created a defense for the state and controlled certain 
exchanges.  Ratzel’s theory also developed three main ideas about borders.  First, 
was the concept of a border “fringe”, an area created where two states meet and 
where the characteristics and authority of both states mingle.  Second, he believed 
that borders both influenced and measured a state’s power.  Ratzel argued strong 
states were those which had close ties between their center and border regions.  If 
states did not maintain this relationship, they risked the border region developing 
its own identity or merging with an adjacent state.  Finally, Ratzel believed that 
borders had dynamic qualities where their boundaries tended to become 
simplified and where larger areas took over smaller ones.  In other words, Ratzel 
believed there was a tendency for smaller political units to combine or be 
absorbed into larger ones (Prescott, 1978: 14-15). 
Semple (1911) thought of borders as frontiers, which were uninhabited 
zones for protection and division.  However, she observed that boundaries did not 
divide the customs of a region.  Instead, each culture modified the customs of the 
other side.  Thus, Semple described borders “as variable zones open to pressures 
from both the physical and cultural environments” (Minghi, 1969: 140-141).  
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Fawcett (1918) described frontiers as zones of transition and while all zones are 
transitions of one sort or another, in a frontier, transition is the dominant 
characteristic.  Although he believed that a frontier’s only purpose was to protect 
the interests of the state, they could also provide an “approved” meeting place for 
the populations of adjacent countries (Prescott, 1978: 19-20).  
Ancel (1938) “regarded the boundary as the result of state power 
generated by a particular political-social group” rather than the border 
determining a state’s strength (Prescott, 1978: 22-23).  “[T]he boundary reflects 
the relationships between neighboring groups and should be studied to this end 
rather than a single element of the landscape” (Prescott, 1978: 23).  Ancel 
believed that boundaries would move according to the strength of the state and 
that a boundary was the product of pressure placed by each country, but this did 
not necessarily imply a physical fluidity.  New pressures may result in the state 
changing its control over the border, rather than the border itself changing.  Thus, 
the boundary existed at a point of equilibrium, an idea that was also presented by 
Spykman (1938) (Prescott 1978: 23-25).  Boggs (1940) considered the functions 
of boundaries to be “negative, rather than positive”.  He rejected the idea that 
boundaries formed bonds between regions and believed that borders interrupted 
trade by their restrictions.  However, Boggs “asserted that any boundary is 
permeable and over time ‘a sort of osmosis takes place, the osmotic pressure 
increasing directly with institutional barriers to interactance’” (Minghi, 1969: 
143-144). 1   Taking a more positive stance, Spykman (1942) saw borders as 
“points of contact” rather than “lines of demarcation between legal systems”.  
Moodie (1957) presented the opposite viewpoint and said that “boundaries 
epitomized the growth of centralization of authority and power of the states they 
                                                 
1
  Employing a biological paradigm, Boggs used the term “osmosis” but a better analogy might be 
“selective permeability”. 
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divided, the functions of the boundary were divided, not from the nature of the 
line, but from the nature of the communities it separated” (Minghi, 1969: 145-
146). Weigert et.al. (1957) dismissed the idea that boundaries function as barriers 
and posited that borders played a selective role.  “Borrowing from Boggs, the 
authors saw cross-boundary influence as osmotic pressure from the neighbor” 
(Minghi, 1969: 146). 
Kristof (1969) wrote an influential piece which defined borders and 
frontiers, and then differentiated between the two.  Historically, nations were not 
necessarily divided by lines but by frontiers: “areas which [were] part of the 
whole”.  Frontiers were what lie ahead of the hinterland and were not considered 
to have legal, political, nor substantive content.  Frontiers simply existed as a 
result of expanding the inhabited world and represented its limitless possibilities 
and opportunities. “The frontier is outer-oriented.  Its main attention is directed 
toward the outlying areas which are both a source of danger and a coveted prize” 
(Kristof, 1969: 126-127).  Kristof defined a boundary as “the outer line of 
effective control exercised by the central government.”  Boundaries are the limits 
to political entities and everything within a border is bound together (Kristof, 
1969: 128). 
Kristof also differentiated between frontiers and borders by arguing the 
purpose of borders was to separate while the function of frontiers was to integrate.  
States create borders to control the movement of “persons, things, and even 
ideas”, to create an orientation towards the center.  Since borders have no material 
existence, they become insensitive extensions of the state.  The state has no 
special interest in these borderlands and thus their inhabitants feel detached from 
the center. This isolation causes the inhabitants to develop their own interests and 
to have more tenuous bonds to the state than other regions.  Kristof believed the 
integrating role of frontiers is limited to those persons who were attracted to the 
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ideal of living on a frontier.  Frontiers become attractive “if the adoption of it 
promises better chances of survival in the given environment or if it appears 
generally ‘superior’”.  Thus, based on this individualistic definition of frontiers, 
Kristof warned against drawing boundaries for assimilative purposes since the 
role of a border is to separate not unite (Kristof, 1969: 127-129). 
Kristof also believed that boundaries delimit a state or its “creed”.  It is in 
the interest of the state to create borders in the place of frontiers, so that the state 
may enforce its own interests, structure, and ideology.  He argued the state’s 
authority to create these borders was based upon jural law.  While the laws of 
nature are simply those which determine reality and natural law (or moral law) is 
not what is but what should be, jural law is an attempt to draw together the laws 
of nature and moral law so that moral law can be enacted in an efficient way.  The 
meshing of the two creates an imperfect product of compromise, but is arguably 
the best that humanity can manage.  Thus, boundaries are a spatial expression of 
jural law, but can never be considered part of nature because they are always 
created by man (Kristof, 1969: 127-130). 
From these many theories of borders, one can derive three primary 
conclusions.  First, borders have a defensive function.  States view their control 
over a border as representative of their ability to centralize power and control 
territory.  Unwelcome intrusions across a nation’s borders threaten the 
sovereignty of the state and are responded to with force.  Therefore, because 
states ultimately view self-survival as their most basic function, they are naturally 
self-defensive when it comes to the exchange of goods, services, institutions, and 
labor.  Second, borders have a divisive function.  The role of borders is to separate 
territories because, as Moodie and Kristof pointed out, they are ruled by 
governments who differ in their systemic beliefs and objectives.  Nation-states 
separate because they are inherently unique for any number of reasons: language; 
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culture; religion; etc.  Thus, forcefully uniting these regions will only lead to 
situations where they may violently split apart.  Additionally, there do not appear 
to be any reasonable alternatives to borders and the nation-state.  Before the 
advent of the modern nation-state, governments were often empires, city-states, 
and kingdoms, alternatives that few persons today would likely find attractive, 
particularly since these forms of governance were often associated with 
authoritarianism, tributary aggression, and outward aggression.  Some argue the 
boundaries of territories should be redrawn to create nations, which are ethnically 
or linguistically homogenous or that territories lost in past wars should be 
returned to their previous rulers. With regard to the latter, nation-states rarely give 
up territories they consider as part of the whole and doing so would not 
necessarily serve any beneficial purpose.  In terms of the former, it is impossible 
to divide ethnic groups without taking land or creating minorities, practices that 
have typically led to violence.  Besides, what region of any reasonable size has 
ever had complete ethnic homogeneity without the previous use of force?  Thus, 
we must deal with the inevitable conflicts and inefficiencies that result from 
borders, since, as Kristof pointed out, borders are the result of an imperfect 
compromise of moral law.  The third role of borders is integrative.  Borders create 
zones where neighboring states can interact with each other and trade is, perhaps, 
the most valuable of these interactions.  At the same time, borders inevitably 
impede commerce and other economic linkages.  The next sections provide a 
discussion on some views of trade and sovereignty, as well as the problems that 
arise from international borders. 
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National Sovereignty and Trade 
HOW BORDERS AFFECT TRADE 
The inefficient consequences that borders have on trade flows are 
exacerbated when states exercise their protective function.  But, as Hoover (1948) 
pointed out, even with a fairly open border, there are impediments to trade which 
are inherently different from those normally associated with the friction of space 
and in addition to tariffs, quotas, and subsidies.  These other barriers may include 
the extra time and expense needed to fill out forms for international transactions, 
the effects of language and culture on consumer preferences, as well as 
differences in measurement and engineering standards (Hoover, 1948: 217).  
Other obstacles to trade could be the limitations of copyrights and patents, or the 
regulation of certain actions and transactions.  There may also be obstacles 
affecting the flows between individuals, groups, or populations, particularly the 
flow of information or knowledge.  Some of these impediments may be temporal 
in nature, while short to medium-term obstacles may be the result of political, 
economic, or military crises.  Long-term obstacles often result from differences in 
political and institutional structures that are all but impossible to overcome 
(Suarez-Villa et al., 1992: 95-96).  Religious restrictions can also hinder trade, 
particularly when religious customs require substantial changes to a product.  
Finally, transportation costs are usually higher across borders because the 
transportation “circuitry” (network) allows for fewer crossing points, which adds 
time and costs to a trip (Hoover, 1948: 218).  
Hoover also maintained that international borders distort the size and 
pattern of market areas within a country.  Market areas that one would expect to 
otherwise span across a border are made smaller or are eliminated because of the 
added expense of crossing them.  However, it should be pointed out that market 
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size is specific to a good, which means that not all goods face these constraints.  
Goods with ubiquitous demand and supply are less likely to experience these 
effects, while less-ubiquitous goods would have a greater opportunity of being 
effected by the border.  In general, however, most distributors are more likely 
locate away from the border so that they can serve a larger market and this 
restrains the development of border cities (Hoover, 1948: 216-222). 
A PERSPECTIVE ON TRADE AND BORDERS 
 When studying trade, there are multiple geographic perspectives from 
which it can be viewed, for example: trade between countries; trade between a 
country and another country’s states or provinces; trade between countries in a 
trade bloc; etc.  Economists have historically studied international trade as 
occurring between two countries that are viewed as separate and monolithic (See 
Figure 2.1).  The two most predominant theoretical starting points for studying 
nation-to-nation trade are the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin approaches.  
Ricardian theory (also known as comparative advantage) assumes that there is 
only one factor involved in the production of a good, in a two-good economy, and 
that countries produce the good, which they make the most efficiently using the 
factors they possess.  A country would not produce a good that it makes 
inefficiently, since it could obtain these goods from another country at a lower 
cost (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997: 14-17).  The Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade 
assumes there are multiple factors of production that are available for producing a 
good in a two-good economy, but still assumes that each country will only 
produce the good that it makes most efficiently with the factor endowments it 
possesses.    
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Figure 2.1:  Bilateral International Trade 
 
Researchers have also examined a country’s sub-units (i.e. regions, states, 
or provinces) and how they relate to trade with another country, although this 
perspective is less common.  In reality, trade between two countries does not 
occur in a spatially even process because states or provinces have different factor 
endowments, consumer incomes and tastes, access to technology and resources, 
etc.  The differences in the pattern of international trade between the regions of 
countries are what Courant and Deardorff (1992) have called “lumpiness” (See 
Figure 2.2).  Regional inequalities in factor endowments affect the overall 
specialization of a country and cause it to produce a different amount of goods 
than would a country with evenly distributed factor endowments (Courant and 
Deardorff, 1992: 198-199).  During the debate over the ratification of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, there was 
considerable attention given to the effects of the agreement on individual U.S. 
states and their trade with Mexico, because of their different factor endowments. 
While there is a great deal to learn from studying trade at the sub-national 
level, there are reasons why researchers commonly use the nation-state as their 
primary unit of analysis.  First, nation-states enact policies that are typically 
uniform across their entire territory and this provides a reason for agglomerating 
and studying these areas as a whole.  These policies create identical barriers to 
Country A Country B 
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trade and travel that prevent the free flow of factor endowments and labor 
(Krugman, 1991: 71-72).  Second, it is a simplifying assumption that makes 
modeling easier (Krugman, 1991: 2) and, finally, it most certainly simplifies the 
data requirements of modeling, since the nation-state is the most common unit of 
data collection and reporting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: A Bilateral View of Trade – With Country A “Lumpiness” 
 
 
 Figure 2.3 depicts trade among countries within a multilateral trade bloc.  
Each country is engaged in bilateral trade with all other member countries, and 
together they form an intertwined, but not exclusive, relationship.  The circle 
surrounding the member countries, in this figure, represents the agreement that 
forms the trade bloc.  Since the countries are bound together by the agreement, it 
is possible that the agreement forms an intangible supranational border around 
them. 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY A COUNTRY B 
 22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Trade within a Trade Bloc 
 
Figure 2.4 shows a multiple and simultaneous perspective of trade for a 
single country, without lumpiness.  In this figure, the cylinder shapes that passes 
through each of the three layers identifies the country.  The largest circle or layer, 
located at the top of the figure, represents a country’s position in the world 
economy and its trade with all other countries, which is simply an expanded view 
of trade between individual countries.  The second layer represents the same 
country and its interactions within a trade bloc.  Finally, the bottom layer shows 
the movement of its goods with another individual country.  The purpose in 
showing all of these layers is to point out that trade occurs between more than just 
individual countries, as is often assumed in economic theory.  It also demonstrates 
that countries trade in the global economy using various terms of trade, which, for 
example, could be defined as the range of tariffs that a single country applies for 
the same good to a variety of trading partners.  Thus, in practice, countries engage 
Country E
Country A
Country CCountry D
Country B
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in global trade under a multitude of scenarios, simultaneously.  While economists 
may study each layer of the figure separately, this only gives a tomographic view 
of trade and not a unified picture.  Finally, within this view, there exists a national 
border to trade, where countries are more likely to obtain goods from within their 
borders than from another country.  This is what economists have called a “home 
bias”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Simultaneous View of Trade in a Three-Dimensional Space for a 
Single Nation 
 
 There is the possibility of a second simultaneous and parallel, but not 
invisible, framework that is similar in structure to that which is organized around 
the nation-state, but it is instead based upon the geography of the trade bloc (See 
Figure 2.5).  What is unusual about this perspective, in the case of the CACM, is 
that this supranational border would only have a de facto existence, not a legal 
one.  Additionally, any relationships between the CACM and other geographic 
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units are artifacts of trade and not the result of specific initiatives.  In the case of 
another integrated trade bloc, the European Union (EU), trade agreements are 
signed with between the EU and the individual countries, so their relationship (i.e. 
the supranational boundary) is tangible in a legal sense.  Additionally, one of the 
goals of the EU has been to expand the home bias to include the entire trade bloc, 
not just an individual country.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Simultaneous View of Trade in a Three-Dimensional Space for a 
Trade Bloc 
 
We should think of countries that are members of trade blocs, as being on 
a continuum, which contains the two conditions illustrated by Figure 2.4 and 
Figure 2.5.  The condition represented by Figure 2.4 would be a country that is a 
member of a trade bloc, but one that has only relinquished the minimal amount of 
sovereignty necessary to make the trade bloc work.  The members of the North 
 25
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provide a good example of countries 
following this philosophy.  Figure 2.5 reflects a condition where a significant 
amount of country’s sovereignty has been given away, so that the nation-state 
begins to diminish to a secondary role, while the multinational institution acquires 
supranational authority.  In the most extreme version of this view, the nation-state 
would cease to exist and the individual countries may produce lumpiness within a 
supra-national entity.  A country or group of countries could lie anywhere along 
this continuum, but most have chosen to exist at the least restrictive end.  
Additionally, a country or group of countries existence on the continuum is not 
static and they may change their position over time.  The EU provides a modern 
example of countries along this continuum, moving towards a strong 
supranational authority.  In the case of the CACM countries, we have seen a 
group of countries that have attempted or at least have expressed some 
willingness to attempt a move from the strong nation-state condition to a stronger 
supranational authority.   
THE WEAKENING AND DISAPPEARANCE OF THE NATION-STATE 
There is nothing particularly timely about the current concerns that the 
nation-state is disappearing.  According to Newman, these predictions go back to 
the anarchists, the federalists, and later the pluralists of the 20th Century (Newman 
1996: 9).  However, during the past four decades the nation-state’s naysayers and 
alarmists have been particularly active.  Biersteker (1981) described the more 
recent incantations of this theme as beginning during the 1960s and 1970s, when 
students of international relations challenged the idea that the state was the 
primary actor between nations.  Instead, it was argued, that transnational actors, 
primarily corporations operating in the international environment, were frequently 
operating beyond the control of the nation-state.  Although it was not proposed 
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that nation-states had loss all authority, they were, nonetheless, much more 
constrained in their attempts to implement policies and exercise control 
(Biersteker 1981, 147).  The belief that TNCs were usurping the authority of the 
state also fit nicely into Marxist thought, which maintained that the nation-state is 
“subordinate within the world capitalist system” (Biersteker 1981: 148).  Another 
popular theoretical framework during the 1970s and 1980s was dependency 
theory, which viewed less-developed countries as operating at the periphery of a 
world economic system that was dominated by industrialized countries.  By the 
beginning of the 1970s, Biersteker argued, there was a convergence of thought 
occurring among all these major theories of international relations.  The 
consensus was that TNC participation in the world economy had diminished state 
authority and this situation had become most obvious in the developing world 
(Biersteker 1981: 147-149). 
Not all researchers accepted the thesis that nation-states were increasingly 
losing their authority to TNCs.  Bergsten (1973 and 1974) believed that 
developing countries were actually reasserting control over TNCs, during the late 
1960s and 1970s.  One of the reasons for this was that countries had more 
choices, when considering TNC investment, and did not have to immediately 
agree to whatever terms they were offered.  Another position was the 
“Neomercantilist” school of thought, which countered the concept of a weakened 
state by reintroducing state power “as the central focus of the international 
political economy”.  Neomercantilist questioned whether dependency theorists 
and liberal economists had underestimated the importance of the state and pointed 
out that it was the state that created and maintained the conditions for the global 
economy not the TNCs (Biersteker 1981: 149-150).  Finally, there were other 
theorists who argued that a balance of power had come into existence between 
TNCs and the state by the late 1970s.  The power of TNCs had diminished and 
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they were only able to constrain the state when they had little invested in a 
country, its market was small, and there was no serious international competition.  
The general feeling among researchers by the early 1980s, according to 
Biersteker, was that the balance of power was shifting back to the state 
(Biersteker 1981: 151). 
In his own research on TNCs, Biersteker questioned whether the state 
really was regaining control.  He explored this question by identifying and 
discussing three strategies that nation-states in developing countries had used 
during the 1970s to regain control: indigenization; nationalization; and national 
self-reliance.  Indigenization is when a state requires that some portion of the 
assets or personnel of a TNC be locally based.  Many countries during the 1970s 
indigenized companies by requiring joint-ownership with domestic investors or 
the state and/or by requiring that part of the workforce consist of nationals and/or 
by limiting the repatriation of the company’s profits and dividends.  But, 
Biersteker argued, this strategy had little effect on companies, if they were able to 
maintain managerial control.  In fact, companies often found ways to minimize 
the effects of indigenization by spreading local ownership over many investors or 
even bribing local officials to retain control.  The nationalization of a foreign 
facility meant that a government seized ownership of the facility for its own 
production, although there was often some compensation for the property.  
Nationalization also had limited impacts because companies would minimize their 
risks by spreading the production process among many countries in a region.  
Therefore, even if a facility was nationalized, it did not produce a product that 
was readily convertible to a final good.  Additionally, developing countries 
typically did not have the managerial and technical expertise to operate these 
facilities after they nationalized them and, in some events, the original owners of 
the nationalized facility was contracted to operate it.  The final strategy is self-
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reliance, which requires a country to completely remove itself from the global 
economy, so that it can restructure and participate in the global economy on a 
more equal footing.  Biersteker points out that this strategy was not uncommon, 
during the 20th Century, and was followed by China, Albania, North Korea, and 
Cambodia.   However, it is a difficult strategy to develop and maintain and only 
those countries that are already so poorly developed that no one would miss them 
economically are allowed to withdraw.  In summary, Biersteker believed that 
TNCs were able to “penetrate the boundaries of the state”, but that the state as an 
institution was not likely to go away (Biersteker 1981: 155-172). 
More recently, the question of national sovereignty and economic 
integration was in vogue during the planning and creation of the European Union.  
Newman identified two arguments used by supporters of the EU proposal as to 
why national sovereignty should not be a concern: sovereignty was a myth; and 
sovereignty is dangerous.  With regard to the first argument, proponents argued 
that nations have never had complete sovereignty so it could not be taken away.  
Supporters of the EU also maintained that nations had been continuously losing 
sovereignty as a result of global integration; therefore, EU membership would 
simply be a continuation of this trend.  The second argument, that state 
sovereignty is dangerous, was based upon the belief that a nation will use its 
internal sovereignty as a justification for gaining absolute power, while its 
external sovereignty will be used to legitimize “aggression, expansion, and 
disregard for others in the name of a single interest defined by the state”.  Their 
response to these dangers, sovereignty’s naysayers believed, was to create 
supranational or multinational rule (Newman 1996: 9-10).   
There is a belief by some that, with economic liberalization, the power of 
the state will diminish and that economic activity will occur unfettered across 
borders.  Thus, the many hindrances to trade that are created by national borders 
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will disappear as goods and factors of production flow in a frictionless world.  
Kenichi Ohmae (1995) declared that during this current period of globalization, 
economic activity is what determines the environment in which all other 
institutions must operate and this includes governments.  He argued the state is 
incapable of dealing with the global economy because it is only comfortable when 
exerting control.  Because the nation-state cannot regulate the global economy, it 
simply gets in the way of progress and no longer serves any purpose.  Ohmae 
posited that the only logical division of the globe, at present, would be to create 
regional states formed out of “natural economic zones”, which would consist of 
large regions that do not follow national boundaries.  Equally dogmatic, Bryan 
and Farrell (1996) argued that, “capital markets constrain what the government 
can do - not the other way around.”  The current weakening of state control is 
being driven by the global capital market and market’s ability to act beyond the 
control of any state authority.  The rise of the global marketplace will eventually 
force governments to reduce their control over private firms, so these firms can 
compete internationally.  The global capital market will also limit the power of 
governments, since they will be forced to follow more responsible fiscal policies 
to avoid destabilizing their currencies (Veseth 1998: 35-37).   
There are many other arguments in the debate over globalization to 
support policies that would enhance or diminish a nation’s sovereignty.  
Postmodernists have been fixated on the concept of borders, believing that 
physical borders are now irrelevant and that individual and group identities create 
new territories in a borderless space.  A more tangible perspective maintains that 
technological advances and interdependence are undermining national 
sovereignty (O’Dowd, Corrigan, and Moore 1995: 273).  This argument is 
particularly compelling when one considers the changes that have occurred in the 
world’s financial markets.  Current technology permits huge amounts of financial 
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capital to be moved across national borders with governments having little or no 
control over the flow.   Many see this activity in the world financial markets as a 
significant threat to national sovereignty (Makler and Less 2002: 831-832).  Some 
even believe that world capital market powers have become stronger than national 
governments (Hirst and Thompson 1996:175-176).  Finally, transnational 
environmentalist groups forward a position that nation-states have lost their 
authority to control TNCs and that global competition for capital has encouraged 
countries to make their environmental regulations more lax.  Environmentalists 
say this has created a “race to the bottom”, or a competition between countries to 
provide the least restrictive environment possible (Burtless et al. 1998: 115).  
Many environmentalists also believe that environmental problems can only be 
addressed from a global or regional perspective, which means the nation-state 
framework is incapable of solving them (Storey 2001: 115). 
Defending the Nation-State in the Global Economy 
The previous section identified many of the concerns vocalized by 
opponents to globalization and, among these concerns is a consistent belief that 
national sovereignty is being stripped away by a nation’s involvement in the 
global economy.  But, in reality, no nation can reasonably expect to exercise 
complete control over all domestic matters without any influence from external 
factors, if it is at all engaged in the global economy: 
Unless a country is completely isolated from the rest of the world, any 
sovereignty it enjoys is bound to be constrained, in the sense that whatever 
decisions it chooses to take are, to some extent, influenced by forces 
beyond its jurisdiction (Dunning 1993: 529 quoted in Jeffrey 1999:23). 
  
Kobrin (1997) forwarded a similar position when they said,  
State autonomy has never been absolute and decision making power has 
always been constrained by international economic transactions; the trade-
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off between the efficiency gains from cross-border economic activity and 
lost autonomy is far from new (Kobrin 1997: 155 citing Keohane and Nye 
1989: 248). 
 
Likewise, Arnon and Weinblatt said, “in most cases sovereign decision-makers 
are restricted by many factors including the behavior of other decision-makers” 
(Arnon and Weinblatt 2001: 304).  So, as each of these authors have pointed out, 
there is nothing unique or recent about sovereign nation-states being influenced 
by other nation-states or even non-governmental entities, because external forces 
have always had some influence on rulers and nation-states.  In fact, it is 
somewhat bewildering that opponents of globalization would argue that a nation-
state should experience no hindrances in its pursuit of total self-interest.  Jeffrey’s 
belief that a country’s well being is undeniably bound by its mutual interests with 
other states is an accurate one.  Rather than causing harm, states can improve their 
own well being by coordinating efforts with other states at the national and 
international level (Jeffrey 1999: 23).   
Although nation-states willingly engage in the global economy and 
surrender some sovereignty, Jeffrey contends that nation-states are extremely 
reluctant to give their sovereignty away, because sovereignty is considered to be 
empowerment.  Likewise, when nation-states do give up sovereignty, they are 
perceived as having become weaker (Jeffrey 1999: 21).  But, the paradox of trade 
is that a country can produce a net gain of sovereignty if it selectively and 
strategically lets some go of it.  Hobbes had noted that there were mutual benefits 
to be gained if men were willing to agree to a mutual relinquishment of some of 
their rights, similarly nations must also be willing to give up certain rights if they 
want to create a mutually beneficial environment.   The paradox of trade also 
works in a similar reverse fashion, if a nation-state refuses to give up any rights 
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and withdraws from the international community, then it will likely end up with 
fewer rights and less prosperity (Jeffrey 1999: 21-22).   
The complement to the belief that no nation-state should be influenced by 
another nation-state or non-governmental entity is the belief that nation-states 
should possess absolute authority over their trading relationships but, as Jeffrey 
(1999) again points out, nation-states “do not have absolute and unfettered rights 
of sovereignty” and provided two reasons why this is so.  The first reason is that 
the constitutions of nation-states allow them to enter into treaties and agreements 
with other countries.  By allowing this authority, the constitution permits the 
nation-states to relinquish some sovereignty to obtain a mutual benefit.  Treaties 
and agreements give nation-states the right to participate in and be influenced by 
international law, which is the second reason why nation-states do not have 
absolute power (Jeffrey 1999: 25).2   As with the argument that nation-states 
should never be influenced by outside actors, it is equally bewildering that there 
are researchers and theorists who would argue that the nation-state should have 
absolute power.  Given the desirability of the stable, democratic nation-state, there 
are relatively few members of democratic societies who would desire a life in a 
nation-state with absolute power.  Most citizens would rather live in an 
environment where the authority of the state has limitations, which reflects Hirst 
and Thompson’s view that a state’s sovereignty in the present period is 
represented more by its ability to police than its need have complete control (Hirst 
and Thompson 1996: 190).  However, O’Dowd, Corrigan and Moore present the 
                                                 
2 Treaties and international agreements create international law, because (under the Westphalian 
Order) there is no superior power to the nation state.  However, Jeffrey notes that this system 
creates a contradiction, because it is impossible to argue that no authority exists higher than the 
nation-state, while at the same time stating there is a “higher” level of international law.  To 
address this contradiction, theorists have argued that: the sovereignties of countries fuse through 
their voluntary agreement; international law only exists as long as all parties agree to it, therefore 
the nation-state still has final authority; and Hegel and Austen’s argument that there is no such 
thing as international law, therefore there is no contradiction (Jeffrey 1999: 36).   
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most matter-of-fact argument on the matter when they wrote that a nation-state 
with absolute authority “would undermine the distinctive features, which 
separates the ‘modern’ nation-state from its medieval predecessors” (O’Dowd, 
Corrigan, and Moore 1995: 273).   
In addition to political sovereignty, there are also concerns that 
globalization is detrimental to a nation-state’s economic sovereignty.  Arnon and 
Weinblatt define economic sovereignty to include, “among other things, the 
freedom to choose economic policies” (Arnon and Weinblatt 2001: F304).  The 
freedom and authority to willingly enter into a trade agreement, without coercion 
of any type, demonstrates that a nation-state possesses and exercises “economic 
sovereignty”.  Treaties are based upon a consensus by all the member states 
(Jeffrey 1999: 31).  As Burtless et al. (1998) point out; the United States cannot 
enter into a trade agreement with another country unless elected officials (i.e. the 
President and the Senate) approve it by a vote.  Opponents are given the 
opportunity to make their case, but if they do not prevail, they cannot reasonably 
argue that the nation’s sovereignty was diminished by the willful entry into the 
agreement even if it is one they opposed (Burtless et al. 1998: 117-118).  Even 
when countries do not gain economically from a trade relationship, they still 
maintain their sovereignty because they have exercised a willful decision.  A 
country’s entry into a trading agreement never guarantees that the relationship 
will be advantageous to all parties involved.   
 Much of the concern over TNCs involvement in the global economy is the 
result of their sheer size, in terms of assets and revenues, which gives them 
significant power and ability to influence policy in multiple countries.  A popular 
assertion by globalization’s opponents, which was forwarded by Reinicke, 
contends that while TNCs are unable to gain control of a nation-state’s “legal 
internal sovereignty”, they are able to effectively challenge the “operational 
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sovereignty” of states because they prefer to function in a non territorial space 
(Reinicke 1998: 66-69).  While there is no question that TNCs try to challenge the 
nation-state to maximize their control and wealth, the truth is that TNCs must 
have nation-states to function effectively.  As Hirst and Thompson (1996) point 
out, this is because corporations benefit from the functions that only a national 
government could provide, such as trade rules, property rights, and exchange rate 
stability.  Additionally, common tariffs and trading regimes could only exist if 
two nations were willing to implement and enforce them.  The stability that exists 
in the international economy is there because countries agree to coordinate and 
align their economic policies and, for this reason, corporations want to identify 
with a nation-state.  In the case of the United States, the federal government is 
actively involved in protecting domestic producers in overseas markets, invests 
heavily in research and development, and its courts systems protects a wide range 
of legal rights.  What benefits, Hirst and Thompson ask, would there be for a 
corporation to exist in an undefined territorial space (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 
186-187)?  Critics might argue that it is hardly surprising that governments 
reinforce corporations in the world economy, since governments are subordinate 
to the capitalist system.  But, while there is an unquestionable influence from 
corporations on government policies and decisions, the state also receives a 
benefit from the economic prosperity that TNCs produce and these benefits 
should not be overlooked.  A nation-state’s legitimacy is frequently determined by 
its ability to create an environment of economic prosperity and opportunity and if 
the nation-state is unable to create this environment, its legitimacy declines, and 
the state may be removed or replaced.  Thus, TNCs contribute directly to a nation-
state’s legitimacy and, subsequently, its ability to exercise sovereignty, especially 
in democratic states. 
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 A question that is typically ignored during most discussions on trade is 
why nation-states allow their corporations to participate in the global economy at 
all.  Kobrin (1997) contends that companies in many industries are faced with the 
choice of participating in the world economy or risk going out of business.  Most 
companies face fierce competition at both the domestic and international level 
and, as their businesses grow; it becomes increasingly difficult for them to limit 
themselves to producing and selling goods solely in their own domestic market.  
At some point, most large and even many small companies must enter into the 
global economy to compete and operate profitably.  Kobrin also points out that 
industries like telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and 
aerospace require markets that are larger than even the largest of nations, to 
support the research and development they require to remain competitive (Kobrin 
1997: 155-157).  Thus, as globalization has expanded world trade, companies find 
it increasingly difficult to only operate in their domestic market. 
Opponents to globalization often argue that increased control by the state 
and/or, contradictorily, by multinational or supra-national institutions should be 
exercised to control the behaviors of TNCs and the negative impacts of 
globalization.  However, as Gómez-Buendía identified, when nations create 
international institutions to respond to possible negative consequence that might 
arise from globalization, they create an additional loss of nation-state sovereignty 
(Gómez-Buendía 1995: 27).   
THE RESILIENCE OF THE STATE 
 Despite the attacks globalization has waged on the nation-state (both real 
and contrived), the nation-state has shown remarkable resilience.  Storey (2001) 
made four arguments to counter the position that globalization is threatening the 
relevance of borders and the nation-state.  First, globalization is not a new 
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phenomenon and has actually been occurring for quite some time.  While it is 
occurring faster than it has in the past, globalization is not new and the nation-
state has yet to disappear.  On the other hand, most of the concern about 
globalization is a relatively recent development.  Second, not everyone has the 
same experience with globalization.  Globalization has had a relatively minimal 
effect on many of the poor in the developing world, so they do not perceive the 
same threats that are vocalized in the world’s industrialized countries, where the 
awareness of globalization is most acute.  Third, globalization is being actively 
resisted around the world.  This resistance may come from the regulation of 
industries or the refusal of a nation-state to join or comply with a multilateral 
agreement or by protestors in the streets.  Finally, nation-states and their borders 
serve important functions and they are not simply going to disappear.  In fact, 
most of the pressure on nations-states has simply been to reconfigure their borders 
or replace them with large state-like territories (Storey 2001: 115-122). 
Researchers are also beginning to offer empirical answers to questions on 
the true extent of globalization and, thus far, the evidence has not pointed to the 
disappearance of national borders on the nation-state.  Ceglowski (1998) reviewed 
several studies, which concentrated on the U.S.-Canadian border, and concluded, 
despite increased globalization, that borders still affect international trade.  The 
U.S.-Canadian border provides a particularly useful example for this research, 
since tariffs between the two countries are at a minimal level after ratification of 
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).  The two countries also share similar historical and cultural 
heritages, legal systems, consumer preferences, and, with the exception of 
Quebec, the two countries share a common language.  However, despite these 
similarities, the border still appears to affect trade.  Helliwell and McCallum 
(1995) estimated that Canadian provinces trade 20 times more merchandise 
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among other Canadian provinces than they do with U.S. States of equal distance 
of similar economic size.  Rogers and Jenkins (1995) found there were persistent 
price differentials between equivalent goods in both countries.  A study by Engel 
and Rogers (1996) found the U.S.-Canadian border added the equivalent of 1,780 
miles between consumer markets and to the price of consumer goods.  These 
results led Ceglowski to arrive at two conclusions: first, the U.S.-Canadian border 
has an unexpectedly large impact on trade; and second, if the effects of this border 
are so significant, then the impacts are undoubtedly larger between countries 
having greater barriers to trade (Ceglowski 1998: 17-23). 
Helliwell (1998) conducted a more comprehensive study of the U.S.-
Canadian border and OECD countries, which affirmed the results of these earlier 
studies.  He found, that in 1996, Canadian provinces were still 12 times more 
likely to trade with other provinces than with states in the United States of equal 
distance and similar economic size.  The borders between members of the 
European Union (EU) had less effect and integration was greatest between EU 
countries that spoke the same language.  International borders were also found to 
have significant effects on trade between developing countries and some of these 
countries were over 100 times more likely to trade within their borders than 
across them.  The average effect of borders on OECD countries, with an average 
per capita income, was shown at a factor of 20.  The results of these border effects 
prevented an equalization of prices and, as a result, goods were priced higher or 
lower in one country than in the other.  Helliwell also found similar results for 
capital and labor movements, with both factors being more likely to flow within 
countries than between them. 
Finally, opponents to globalization cannot continuously extrapolate 
current conditions and policy initiatives into the future.  A country’s attitude 
towards the openness of its borders is not static and it will make adjustments 
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according to the perceived risk.  When the environment is peaceful and there are 
opportunities for trade, then countries will typically allow their borders to become 
more permeable.  However, in regions where there is the potential for conflict or 
conflict already exists, functional countries are more likely to limit the flow of 
people and goods.  Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York 
City and Washington D.C., the United States government followed a border 
policy that reflected the first scenario.  The country’s emphasis at that time was 
on making the process of crossing the border quicker and easier, while security 
concerns focused primarily on illegal drug interdiction and smuggling, along with 
slowing the flow of illegal immigration.  Since the September 11th attacks, the 
United States has completely changed its view of its borders.  The United States 
no longer believes that it is operating in a generally safe environment.  On the 
contrary, the country now sees itself as being in a very dangerous world filled 
with significant and imminent threats.  The U.S. government’s view of borders 
has changed and its borders are now viewed as serving a protective function first, 
while the role of encouraging trade has become a secondary.  Consider the 
reorganization of the former U.S. Customs Department in the Department of 
Treasury to a new agency that is called “Customs and Border Protection” under 
the “U.S. Department of Homeland Security”. 
Summary 
The nation-state is a relatively recent creation in human history that began 
functioning during the 17th Century.  Prior to its foundation, human governance 
evolved through a series of changes which included: the development of territorial 
boundaries during the Persian and Roman empires; the transition of absolute 
authority from the Church to secular governments; the precise delineation of 
territories; and the consolidation of territories into single units ruled by a single 
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leader with absolute authority.  A nation-state’s sovereignty also became 
dependent upon external forces, which provided recognition of a nation-state’s 
authority over its own territory.   
This concept of recognizing another state’s authority over its territory first 
came into practice as a result of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.  Another 
practice introduced by that treaty was a parsimonious system of international law, 
which only required nation-states to give up the minimal amount of authority 
necessary to reach a mutual goal.  During the 20th Century, the Westphalian view 
of world order was challenged by the creation of the United Nations, which 
developed a multinational body that planned and implemented global policies.  
The UN has even created the authority to temporarily replace the state, in nations 
where national rule has broken down.  However, at present, it is unclear whether 
the world’s nation-states have truly transitioned from the Westphalian Order 
paradigm to the United Nation’s paradigm or whether the United Nations is 
simply a temporary experiment. 
Once the nature of the nation-state and the meaning of national 
sovereignty are understood, along with the realization that external actors are a 
critical element in the development of national sovereignty, then it is a logical 
extension to consider the interactions of nation-states in the global community.  
Because nation-states are based upon a territorial existence, it is unavoidable that 
they interact with one another, particularly along their contiguous boundaries.  
These boundaries between nation-states serve three primary functions: they 
demonstrate a state’s ability to define its territory and protect itself from unwanted 
intrusions; they divide regions that are inherently unique and could not be forced 
together; and they offer opportunities for interactions and, perhaps, the most 
useful interaction is trade.  But while borders offer opportunities for trade, they 
can create a variety of hindrances as well.  Thus, the role of borders as a meeting 
 40
point between countries, along with the conflicting interactions that occur at these 
locations, make international borders a logical unit for the analysis of trade.    
When thinking about trade between countries and in the context of 
national sovereignty, it is also practical to realize that these relationships are more 
complex than simply one country trading with another.  In reality, a country’s 
trading arrangements often consist of relationships within regional trading blocs 
and other types of multinational agreements.  Therefore, the sophisticated trading 
patterns of the present environment are not fully captured by many of the 
traditional trade theories. 
As the globalization of trade has become more prevalent over the past four 
decades, some researchers and pundits have developed a large volume of 
literature, which contends that the nation-state has been significantly weakened.  
Much of this loss of sovereignty, they maintain, has been caused by transnational 
corporations.  These people are particularly concerned that the national 
sovereignty of nation-states in the developing world is being stripped away by 
multinational trade institutions and TNCs.  Critics of this argument have pointed 
to a resurgence of state authority and have argued that TNCs can no longer 
challenge the state as they have in the past.  Others interested in globalization 
have argued that: the nation-state no longer serves a useful function in a global 
economy and should be abolished; that new borders are being formed based upon 
identities, rather than geography; that technological advances in the world 
financial markets have diminished national authority; and that the Earth’s 
environmental problems can no longer be solved under the nation-state paradigm. 
 Despite these and many other concerns about the future of the nation-state, 
it is highly unlikely that the nation-state is in danger of disappearing.  This is 
because even the perceived threats, such as TNCs and global financial markets, 
need nation-states to provide a stable environment to function.  It is also 
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unrealistic for opponents of globalization to expect a nation-state to exist in a 
global community without some influence from outside sources, whether they are 
other nation-states, private organizations or multinational institutions.  Opponents 
to globalization have also argued that nation-states should have complete control 
over their domestic affairs, but it is doubtful that most citizens of democratic 
countries would prefer such an imperious state.  Recently, researchers have begun 
to examine national boundaries to better understand the effects of globalization.  
Thus far, their studies have shown that as trade has been liberalized, national 
borders have not disappeared, but there are still lingering questions about how 
trade affects the nation-state.   
Now that the theoretical foundations for this study have been put forth, the 
next chapter of this report will turn to the study area and provide the reader with 
an overview of the Central American region.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REGION 
 
During the 20th Century, Central America has twice come to the forefront 
of the general population’s attention in the United States.  The first time was 
during the planning and building of the Panama Canal and the second was during 
the 1980s with the disturbances in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and, to a lesser degree, 
Guatemala.  Since the end of the Cold War and the implementation of the region’s 
peace agreements during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Central America has 
since again acquired a low profile in the American conscience.  However, the 
countries of Central America have taken advantage of this relatively peaceful 
period to grow their economies and their foreign trade, both within the region and 
extra-regionally.  Still, many people do not know the Central American region 
well, including those who have an interest or who conduct research in other parts 
of Latin America.  Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to provide readers 
with a broad overview of the five countries of the Central American Common 
Market so that they will have a basic understanding of the region’s characteristics.  
This chapter will discuss Central America’s geography and climate, languages 
and cultures, history, population and macroeconomic characteristics, and its 
transportation network.  
Geography and Climate 
The countries of the CACM are located on the Central American isthmus, 
which connects the Continents of North America and South America (See Figure 
3.1).  To the east, the isthmus is bordered by the Caribbean Sea and to its west 
lays the Pacific Ocean.  The climate is tropical, but temperatures are primarily 
determined by elevation.  Much of the isthmus is covered with rugged mountains, 
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hills, and escarpments, but portions of the coastal region consist of low plains, 
rolling hills, and intermontane basins (Kennedy 1985: 11). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  The Countries of the Central American Common Market 
 
 The Central American Common Market consists of five independent 
nations: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.  In 
addition to the Central American mainland, there are a number of small islands on 
the coasts of these countries that form part of their territories.  Most notable are: 
the Bay Islands, which lie off the coast of Honduras; the Maiz (Corn) Islands, 
which lie off the coast of Nicaragua; San Andrés and Providencia which lie off 
Nicaragua’s Caribbean Coast and are under Colombian control; and several small 
islands under Salvadoran and Honduran control in the Gulf of Fonseca. 
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 Nicaragua has the largest land area of the Central American countries with 
129,494 square kilometers of territory, followed by Honduras, Guatemala, and 
Costa Rica (See Table 3.1).  El Salvador, Central America’s smallest country, has 
a land area of only 20,720 square kilometers or less than one-sixth the size of 
Nicaragua.  The highest point in Central America is Volcan Tajumulco in 
Guatemala, which is 4,211 m (13,816 feet), while the lowest point in each of the 
countries is sea level. 
 
Table 3.1: Geographic Characteristics of the CACM Countries 
 
Country Capital Land Area Coastline Highest Point Lowest Point 
Costa Rica San José 50,660 sq km 1,290 km Cerro Chirripo 
3,810 m 
Pacific Ocean  
0 m 
El Salvador San 
Salvador 
20,720 sq km 545 km Cerro El Pital 
2,730 m 
Pacific Ocean  
0 m 
Guatemala Guatemala 
City 
108,430 sq km 400 km Volcan Tajumulco 
4,211 m 
Pacific Ocean  
0 m 
Honduras Tegucigalpa 111,890 sq km 820 km Cerro Las Minas 
2,870 m 
Caribbean Sea 
0 m 
Nicaragua Managua 129,494 sq km 910 km Mogoton  
2,438 m 
Pacific Ocean  
0 m 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency.  CIA World Factbook, 2000. 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html 
 
CLIMATE 
 South of the Tropic of Cancer, elevation is the single most important 
determinant of temperature.  Locations below 1000 m. in elevation are called the 
tierra caliente, those between 1000 and 2000 m. are called the tierra templada, 
and areas above 2000 m. are called the tierra fría, because they are relatively 
cold.  In the tierra caliente, which includes the coastal plains, adjacent foothills, 
and low interior depressions, the average yearly temperatures range between 25° 
and 30° C or between 20° and 25° C.  Temperatures in the tierra templada, which 
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contains the lower tropical highlands, intermediate mountain slopes, and much of 
the Central American plateau, range from 15° and 20° C.  The tierra fria, of which 
there is only a small portion in Central America (primarily the upper Guatemalan 
plateau and some mountain peaks), has an average temperature of less than 15° C 
and frosts can be common between the months of November and February.  The 
warmest period in Central America is between March and May, while the summer 
months are somewhat cooler because of the region’s rainy season (Vivó 1964: 
188 and 198-199). 
Generally, Central America’s rainfall is seasonal and the most rain usually 
falls between the months of May and October, while the drier period usually 
occurs between December and April.  Within these rainy and dry seasons, 
typically, September is Central America’s wettest month and March its driest but 
there can be variations to this pattern.  For example, the Caribbean coastal area, 
extending from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico to Panama, receives 
rainfall throughout the year (Vivó 1964: 201-203).  The greatest amount of annual 
rainfall in Central America occurs along Nicaragua’s Caribbean coast, which 
receives up to 381 cm (150 inches) of rain a year (Kennedy 1985: 53).   
NATURAL DISASTERS 
 Located in a tropical climate between two continents and bordered by two 
warm oceans, the Central American isthmus is susceptible to a number of natural 
disasters, including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tropical storms.  Given 
the region’s lack of resources and the remoteness of much of its territory, these 
events can have devastating effects on the Central American population.   Not 
only have many lives been lost, but these events also destroy crops that are critical 
for the region’s export trade and national income, damage and destroy desperately 
needed infrastructure, and sap the countries’ national reserves.   
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The Central American region experiences significant tectonic activity 
because there are five lithospheric or tectonic plates in the region that are moving 
in various directions (Weyl 1980: 279-282).  During the 20th Century, there were 
five earthquakes in Central America that killed more than 1,000 people and the 
worst of these was the Guatemalan earthquake of 1976, which killed 23,000 
people (National Earthquake Information Center 2003).  Central America’s 
tectonic activity has also created a chain of more than 250 volcanoes that runs 
down the Pacific Rim of the isthmus, many of which are presently active 
(Kennedy 1985: 10).  There are active volcanoes are located in each of the CACM 
countries, with the exception of Honduras and, during the 19th and 20th Centuries, 
there have been two major volcanic eruptions.  In 1835, the Nicaraguan volcano 
Cosiguina erupted, but caused no more than 10 deaths and, in 1902 the 
Guatemalan volcano Santa María erupted, killing more than 5,000 people 
(Sigurdsson 2000: 260).   
The Central American region is also prone to tropical storms, including 
hurricanes from the Atlantic.  During the past 50 years, Central America has been 
hit by two severe hurricanes.  The first was Hurricane Fifi, which struck Honduras 
in 1974 and killed 8,000 people.  The second hurricane and, perhaps the most 
severe to ever strike Central America in terms of loss of life, was Hurricane Mitch 
in 1998.  Hurricane Mitch killed more than 11,000 people and left millions of 
people homeless.  The economic damage from Mitch surpassed $5 billion ($4 
billion in Honduras alone) and almost completely destroyed the infrastructure of 
Honduras, as well as many of the region’s export crops (National Climatic Data 
Center 1999).   
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Language and Culture 
Linguistically and ethnically, Central America is a surprisingly diverse 
region.  While the conquering Spanish and the subsequent governments did much 
to destroy Central America’s diversity, it still remains partially intact.  The 
region’s lingering ethnic diversity has also become an important political factor 
because throughout the region’s history it has complicated the nation-building 
process, particularly in Guatemala. 
LANGUAGES 
Most people living in the five CACM countries speak only Spanish.  
However, in many parts of Central America there are people who are fluent in 
Spanish, yet continue to speak and use their native Indian or Creole tongues.  
Newer generations of indigenous peoples in Central America, whose parents have 
become more assimilated into the Spanish culture, tend to use Spanish more than 
their native language (Kluck 1983: 56).  Overall, the number of people speaking 
indigenous languages is declining and some Central American languages have 
now become extinct.   
The level of linguistic diversity varies by country, but given its large 
Indian population, it is not surprising that the peoples of Guatemala speak almost 
two-dozen different Indian languages (See Table 3.2).  Most of Guatemala’s 
indigenous languages are Mayan-based, with the exception of the Xinca 
languages (now extinct) and the Black Carib.  There are several indigenous 
languages spoken in Honduras, such as: Jicaque, Lenca, Paya, Black Carib, and 
Miskito.  Among these languages, Black Carib and Miskito have the largest 
populations of speakers.  The Black Carib language (called Garifuna in Belize and 
Guatemala) is a Carib-based Creole, while the Miskito language is a Creole based 
on Bahwika, containing elements of West African languages, Spanish, English, 
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and German (Esheverri-Gent 1995: 97-98).  Miskito speakers are also found in 
Nicaragua, along with some speakers of the Sumu and Matagalpa languages.  
There are few speakers of native languages in El Salvador or Costa Rica, although 
some Salvadorans continue to use the Nahuatl languages (Aztec-based) (Suárez 
1983: xvi-xvii).  The other languages that once existed in these two countries have 
now become extinct.  Many of the blacks living along Central America’s 
Caribbean coast speak a Jamaican dialect of English and are found on the Islas de 
Bahía in Honduras, along the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, and in the Limón 
Province of Costa Rica.  (Esheverri-Gent 1995: 100 and Kaplan 1983: 91).   
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Table 3.2: Present Day Indian Languages in Central America 
 
Country Language 
Costa Rica Mangue (extinct) 
  
El Salvador Nahuatl languages, Pipil 
 El Salvador Lenca (extinct) 
  
Guatemala Chicomuceltec 
 Itzá 
 Lacandón 
 Chol 
 Chortí 
 Chuj 
 Kanjobal 
 Jacaltec 
 Acatec 
 Mam 
 Teco 
 Ixil 
 Aguacatec 
 Quiché 
 Cakchiquel 
 Tzutuhil 
 Sacapultec 
 Sipacapa 
 Uspantec 
 Pokoman-Pocomchí 
 Kekchí 
 Xinca Languages (extinct) 
 Black Carib (Garifuna) 
  
Honduras Jicaque from El Palmar (extinct) 
 Jicaque from La Flor 
 Honduras Lenca 
 Paya 
 Black Carib (Garifuna) 
 Miskito 
  
Nicaragua Subtiaba (extinct) 
 Mangue (extinct) 
 Miskito 
 Sumu 
 Matagalpa 
 
Source: Suárez, Jorge A.  The Mesoamerican Indian Languages.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983: xvi-xvii. 
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ETHNICITIES 
 Most of the inhabitants of Central America are a mixture of Spanish and 
indigenous ancestry or what Latin Americans typically call mestizo.  This mestizo 
identify is generally accepted by people throughout the isthmus, with the 
exception of the Costa Ricans.  Approximately 95 percent of Costa Ricans 
identify themselves as being of European descent, although most of them have 
some indigenous ancestry.  In fact, most Costa Ricans identify themselves as 
“White” and this Costa Rican “whiteness” has been an intrinsic part of the 
country’s identity since the middle of the 19th Century (Kaplan 1983: 90, 93). 
Although the majority of the Central American population has at least 
some Spanish ancestry, there are still many native Indians living in the region.  
The largest populations are in found Guatemala, but there are others found in 
Honduras and Nicaragua.  In El Salvador and Costa Rica, on the other hand, the 
indigenous peoples have almost been entirely assimilated into the larger 
population.  Throughout its history, there have been conflicts in Central America 
between the Spaniards and the indigenous people that have created uprisings and 
crackdowns, as the Spanish population has attempted to control and, in some 
cases, eliminate the Indians of Central America.  However, even without this 
violence, the indigenous populations have declined in number as they have 
assimilated into the mainstream Spanish culture by marrying mestizos, speaking 
Spanish, converting to non-indigenous religions, adopting Western dress, and 
entering into formal sector jobs (Kluck 1983: 43-44). 
Among the indigenous peoples of Central America, the Mayan Indians 
make up the largest indigenous group and, in Guatemala, they form more than 40 
percent of the country’s population (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 1996: 14).  
Guatemalan Mayans live within in a wide swath of the country’s Highlands from 
the northwest to the south.  Most of the country’s Mayan-speaking Indians are 
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poor and despite their numbers, they hold little of Guatemala’s economic or 
political power (Kluck 1983: 50-53).  Mayans also live in Honduras and have 
settled primarily in the Honduran Departments of Copán and Ocotepeque 
(Escheverri-Gent 1995: 97-98). 
Smaller groups of indigenous peoples live in all the countries, except El 
Salvador.  Who remain in El Salvador are people with an Indian cultural or racial 
background living in the country’s western departments, but there is not a 
culturally or ethnically distinct community (Helms 1990: 53-54).  In Costa Rica, 
there are the Talamanca, who are composed of two subgroups: the Bribri and the 
Cabécare.  There are also the Guatuso Indians, but in 1970, fewer than 200 of 
them remained (Kluck 1983: 90-93).  In Honduras’ largest indigenous group is 
the Lenca, according to Esheverri-Gent, who are located in the west and 
southwestern interior of the country.  However, they have largely assimilated into 
Honduran society and speak Spanish instead of their indigenous language.  The 
Chorotega are another Honduran Indian group that speaks Spanish, but have 
maintained some of their culture and religion.  They now live in the Department 
of Choluteca.  There are also some Pipil Indians living in the northeast coastal 
regions of Honduras and small populations of Tol or Jicaque Indians living in 
isolated areas of mountainous rain forests in the country (Esheverri-Gent 1995: 
96-100).  In Nicaragua, there are small indigenous groups called the Sumu and the 
Rama.   The Monimbó, Subtiava, and Matagalpan Indians also live in the country, 
but these groups have become highly assimilated into the mainstream Spanish 
culture (Gilbert 1994: 65-66). 
Central America has a sizeable black population, which is made up of 
several subgroups.  The Black Caribs (or Garifuna) are descendants of freed 
Caribbean slaves and the native Carib of St. Vincent Island.  They live in 
Honduras, primarily on the Islas de Bahía and northern Honduran coast, as well as 
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along the Caribbean Coast of Guatemala.  Black Caribs speak a Carib Creole and 
have distinct cultural attributes (Esheverri-Gent 1995: 98-100 and Kluck 1983: 
51-53).  Another black subgroup is the Miskitos Indians whose ethnicity is based 
upon a mixture of indigenous, African, and European origins.  Nicaragua has the 
largest population of Miskito Indians, where they live primarily in the country’s 
Atlantic coastal regions (Gilbert 1994: 65-66).  Honduras also has a Miskito 
population, which is concentrated in the northeastern part of the country.  
Between the Black Carib and the Miskito populations, the Black Caribs maintain 
more African elements but the Miskitos are largely considered indigenous, while 
the Black Caribs are considered blacks (Esheverri-Gent 1995: 96-100).  English-
speaking blacks in Costa Rica, who are primarily of Jamaican descent, mostly live 
in the country’s Limón Province along the Caribbean Coast and many of them 
work in the banana industry (Kaplan 1983: 90-93).  El Salvador’s black 
population has become sufficiently integrated so that there is no culturally or 
ethnically distinct black community in the country (Helms 1990: 53-54). 
In addition to the mestizo, indigenous, and black populations, there are 
other, smaller ethnic groups living in Central America.  For example, there is a 
small Chinese populace in Costa Rica, which worked as railroad laborers during 
the 19th Century and now lives mostly in the San José area (Kaplan 1983: 90-93).  
Honduras has a small population of Arab immigrants, who have maintained some 
cultural identity but are actively assimilated into the society and economy 
(Esheverri-Gent 1995: 98-100).  During earlier periods of Central America’s 
history, there have been immigrants from Europe and North America who have 
come to the region.  However, while they may continue to speak their traditional 
languages and maintain some customs, these groups have assimilated into the 
larger culture of Central Americans. 
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Regional History 
PRE-COLUMBIAN AND CONQUEST 
The general consensus among anthropologists is that Western 
Hemispheric settlement occurred as humans crossed a land bridge at what is now 
the Bering Strait and migrated southward though North America, the Central 
American isthmus, and finally into South America.  The first known human 
inhabitation of Central America, from archeological records, is thought to have 
occurred around 3000 B.C. (Haggerty 1990: 4), but may have been sooner.  In 
addition to the Mayans, indigenous populations that occupied Central America 
when the Spanish arrived were thought to have entered the region from Mexico 
and Colombia (Haggerty and Millet 1995: 4-5).   
Central America’s Mayans were a highly advanced culture that extended 
from the Yucután peninsula and Chiapas of Mexico, through Guatemala and into 
western Honduras.  The rise of the Mayan culture began around the first 
millennium A.D. and reached its height between 600 A.D. and 900 A.D.  The 
Mayans are best known for their accomplishments in astronomy, mathematics, 
and art, as well as their written language, which was based upon a system of 
hieroglyphics.  Economically, the Mayans depended on agriculture and some 
trade, although they did not use the wheel nor did they domesticate animals for 
work.  The Mayan religion was a focal point of the culture and its priest and 
ruling class occupied its major cities, which included Tikal in Guatemala and 
Copán in Honduras.  The Mayan peasant class, on the other hand, lived in small 
villages and farmed the countryside.  There is no firm agreement on what caused 
the eventual decline of the Mayan empire, but when the Spanish arrived, it was 
suffering from economic underdevelopment, a lack of technological innovation, 
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and war with Indian groups from Mexico (Woodward 1999: 12-14 and Black and 
Needler 1983: 5-6). 
Other indigenous populations living in Central America, before the 
Spaniards arrived, are believed to have been related to the Toltecs of Central 
Mexico, called the Chorotega, and the Pipil Indians, who spoke Nahuatl and were 
related to the Aztecs.  The Chorotega settled in Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica, while the Pipil were found in parts of El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.  
The Nahaus were another small Aztec-related tribe that lived in Costa Rica and 
were the group from which the Pipil were formed.  From Colombia, the Chibcha 
became the root of several different Indian groups living in Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica.  Other Indian groups found in prehistoric Central America 
included the Lenca, the Jicaque, the Sumu, the Caribs, the Corobicícs and the 
Quiché (Haggerty 1990: 4-5; Rinehart 1983: 5-6; Haggerty and Millet: 4-5; and 
Brás 1994: 4-6). 
The first contact between the indigenous populations of Central America 
and Europeans occurred during the last voyage of Christopher Columbus.  His 
ships had taken shelter off the coast of Costa Rica during a storm near present day 
Puerto Limón, where Columbus made contact with the Carib Indians who wore 
gold jewelry that he was able to acquire through trading.  This event would later 
lead to the country being named the “Rich Coast” and numerous attempts to find 
these precious metals, but in reality there was little gold to be found in Costa Rica 
(Rinehart 1983: 6).   
The conquest of Central America occurred over a period rather than 
during a single campaign.  A number of Spanish conquistadors moved into the 
region to extract any gold and silver they could find and, after subjugating the 
Indians, converted them to Christianity and developed new cities.  Although they 
encountered initial resistance, the Spaniard’s technological superiority allowed 
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them to conquer most of the Indians, although there were pockets of fierce 
resistance that lasted for decades, such as in Costa Rica (Rinehart 1983: 8-10).  
The effect of the Spanish conquest on the indigenous populations of Central 
America was disastrous.  The indigenous populations were decimated by 
European diseases, for which they had no natural immunity, wars of conquest, 
and Spanish enslavement.  The enslavement of Central American Indians was 
widespread and many were taken from their villages to be used as labor for 
Spanish mining and agriculture.  As an example of the scale by which this 
displacement occurred, between 1528 and 1540, approximately 200,000 
Nicaraguan Indians were enslaved and sent to Peru to work in the Spanish mines 
(Brás 1994: 8). 
COLONIAL PERIOD 
 As the Spanish gained control of various regions of Central America they 
began to rule it, which included the implementation of their bureaucracy.  The 
Central American region as a whole became known as the Audencia of Guatemala 
or Kingdom of Guatemala and it was part of the Vice-royalty of New Spain.  The 
Audencia was ruled by a group of five men, headed by a governor who had 
administrative, military, and judicial authority and was appointed by the King.  
The first capital of the Audencia was in Gracias, Honduras (1544), wherefrom it 
was moved to Antigua, Guatemala in 1549.  It was moved again to Guatemala 
City, its final location, in 1776 after an earthquake had destroyed Antigua three 
years earlier.  In addition to the Audencia, Spanish regional government and 
leadership was further divided into provinces, which were led by alcaldes or 
mayors and, at the local level, there were councils called ayuntamientos. The 
ayuntamientos were known to operate with considerable disregard for edicts sent 
down from higher levels of government (Brás 1994: 8-9).  During Central 
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America’s colonial rule, most of the population growth occurred in Guatemala 
and El Salvador, while Honduras and Costa Rica were especially under populated 
(Haggerty and Millet 1995: 10; and Rinehart 1983: 12). 
 Throughout the New World, the Spaniards created a mercantile economy 
whose role was to generate wealth for the Spanish crown.  In Central America, 
this was achieved primarily through agricultural production, along with some 
mining activity, although the region was not especially rich in precious metals as 
were Mexico and Peru.  In fact, most of the mining in Central American was 
limited to Honduras.  Over time, agriculture in colonial Central America 
transitioned from subsistence to export-oriented production, initially, operating 
under the encomienda system.  Under this system, the Spanish crown issued land 
grants and the Indians who worked on these holdings were required to pay 
tributes to the landowners.  The encomienda system produced widespread 
opportunities for abuse against the Indians, so it was later replaced by the 
repartamiento system during the late 16th and the 17th Century.  The 
repartamiento system sought to protect the Indians by allowing representatives of 
the King to regulate the work and living conditions of the Indians, but the system 
did little to improve their situation.  Farming for consumption within the region 
consisted of growing various foodstuffs, as well as substantial cattle ranching in 
countries like Honduras.  Export crops included cacao during the latter half of the 
16th Century through the 17th Century, while indigo became a primary export crop 
during the 18th Century.  The overall result of the Spaniard’s mercantile system 
was the creation of a stagnant economy that was export-driven and based upon 
few landowners, a large labor class that consisted primarily of Indians, and a 
small artisan class (Haggerty 1990: 5-7; and Haggerty and Millet 1995: 9-11).   
 In addition to the violence the Spaniards brought to the indigenous peoples 
of Central America, they too experienced significant violence at the hands of 
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English, French, and Dutch pirates along the Caribbean coast and even inland.  
Pirate attacks on Central America began in the late 16th and continued through the 
early 19th Century.  In Nicaragua, buccaneers captured and destroyed Granada, 
while others destroyed the Honduran port of Trujillo, closing the port for more 
than 100 years.  In Costa Rica, pirates were active along the Pacific and Atlantic 
coasts and destroyed various port cities.  Even Guatemala experienced their 
wrath.  In addition to the human casualties, the other effect of the pirate attacks 
was to prevent export trade, which subsequently had major impacts on the 
domestic economies of the region.  Great Britain supported many of these pirate 
attacks in Central America as a means of challenging Spanish hegemony, as well 
as an extension of Anglo-Iberian hostilities in Europe.  The British also began 
colonizing parts of Honduras along the Caribbean coast and the Islas de la Bahiá, 
despite Spanish rule, and traded in lumber and pitch.  The British further harassed 
the Spanish by providing support to the Miskito Indians who attacked the Spanish 
in Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica (Haggerty and Millet 1995: 11-12; 
Rinehart 1983: 14-15; Black and Needler 1983: 13-14; and Brás 1994: 9).  
 Another major event during the colonial period was the development of 
the conservative and liberal conflict in Spain, which eventually spilled over into 
Central America.  The War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714) was the origin of 
the conflict, when the Bourbons replaced the Hapsburgs.  The Hapsburgs had 
supported a mercantile system of trade, while the Bourbons supported a free-
market style system.  In this debate, those with more entrenched economic 
interests generally became known as conservatives, while those landowners 
involved in less traditional crops or who wanted to modernize the economy 
became known as liberals.  Over time, the Catholic Church became associated 
with the conservatives, which led the liberals to take on an anti-clerical stance 
(Brás 1994: 10; and Black and Needler 1983: 14). 
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INDEPENDENCE AND THE FEDERATION OF STATES 
 The events leading to Central American independence actually began in 
1808 when Napoleon Bonaparte forced Spain to crown his brother Joseph as 
King.  This act created a widespread revolt within Spain and the Spanish colonies 
refused to accept the legitimacy of Joseph.  In response to Napoleon’s control, an 
exiled parliament of Spanish loyalist went to Cáldiz, Spain and ratified a new 
constitution.  But when Ferdinand VII was later returned to the throne in 1814, he 
refused to recognize the liberal constitution that had been enacted by the 
parliament in 1812.  This act and others ultimately led to a Spanish revolution in 
1820 that restored that constitution.  On April 10, 1821, Mexico declared 
independence from Spain and at first Gabino Gaínza, who was the acting 
governor of the Audencia, resisted calls for Central American independence, but 
he finally acquiesced after sensing that the majority of the populace wanted it.  On 
September 15, 1821, Gaínza declared independence for the Federation of Central 
America and then declared himself President (Black and Needler 1983: 14-15). 
 Even with independence, there was not widespread support for the 
Federation.  Chiapas, which was the sixth province of the Central American 
Audencia, was kept under Mexican control (Brás 1994: 13).  El Salvador and 
Honduras were concerned about Guatemalan influence in the union and El 
Salvador even went so far as to send a delegation to the United States to negotiate 
possible statehood (Black and Needler 1983: 15: and Haggerty and Millet 1995: 
13).  To further complicate matters, for a brief period after the Captaincy of 
Guatemala had declared independence from Spain, Central America came under 
the control of Emperor Agustin Iturbide of Mexico.  He ordered the Central 
American provinces to submit to his rule and become part of the Mexican empire 
(Rinehart 1983: 17).  But there was resistance to Iturbide, which included an 
uprising in El Salvador that was put down by Mexican troops (Haggerty 1990: 7).  
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In Costa Rica, inhabitants fought a short civil war, between those who wanted to 
join Mexico and those who wanted an independent Central American union or 
Costa Rica.  It was those who wanted independence that ultimately won the war 
(Rinehart 1983: 17-18).  As time progressed, Iturbide could not extend his 
authority over the entire region and finally had to relinquish control.  In 1823, he 
was overthrown in Mexico, which allowed the Central American countries to 
declare their independence once again (Haggerty and Millet 1995: 13). 
 It was on July 1, 1823, that the Central American countries made their 
second Declaration of Independence and elected Manuel José Arce of El Salvador 
as president of the Central American Federation and José Cecilio del Valle of 
Guatemala as vice-president.  A new federal constitution was drafted which 
created a federal congress and senate, but each province maintained their own 
legislative body and government.  Courts were also created in each of the 
provinces, as was a bill of rights and the abolishment of slavery (Black and 
Needler 1983: 15).  The basic arrangement of the Federation was that the 
provinces would have authority over their own internal affairs, but the Federal 
government would handle foreign relations and issues between the provinces 
(Rinehart 1983, 18) 
Peace was short lived in the Federation and, by the third Congress the 
Conservatives had gained President Arce’s support and tried installing 
conservative administrations in the provincial governments.  In Honduras, liberal 
Francisco Morazán resisted this effort and overthrew the conservative government 
of the Federation in 1829.  Morazán would later become the Federation’s elected 
president in 1830.  As a liberal, Morazán moved against the Church during his 
rule by eliminating tithes, legalizing civil marriage, and developed a system of 
public education.  In 1834, Valle (a conservative) succeeded Morazán as 
President but Valle died before taking office, so the Congress offered Morazán 
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another term.  In 1840, conservative Guatemalan José Rafael Carrera removed 
Morazán from office and sent him into exile.1  Carrera had first overthrown 
Guatemala’s provincial government and then he overthrew the Federation’s.  By 
1838, however, the Federation had already begun to break up.  The Central 
American Congress had voted to allow the provinces to secede from the Union, 
which all of them would ultimately do (Black and Needler 1983: 15-17).  El 
Salvador was the last country to leave the Central American Federation in 1841 
(Haggerty 1990: 9). 
INDEPENDENT NATIONS 
At the most general level, Central America’s history since Independence 
has been most strongly influenced by an ongoing battle between the conservatives 
and liberal parties, which has created a severely unstable environment for nation 
building.  During the 19th Century, there were numerous instances when one 
Central American country sponsored an insurrection in another Central American 
country and this activity continued into the 20th Century.  Within the environment 
they created, conservatives and liberals not only viewed each other as a threat in 
their home countries, but they also viewed with equal suspicion opposing parties 
in other countries.  Given this paranoia, it is not surprising to learn that countries 
in Central America frequently supported armed insurrections against neighboring 
countries.  Sometimes this support came through the provision of arms or by 
providing base camps, while in other cases it involved the direct participation in a 
country’s military.  Deposed opposition leaders were regularly welcomed in 
neighboring countries of the same party and allowed to plot and carry out coups 
and invasions.  This behavior was typical of all countries within the region, 
                                                 
1 Later, Morzán would go to Costa Rica to help overthrow that country’s national government and 
take power, but that did not work out and he was executed in 1842.   
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including Costa Rica, and it only served to exacerbate the violence that was 
already occurring because of domestic civil strife. 
 One of the more bizarre chapters in Central America’s history was an 
1855 invasion of Nicaragua, by a group of filibusters led by William Walker of 
Tennessee.  After forming an alliance with a group of Nicaraguan liberals who 
had been removed from power in 1853, Walker’s group attacked the ruling 
conservatives in Granada and forced the Nicaraguan army to surrender.  A new 
government was formed with liberal Patricio Rivas acting as a puppet President, 
but with Walker retaining the country’s real authority.  Once in power, Walker 
took control of the Nicaraguan army and, increasingly, the other four conservative 
governments became nervous.  Unsatisfied with indirect control, Walker 
developed aspirations for the Nicaraguan presidency and colonizing the country 
with North Americans.  At this point Rivas broke with Walker and called on El 
Salvador and Guatemala to help overthrow his government.  Walker, 
subsequently, fixed the election and became President, upon which he legalized 
slavery and made English the country’s official language (Brás 1994: 14-15). 
 Opposition to Walker was not limited to the Nicaraguans or even the other 
Central American countries.  The British supported his overthrow as a means of 
challenging United States hegemony in the region, but the United States was 
worried that Walker would seek statehood for Nicaragua and it would enter the 
Union as a new slave state.  Walker was ultimately expelled from the region in 
war that lasted from 1856 to 1857, killing several thousand Central Americans.  
But not one to go where he was welcome, Walker made four more attempts to 
regain control in Central America between 1857 and 1860, until he was finally 
executed before a Honduran firing squad, during his last attempt to retake the 
region (Brás 1994: 15-16). 
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 In addition to Walker’s incursions, there was also state-sponsored 
intervention by Great Britain and the United States.  Great Britain’s involvement 
in Central America began during the colonial period and continued into the 19th 
and the early 20th Century.  The basis for Great Britain’s claims to Central 
America was tied to the Battle of St. George’s Cay in 1798, which gave Britain 
certain rights in the region and preceded the United State’s Monroe Doctrine.  
After the fall of the Spanish, Great Britain became concerned about U.S. 
hegemony in the region, particularly since they too held a great interest in 
building a ship canal across the isthmus.  This U.S.-British rivalry even led to 
some low-level conflict between the two countries in Nicaragua (Brás 1994: 13).  
Great Britain’s meddling also included exercising control over sovereign territory 
in Central America, specifically the British controlled the Islas de la Bahía off the 
Honduran coast until 1859 and Nicaragua’s Mosquito region until 1894 (Haggerty 
and Millet 1995: 16; and Brás 1994: 12).  United States involvement in Central 
America began during the mid-19th Century and was a combination of diplomacy 
and force.  On the diplomatic front, the United States sponsored two Peace 
Conferences for the Central American countries in an effort to reduce the level of 
hostility in the region.  The first Peace Conference was held in 1907 and the 
second in 1923.  Notable events during the first conference were an attempt by 
Honduras to re-establish the Central American Union, which was rejected, and the 
creation of a Central American Court of Justice.  The 1923 Peace Conference was 
held in Washington D.C. and was marked by the United States gaining pledges 
from the Central American countries to stop supporting insurrections in 
neighboring countries.  Militarily, the United States became active in the 
Caribbean Basin after the Spanish-American War of 1898.  U.S. troops landed 
numerous times in Nicaragua and Honduras, during the first part of the 20th 
Century, and the U.S. frequently stationed warships off the Central America 
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coasts to quell revolutionary activity and support the economic interest of U.S. 
companies (Haggerty and Millet 1995: 20-26; and Brás 19-25).  In the case of 
Nicaragua, U.S. troops were permanently stationed in the country from 1912 to 
1933 to support the country’s conservative governments (Brás 1994: 20). 
 After their independence from Spain, the Central American countries went 
from filling Spain’s coffers to trading on the world market.  Given Central 
America’s lack of industrialization, the region had no choice but to concentrate on 
producing agricultural exports, along with some mining.  Coffee became the 
region’s primary agricultural export crop and the cultivation of it produced both 
wealth and problems for the region.  On the positive side, coffee provided a 
profitable source of export income, a significant source of government revenue, 
and a mechanism for financing roadway and port infrastructure improvements.  
The negative consequences of coffee cultivation were the consolidation of 
cultivatable land into increasingly fewer landowners; the de facto enslavement of 
the indigenous population to tend and harvest the crop; and the creation of a 
liberal elite of coffee growers who were willing to employ despotic tactics to 
maintain political and economic control.  It was these negative consequences of 
coffee cultivation that fueled the social unrest in many parts of the region, which, 
at times, erupted violently (Haggerty 1990: 9-13).  Bananas were another major 
Central American export crop that was developed during the 19th Century with 
similar consequences.  The crop was grown extensively in Honduras, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua, particularly along the Caribbean coast.  U.S. fruit 
growers and exporters became major political players in Central America politics 
and they directly and indirectly influenced various domestic matters.  To many 
Central Americans, these companies came to be viewed as symbols of U.S. 
imperialism. 
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Despite their disastrous experience with the Federation, there were a 
surprising number of attempts to reunify Central American after the breakup, 
which were in addition to the Honduras proposal at the 1907 Central American 
Peace Conference.  In 1872, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica 
signed a Pact of Union that was never implemented (Haggerty 1990: 13).  In 
1885, the liberal Guatemalan General Justo Rufino Barrios went so far as to raise 
an army to forcefully reunite the Central American states, but was killed at a 
battle in El Salvador (Black and Needler, 1983: 17-20).  In 1889, all five countries 
signed a pact creating the “Republic of Central America” but like the earlier Pact 
of Union, nothing came of this effort either.  In 1895, El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua signed the Pact of Amapala, which created the “Greater Republic of 
Central America” (later to be called the “United States of Central America”), 
which actually ratified a constitution that went into effect in 1898.  Although 
Guatemala and Costa Rica considered joining the Republic, they never did and 
despite strong support from liberals in all the Central American countries, the 
political realities of unification kept it from working (Haggerty 1990: 13-14). 
Democratic institutions in Central America were very weak throughout the 
19th and 20th Centuries, with free and fair elections being the exception rather than 
the rule.  Once in power, many Central American leaders assumed significant 
powers to promote their special interests and suppress opposition parties.  
Communist parties, union leaders, and activists were the most likely to be targeted 
for government suppression, particularly under the region’s conservative 
governments.  Another problem was the rapid turnover of rulers, especially during 
the 19th Century, which further added to the region’s instability.  Honduras, for 
example, had more than 20 presidents during the 1870s (Haggerty and Millet 
1995: 16).  Military leaders or juntas frequently led Central American 
governments and usually came to power after removing elected civilian leaders or 
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dictators.  During the 19th and 20th Century, armies were used to maintain 
domestic control rather than to protect the country from external threats, 
particularly in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.  Among the five countries, 
Costa Rica built the strongest democratic institutions and even fought a civil war 
in 1948, when part of the population believed that the party in power was 
usurping the democratic process.  The remaining Central American countries, 
however, developed only weak notions of the democratic process.  As Central 
America moved into a period of regional integration during the 1960s, most of its 
population lived under crushing poverty, extreme inequality, and threats of 
persecution for political opposition.  
CONTEMPORARY CENTRAL AMERICA 
If we define the contemporary period of Central America as the 1960s to 
present, it began with improving economic conditions in the region.  It was during 
the 1960s that the Central American countries implemented the CACM agreement 
and formed its supporting institutions through a series of treaties, although the 
initial movement towards a common market had begun after World War II.  
While the region began to improve economically, political conditions were far 
from perfect.  Only Costa Rica was developing a democratic tradition, while the 
rule of other countries continued to vacillate between elected leaders, military 
coups, juntas, and despots. 
Economic progress and cooperation during the 1960s, however, did not 
diminish the willingness of Central American countries to antagonize neighboring 
countries by supporting insurrections.  While direct conflict between the countries 
became less common, underlying tensions were not erased.  The 1969 Soccer War 
demonstrated how easily these tensions could manifest into armed conflict.  The 
origins of the war revolved around several issues, although one of the most 
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important causes was El Salvador’s overpopulation and its lack of adequate 
economic growth.  These conditions led to Salvadorans migrating from the 
country to look for economic opportunities elsewhere.  By the late 1960s, 
approximately 300,000 Salvadorans had moved to western Honduras, with many 
living as squatters and engaged in agriculture, while others worked as small 
entrepreneurs.  Many of the Salvadorans living in Honduras were industrious and 
relatively successful, which created feelings of resentment among the local 
Honduran population.  These feelings were intensified by Honduras’ poor 
performance in the CACM and the growing belief that El Salvador’s success in 
the agreement was occurring at Honduras’ expense.  Honduran resentment would 
turn to suspicion of the Salvadorans in their country.  As the situation intensified, 
Honduras responded to its concerns by expelling and forcefully repatriating many 
of the Salvadorans, which suddenly required El Salvador to deal with these 
refugees and created considerable outrage among the Salvadoran population.  The 
conflict reached a symbolic peak during a preliminary World Cup soccer game 
between El Salvador and Honduras, where many Honduran players and fans were 
harassed and assaulted.  It was this event that led to the conflict being called the 
“Soccer War”.  On July 14, 1969, the Salvadoran army attacked Honduras and 
pushed deeply into the country.  So deeply, in fact, that El Salvador’s frontline 
forces had trouble re-supplying their fuel and ammunition and could not push 
further.  The Honduran Air Force counterattacked and destroyed the Salvadoran 
Air Force and the war reached a stalemate.  The Organization of American States 
(OAS) negotiated a cease-fire that eventually took effect on July 20, 1969 and the 
Salvadoran army eventually withdrew, leaving behind more than 2,000 dead, 
mostly Honduran civilians.  As a result of the war and its problems in the CACM, 
Honduras withdrew from the agreement and a peace treaty with El Salvador 
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would not be signed until the early 1980s (Haggerty 1990: 24-26; and Haggerty 
and Millet 1995: 39-42). 
The Soccer War did little to improve El Salvador’s economic and political 
problems and throughout the 1970s, these issues intensified.  The influence of the 
radical left grew, with substantial support from Catholic clergy who embraced a 
philosophy of social justice called “Liberation Theology”.  As time progressed, 
the left became more active, instigating strikes and government shutdowns and 
later engaging in covert activities to destabilize the government.  The Salvadoran 
right responded by creating “death squads”, paramilitary groups that targeted left-
leaning politicians, activists, and clergy for torture and/or assassination.   The 
primary political arm of El Salvador’s left was called the Farbundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) and, in 1981 they opened a military offensive against 
the Salvadoran government.  Expecting the general population to come their aid, 
the FMLN badly underestimated support for their cause and the Salvadoran 
military was able to counter their offensive.  The Reagan Administration 
immediately began to channel military aid to the Salvadoran government, which 
had been withheld by the Carter Administration because of human rights concern.  
The Reagan Administration did not consider the Salvadoran government’s human 
rights record as a criterion for military aid; rather it viewed El Salvador as a 
significant “barrier” in the fight against communism and Soviet influence in the 
Western Hemisphere (Haggerty 1990: 26-45).  The war settled into a stalemate 
that lasted throughout the decade, but would occasional flare up, such as in 1989, 
when the FMLN attacked the country’s major cities and “psychological” targets.  
The United States continued to provide significant funding to the Salvadoran 
government and the army, while the guerillas received help from Nicaragua and 
Cuba (Moreno 1994: 31-36).  The ultimate resolution to El Salvador’s civil war 
would not come until the late-1980s, under the auspices of the Esquipulas I and II 
 68
peace accords, which led to the active participation of the FMLN in the 
Salvadoran political process (Moreno 1994: 87-94). 
The United States also became deeply involved in a response to 
Nicaragua’s 1979 revolution during much of the 1980s.  However, the origins of 
the conflict were in the 1930s, with the election of Anastasio Somoza Garcia as 
President of Nicaragua.  During the next four decades, Somoza and his family 
amassed a huge fortune from a very poor country through his consolidation of 
political, military, and economic power.  When he did not hold the office of 
President, Somoza extended his hold on power by placing trusted family friends 
in office as puppet leaders.  Dissidents of his regime were subjected to torture and 
murder and Somoza was on the receiving end of numerous assassination attempts.  
Ultimately, one succeeded and he was assassinated in 1956, but Somoza family 
control continued under the rule of his sons Luis Somoza Debayle and later 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle (Brás 1994, 25-28).       
Anastasio Somoza Debayle was the second Somozan son to hold the 
Nicaraguan presidency, with one term from 1967 to 1972 and another term that 
began in 1974.  His brother Luis Somoza Debayle had served from 1957-1963 
and was followed in office by a family friend.  It was during Anastasio’s rule that 
the Somoza family began to lose critical support from the Nicaraguan business 
sector.  One of the major events that led to this loss of support was the 1972 
Managua earthquake, which killed 5,000 people.  Somoza and his associates stole 
or channeled vast amounts of foreign disaster aid into their own coffers, while 
failing to provide adequate assistance to those who were affected by the 
earthquake.  In 1974, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) began 
insurgent activities against the Nicaraguan government and in 1977 an anti-
Somoza group was formed and began operating in Costa Rica.  Under attack by 
the FSLN, the Somoza government began to repress the population even more, 
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which included another major event in modern Nicaraguan history, the 
assassination of opposition newspaper publisher Pedro Joaquín Chamorro 
Cardenal in 1978.  In 1979, the National Patriotic Front was formed, a coalition of 
parties opposed to Somoza, which had the support of the Nicaraguan business 
sector.  Fighting broke out in March 1979 and Somoza fled to Paraguay in July of 
that year.2  The overthrow of the Somozan dynasty was far from bloodless and 
approximately 50,000 people lost their lives (Brás 1994: 25-39).    
Once Somoza was removed from power, a junta was formed which 
promised a mixed economy, political pluralism, and a non-aligned foreign policy.  
Over time, the junta, the military, and the police became increasingly controlled 
by the Sandinistas and Daniel Ortega, which led to their eventual isolation by the 
Nicaraguan business sector and the Catholic Church, which had initially been 
supportive of the overthrow.  The Reagan Administration was also strongly 
opposed to the Sandinistas and viewed them as another communist foothold in the 
Western Hemisphere.  Support was given to Nicaraguan rebels, called Contras, 
who consisted of many former Somozan supporters and military leaders, as well 
as Miskito Indians.  U.S. support for the Contras was stopped by Congress several 
times during the 1980s and secret funding of the Contras by the Reagan 
administration led to a major political scandal in 1986.  By 1987, all U.S. aid to 
the Contras was halted and the fighting had reached a stalemate (Brás 1994: 39-
47).  
 The end to Nicaragua’s conflict began in 1987 when the Costa Rican 
President Oscar Arias held a presidential summit in Esquipulas, Guatemala.  At 
that summit: an agreement was signed that gave amnesty to those charged with 
political crimes; a cease-fire was negotiated; all external aid to the insurgents was 
stopped; and democratic elections were to be held.  In March 1988, the cease-fire 
                                                 
2 Anastasio Somoza would be killed in 1980 by leftist Argentine guerillas in Paraguay. 
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between the Sandinistas and the Contras was signed and in 1989, the five 
presidents agreed upon a plan for disarming the Contras (Esquipulas II).  
Nicaragua’s elections were held in 1990 and, despite Sandinista confidence in 
Daniel Ortega as their presidential candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro was 
elected president as the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO) coalition candidate, 
with 55 percent of the vote and strong support from the Bush Administration 
(Brás 1994: 47-50).  
The third Central American conflict during the 1980s was in Guatemala 
and consisted of a low-intensity conflict during the early part of the decade, which 
aimed to prevent support for government insurgents.  The conflict was initially 
overseen by Guatemalan General Efraín Ríos-Montt, who came to power during a 
military coup in 1982.  Under Ríos-Montt’s watch, the Guatemalan army directed 
most of their efforts at indigenous Mayans who were believed to be supporting 
the country’s communist guerillas.  At the height of the repression, the 
government officially acknowledged that its “death squad” forces were killing 
about 350 people a month and the total number of deaths from Guatemala’s 
conflict has been estimated at between 100,000 and 150,000 people, mostly 
civilian Indians.  Ultimately, the government’s effort was successful at keeping 
communism at bay, but the success came at an impossible price.  In 1984, 
Guatemala’s military leaders allowed the government to transition to an elected 
democracy, but the military continues to play an important role in Guatemala’s 
civilian government (Moreno 1994: 42-47). 
RESIDUAL EFFECTS 
 Even during the relatively peaceful 1990s, the Central American countries 
have been involved in a surprising number of territorial disputes with one another.  
These disputes have often manifested themselves into unrelated areas of national 
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policy and creating barriers to trade has been a common tactic for gaining 
leverage in these disagreements.  In fact, a territorial dispute over the Caribbean 
islands of San Andrés and Provedencia was affecting Central American trade 
during late-2002.  The paragraphs below describe some of Central America’s 
ongoing territorial disputes. 
San Andrés Islands and Provedencia 
The San Andrés Islands consist of one small island and several small cays 
in the Caribbean Sea that lie off the eastern coast of Nicaragua.  Provedencia is 
another small island that lies north of the San Andrés Islands.  Presently, both 
islands are under the control of Colombia, although the Nicaraguan government 
continues to claim sovereignty over them.  The basis for Nicaragua’s claim, 
according to court documents, began at the breakup of the Central American 
Federation in 1838, when the islands became known as part of Nicaragua’s 
sovereign territory.  However, in 1928, Nicaragua signed the Barcenas-Esguerra 
Treaty with Colombia, giving them ownership of the islands.  Nicaragua now 
argues that this treaty was not legally valid and that it continues to be the rightful 
owner.  Nicaragua also argues that Colombia has never made any claims to the 
small cays that lie south of San Andrés Island and, therefore, Nicaragua owns 
them as well (Embassy of Nicaragua 2001).  The dispute is schedule to be heard 
by the International Court of Justice in The Hague, but a resolution to the problem 
is not expected until sometime in 2004.   
In 1999, Honduras ratified a treaty that recognized Colombia’s claim to 
the maritime territory containing these islands, which resulted in a backlash from 
Nicaragua.  In response to Honduras’ ratification of the treaty with Colombia, 
Nicaragua raised the tariff on all Honduran goods to 35 percent in 2001, which 
was in violation of the CACM agreement.  The Central American Court of Justice 
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ruled against the legality of the Nicaraguan tariff, but the Nicaraguan government 
chose to ignore the ruling.  In 2002, Honduras responded by setting its own tariff 
to 35 percent on all Nicaraguan goods, also in violation to the CACM agreement.  
Nicaragua further added to the tension between the countries by attempting to sell 
offshore drilling rights in maritime territory claimed by Honduras.  (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2002b, 8; and Economist Intelligence Unit 2002c: 7-8).  As of 
late-2002, there was no foreseeable resolution to the problem and private firms in 
both Central American countries were suffering from the effects of the tariff. 
Gulf of Fonseca 
 As with many territorial issues in Central America, the dispute over the 
Gulf of Fonseca also has its roots in Central American independence and the 
dissolution of the Central American Federation.  Additionally, there were 
unresolved boundary issues from the 1969 Soccer War between El Salvador and 
Honduras.  In 1986, El Salvador and Honduras submitted a case to the World 
Court to settle six disputed sections of territory, the ownership of the three Gulf 
islands, and a determination of territorial waters in the Gulf that also included 
Nicaragua.  The case took six years to decide and the presiding judge called it the 
most complicated case that had ever been put before the Court.  The Court ruled 
that Honduras had sovereignty over about two-thirds of 168 square miles of 
disputed territory and that El Salvador had sovereignty over the remainder.  
Among the three Gulf islands, El Salvador was assigned control over Meanguera 
and Meanguerita, while Honduras was given the island of El Tigre.  Finally, the 
Court granted shared control over the Gulf of Fonseca between El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua, exempting a three-mile territorial zone for each country 
(Frontier 1982 and World 1992).  Since the ruling, all three countries have begun 
patrolling the Gulf with small, armed vessels and there have been numerous 
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incidents reported by Honduran fishermen who say they have been detained by 
the Nicaraguan government for entering into Nicaragua’s territorial waters.  In 
response to these claims, Honduras has threatened to use naval vessels to protect 
Honduran fishermen, which has only raised the level of tension in the area 
(Honduran 2002 and Nicaragua 2001).  Given the conditions in the Gulf of 
Fonseca after the World Court resolution, it will likely be a flashpoint in the 
region for some time to come. 
Río San Juan 
 Although the Río San Juan is owned by Nicaragua, a treaty permits the 
Costa Rican police to navigate it freely because it partially divides the two 
countries.  In 1998, the Alemán administration of Nicaragua banned Costa Rican 
police from being armed while they were on the river, a decision that was 
denounced by the Rodríguez administration of Costa Rica.  This action led to a 
decline in the relations between the two countries, which were already strained 
due to illegal immigration issues.  In mid-2002, President Pacheco of Costa Rica 
attempted to improve relations between the two countries by downplaying the 
disagreement and choosing not to take the issue to the World Court.  At present, 
the two countries are seeking an informal resolution to the problem (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2002: 14-15; and Economist Intelligence Unit 2002c: 7-8). 
Population and Economy 
 In the years ahead, the populations of the CACM countries will grow 
significantly, due to the region’s age distribution and fertility rates.  Even if there 
were immediate changes to these patterns, high population growth would likely 
continue in Central America for at least the next two decades.  Central America’s 
current demographic conditions and future trends describe a region that will need 
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to create significant economic growth and efficiently manage its existing 
resources, just to maintain its current living standards, much less to improve them.  
The sections below will provide a brief review of the characteristics and recent 
trends of Central America’s populations and economies. 
POPULATION 
Despite its relatively small size and rural character, the Central American 
isthmus is densely populated.  In 2000, the combined population of the five 
CACM countries was more than 33 million persons, an increase of more than 13 
million persons since 1980 (See Table 3.3).  Among the five Central American 
countries, Guatemala was the most populous in 2000, with approximately 11.3 
million persons, while Costa Rica was the least populous with approximately 4.0 
million persons.  Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua had estimated 
populations of 6.4, 6.2, and 5.0 million persons in 2000, respectively. 
 
Table 3.3: Total Population of CACM Countries  
(Thousands of Persons, at mid-year) 
 
Year Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Total 
1980 2,284 4,586 6,820 3,569 2,921 20,180 
1985 2,642 4,769 7,738 4,186 3,404 22,739 
1990 3,049 5,110 8,749 4,879 3,827 25,614 
1995 3,554 5,669 9,976 5,654 4,426 29,279 
2000 4,023 6,276 11,385 6,485 5,074 33,243 
 
Source:  CEPAL.  “Total Population.”  Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2001. 
 
Among the five countries, Honduras experienced the highest compounded 
population growth rates between 1980 and 2000 at 3.03 percent annually, while El 
Salvador has experienced the lowest rate at 1.58 percent (See Table 3.4).  Not 
surprisingly, El Salvador’s growth rate was particularly low during the 1980s 
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when the country was embroiled in its civil war.  In addition to the tens of 
thousands of deaths that resulted from the hostilities, there was a significant 
migration of economic and political refugees out of the country.  Nicaragua and 
Guatemala also experienced fatalities and migration from war, although it appears 
they had less of an effect on the growth rates of their populations.  On the other 
hand, Costa Rica and Honduras received many of these refugee migrants from the 
region during the 1980s, which in turn increased their population growth rates.  
The political stability and economic growth of the 1990s also appear to have also 
created the conditions to accelerate the overall compounded population growth 
rate of the region. 
 
Table 3.4: Annual Compounded Growth Rates of the Population 
 
Country 1980-1990 1990-2000 1980-2000 
Costa Rica 2.93% 2.81% 2.87% 
El Salvador 1.09% 2.08% 1.58% 
Guatemala 2.52% 2.67% 2.60% 
Honduras 3.18% 2.89% 3.03% 
Nicaragua 2.74% 2.86% 2.80% 
Total 2.41% 2.64% 2.53% 
 
Urbanization 
Between 1980 and 1999, there has been a sharp trend towards greater 
urbanization in Central America (See Table 3.5).  During this period, all countries 
in the CACM became more urbanized and by 1999 the population of the CACM 
was slightly more urban than rural.  In 1980, only Nicaragua had the majority of 
its population living in urban areas, but in 1999 it was joined by El Salvador and 
Honduras.  If current trends in the region continue, Guatemala and Costa Rica 
will likely see a majority of their populations urbanized in the near future, as well.  
The capital cities and their surrounding regions are experiencing the most 
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population growth and migration, but growth has also occurred in those secondary 
cities where there has been significant economic activity, such as San Pedro Sula 
in Honduras, which has become a preferred location for many of the region’s 
foreign-owned textile and apparel manufacturers. 
 
Table 3.5: Urban and Rural Populations in CACM Countries (thousands) 
 
1980 Rural Urban % Urban Total 
Costa Rica 1,299 985 43.1 2,284 
El Salvador 2,706 1,880 41.0 4,586 
Guatemala 4,233 2,587 37.9 6,810 
Honduras 2,287 1,281 35.9 3,568 
Nicaragua 1,441 1,480 50.7 2,921 
CACM 11,966 8,213 40.7 20,179 
     
1999 Rural Urban % Urban Total 
Costa Rica 2,041 1,892 48.1 3,933 
El Salvador 3,054 3,100 50.4 6,154 
Guatemala 6,025 5,064 45.7 11,090 
Honduras 3,125 3,190 50.5 6,316 
Nicaragua 1,493 3,445 69.8 4,938 
CACM 15,739 16,693 51.5 32,431 
 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank.  “Urban and Rural Population.”  12 December 2001.  
http://www.iadb.org/int/sta/ENGLISH/ipaxnet/intgrpnet/ab/a2.htm.  Accessed 19 June 
2001. 
 
Population Projections 
The UN has projected that the combined population of the five CACM 
countries will increase from approximately 33 million in 2000 to almost 65 
million in the year 2040, an increase of almost 100 percent (See Table 3.6).  
These UN figures also predict that the populations of Guatemala, Honduras, El 
Salvador, and Nicaragua will more than double during the next 40 years, while El 
Salvador’s and Costa Rica’s populations are expected to increase by about two-
thirds. 
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Table 3.6: Population Projections for CACM Countries, 2000-2040 (thousands) 
 
Year Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Total 
2000 4,023 6,276 11,385 6,485 5,074 33,243 
2010 4,857 7,441 14,631 8,203 6,529 41,661 
2020 5,592 8,534 18,123 9,865 7,997 50,111 
2030 6,238 9,554 21,441 11,392 9,353 57,978 
2040 6,769 10,475 24,414 12,736 10,545 64,939 
 
Source:  CEPAL.  “Projections of total population.”  Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and 
the Caribbean.  Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2001. 
 
THE ECONOMY 
As with many developing countries in the world, the Central American 
economies are very small; in fact, their annual Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) 
are smaller than the annual revenues of many large corporations.  Among the five 
Central American countries in 2000, Guatemala had the largest GDP at $17.7 
billion, Costa Rica’s GDP ranked second at $14.9 billion, while El Salvador’s was 
third at $11.0 billion (See Graph 3.1).  At substantially lower levels were the 
GDPs of Honduras and Nicaragua at $4.5 and $2.3 billion, respectively.  The 
overall trend for real GDPs between 1960 and 2000 for all the countries has been 
upward growth, but GDPs fell during the 1980s when there was civil unrest and 
the countries experienced numerous economic crises.  The most dramatic decline 
of GDP occurred in El Salvador and the effects of its civil war have been lasting.  
In 1978, El Salvador’s GDP was $8.6 billion, the second highest in Central 
America and almost $2 billion higher than Costa Rica.  By 1981, El Salvador’s 
GDP fell to $6.6 billion, while Costa Rica’s GDP surpassed it, reaching $6.9 
billion.  Although El Salvador’s economy has improved since then, it has not 
caught up with Costa Rica and appears to be falling further behind.  Similarly, 
Nicaragua’s economic performance after the overthrow of the Somoza regime in 
late 1970s and under the Sandinista economic policies of the 1980s was less than 
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impressive.  Even after Nicaragua’s return to a more U.S.-friendly and pro-
capitalist government, the country’s 2000 real GDP was still less than what it was 
in 1974. 
 
Graph 3.1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Constant U.S. dollars (1995), 
1960-2000 
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Source: World Bank.  World Development Indicators 2002.  CD-ROM.  Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 2002. 
 
Per Capita Gross Domestic Product 
Although it is an imperfect measure and does not account for income 
inequality, per capita GDP provides some insight into a country’s relative wealth.  
Among the five Central American countries, Costa Rica had the highest GDP per 
capita in 2000 at $3,912 (See Graph 3.2).  This was more than twice the per capita 
GDP of the next highest country, which was El Salvador at $1,752.  Guatemala 
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ranked third among the five countries with a GDP per capita of $1,558, while the 
GDP per capita in Honduras and Nicaragua were significantly lower at $711 and 
$466, respectively.  All the Central American countries experienced some decline 
in per capita GDP during the late 1970 and the early 1980s, although the sharpest 
drops occurred in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, respectively. 
 
Graph 3.2: Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (1995 U.S. dollars), 1960-2000 
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Source: World Bank.  World Development Indicators 2002.  CD-ROM.  Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 2002. 
 
Debt 
 Since 1970, the external debts of the Central American countries have 
grown significantly and the region suffered from a serious debt crisis during the 
early 1980s (See Graph 3.3).  From 1983 onward, Nicaragua carried the majority 
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of the region’s external debt, which reached its peak in 1994 at almost $12 billion.  
During 1994, Nicaragua’s external debt declined sharply, but by the next year it 
had begun to increase again, reaching $7.0 billion in 2000.  After Nicaragua, 
Honduras had the most external debt in the region with approximately $5.5 
billion, followed by Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador with external debts 
of $4.6, $4.5, and $4.0 billion, respectively. 
 
Graph 3.3: Total External Debt 1970-2000 (Billions U.S. $) 
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Source: World Bank.  World Development Indicators 2002.  CD-ROM.  Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 2002. 
 
Foreign Investment 
 Since the mid-1990s, there has been a general trend towards an increasing 
amount of gross foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP in the Central 
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American countries (See Graph 3.4).  Although the amount of the region’s foreign 
investment tends to fluctuate year by year, Nicaragua has been the greatest 
beneficiary of this investment, in relative terms.  It went from no foreign direct 
investment between 1980 and 1991 to foreign direct investment that was equal to 
approximately 13.5 percent of the country’s GDP in 1999.  Guatemala has also 
experienced a sharp increase, rising from less than 1.0 percent of GDP in 1996 to 
more than 10.0 percent of GDP in 2000.  Costa Rica and Honduras have shown a 
slow but steady increase in foreign direct investment, but El Salvador’s foreign 
investment has been relatively minor throughout this period, excepting a large 
investment in 1998. 
 
Graph 3.4: Gross Foreign Direct Investment (Percentage of GDP), 1974-2000 
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Source: World Bank.  World Development Indicators 2002.  CD-ROM.  Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 2002. 
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Foreign Remittances 
 Foreign remittances are a significant source of income for the Central 
America countries.  El Salvador had the highest total foreign remittances in 2000, 
which were estimated at $1.75 billion in 2000 (See Table 3.7), while Guatemala 
had the second highest amount in 2000 at $563 million.  Honduras ranked third 
with $409 million and Nicaragua followed with $320 million.  Costa Rica had the 
lowest amount of foreign remittances, which is not surprising, since its relative 
economic prosperity means that fewer citizens must leave to find employment.  
While there is no way to discern the source countries of the remittances from the 
data, in the case of Nicaragua, a substantial amount likely comes from Costa Rica, 
where approximately one-half million Nicaraguans now live and work. 
 
Table 3.7: Foreign Remittances, 1995-2000 (Thousands of Current U.S. $) 
 
Year Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
1995 
 
115,900 1,060,702 357,500 120,000 75,000 
1996 121,690 1,083,838 375,400 128,400 95,000 
1997 115,840 1,199,486 408,000 160,000 150,000 
1998 112,370 1,338,321 456,500 220,000 200,000 
1999 101,100 1,373,729 465,600 320,000 300,000 
2000 106,155 1,750,771 563,400 409,600 320,000 
 
Source: World Bank.  World Development Indicators 2002.  CD-ROM.  Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 2002. 
 
SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
 The living conditions in all the Central American countries are 
substantially lower than those found in the industrialized countries of the world.  
Costa Rica is generally regarded as having the highest living standards, with a 
considerable difference existing between its social conditions and those of the 
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remaining four Central American countries.  Among these four countries, 
Honduras and Nicaragua are unquestionably the poorest, but the social conditions 
in Guatemala can be equally bad or worse for much of the populace. 
Poverty and Inequality 
 Table 3.8 shows the percentage of Central American households that are 
defined as poor or indigent (See Table 3.8 notes for definitions of these terms) by 
country and identifies whether these households are urban or rural.  The period of 
coverage differs for each country, so direct comparisons are not possible, but the 
data do provide some insight in to the pervasiveness of poverty in the region.  It is 
striking that Central America’s rates of poverty have remained so high and 
improved so little, despite the region’s rapid economic growth during the 1990s.  
In the past, these high rates of poverty were attributed to the region’s political 
instability, but are now manifesting into a severe and worsening levels of street 
crime.   
Between 1981 and 1997, Costa Rica’s rates of poor and indigent 
households in the region were relatively low.  In 1997, approximately 20 percent 
of Costa Rica’s households were considered poor, while seven percent were 
defined as indigent.  Honduras, on the other hand, had almost three-quarters of its 
population defined as poor in 1997 and almost half the population defined as 
indigent.  El Salvador had slightly less than half of its population living in poverty 
in 1997, with almost one-fifth of the population being classified as indigent.  The 
data available for Guatemala and Nicaragua also showed high rates of poverty and 
a large number of indigent households.  In 1989, 65 percent of Guatemala’s 
households were poor and 37 percent were indigent, while two-thirds of 
Nicaragua’s urban households were poor in 1997 and 36 percent were considered 
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indigent.  In all of the Central American countries, with the exception of 
Nicaragua, rural areas tended to have poorer households than did urban areas. 
 
Table 3.8: Percentage of Poor and Indigent Households by Country 
 
  Poor Households† Indigent Households‡ 
Country Year Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Costa Rica 1981 22 16 28 6 5 8 
 1990 24 22 25 10 7 12 
 1994 21 18 23 8 6 10 
 1997 20 17 23 7 5 9 
El Salvador 1995 48 40 58 18 12 27 
 1997 48 39 62 19 12 28 
Guatemala 1980 65 41 79 33 13 44 
 1989 63 48 72 37 23 45 
Honduras 1990 75 65 84 54 38 66 
 1994 73 70 76 49 41 55 
 1997 74 67 80 48 35 59 
Nicaragua 1997 -- 66 -- -- 36 -- 
 
† Percentage of households having incomes amounting to less than twice the cost of a basic food 
basket.  Includes indigent households. 
‡ Percentage of households having incomes amounting to less than the cost of a basic food basket.  
Source:  CEPAL.  “Poor and indigent households, by urban and rural areas.”  Statistical Yearbook 
for Latin America and the Caribbean.  Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2001. 
 
 Another tool for measuring poverty is the Gini Coefficient, which is a 
measure of inequality that ranges from a value of 0 to 100: the higher a country’s 
Gini Coefficient value, the greater the inequality that exists in that country.  
Among the Central American countries, in 1997, Costa Rica had the lowest level 
of inequality, while Nicaragua had the highest (See Table 3.9). 
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Table 3.9: Gini Coefficients for Central American Countries 
 
Country Year Gini Coefficient 
Costa Rica 1997 45.9 
El Salvador 1998 52.2 
Guatemala 1998 55.8 
Honduras 1998 56.3 
Nicaragua 1998 60.3 
 
Source: World Bank.  World Development Indicators 2002.  CD-ROM.  Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank, 2002. 
 
Economic Participation 
 Roughly half of the population in the CACM countries was economically 
active in 2000.  Nicaragua had the highest rate of economic participation at 54.0 
percent, while Guatemala had the lowest rate at 46.9 percent (See Table 3.10).  
Significantly more males participated in the Central American economies than did 
females.  The greatest discrepancy between male and female economic 
participation was in Guatemala, where 70.2 percent of the men worked for wages, 
while only 23.5 percent of the women worked for pay.  Nicaragua had the least 
discrepancy, where 72.1 percent of the country’s males were economically active, 
as were 37.0 percent of the county’s females.  The higher rate of female 
participation in the Nicaraguan economy is, perhaps, a legacy of Sandinista 
policies during the 1980s that promoted greater gender equality. 
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Table 3.10: Rates of Participation in Economic Activity by Sex, 2000 
 
Country Both Sexes Male Female 
Costa Rica 51.1 72.9 28.9 
El Salvador 51.0 71.6 31.5 
Guatemala 46.9 70.2 23.5 
Honduras 52.4 77.0 27.6 
Nicaragua 54.0 72.1 37.0 
 
Source:  CEPAL.  “Participation rates in economic activity, by sex.”  Statistical Yearbook for 
Latin America and the Caribbean.  Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2001. 
 
 Among those persons who are economically active in Central America, 
the vast majority were involved in the agriculture and services industries (See 
Table 3.11).  Over time, the percentage of the region’s workforce in agriculture 
has declined, while the percentage of workers in service industries has increased.  
Between 1970 and 1990, employment in the manufacturing sector increased in 
most of the countries, although it declined in Nicaragua.  Unfortunately, these 
statistics are somewhat dated, so there have surely been changes to the patterns 
shown below.  It is likely, since 1990 that the agricultural sector has continued to 
lose employment, while the service sector has increased its share of total 
employment. 
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Table 3.11: Structure of Economically Active Population by Sector  
1970-1980-2000 
 
1970 Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Agriculture 42.5 56.0 61.2 64.9 51.5 
Industry 20.0 14.4 17.1 14.1 15.5 
Services 37.5 29.6 21.7 21.0 33.0 
     
1980 Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Agriculture 30.8 43.2 56.9 60.5 46.5 
Industry 23.1 19.3 17.1 16.2 15.8 
Services 46.1 37.5 26.0 23.3 37.7 
     
1990 Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua 
Agriculture n/a 36.1 52.5 43.9 43.2 
Industry n/a 20.5 19.4 15.9 14.0 
Services n/a 41.4 27.8 33.1 42.8 
 
Source:  CEPAL.  “Structure of the economically active population, by sector of economy 
activity.”  Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean.  Santiago, Chile: 
United Nations, 2001. 
 
Transportation Network 
In general, Central America suffers from an inadequate transportation 
system that makes the shipping of goods within countries and across their borders 
difficult and costly.  The region’s poor transportation network exacerbates its 
other disadvantage to trade: the many borders that must be crossed for goods that 
are traded between the countries of the CACM.  Each crossing of a border adds 
significantly to the time and cost of transport, although the formation of a Central 
American customs union between some of the countries in 2004 is hoped to 
alleviate many of the current problems.  This section reviews the existing 
transportation infrastructure of the five CACM countries and reviews plans to 
improve the region’s transportation system. 
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ROAD AND RAIL TRANSPORT 
 The vast majority of Central America’s intra-national and intra-regional 
commuter and trade traffic moves along its network of roadways.  Among the 
Central American countries, Costa Rica had the most roadways in 2000 with 
37,273 kilometers, while El Salvador, given its small size, had the fewest at 
10,209 kilometers in 1997 (See Table 3.12).  Most of Central America’s roadways 
are not paved and the percentage of roads that are paved ranged from a high of 
approximately 21.0 percent in Costa Rica to a low of 10.9 percent in Nicaragua.  
However, even when the roadways are paved, many are in poor condition and 
require significant amounts of time to traverse.   
The operating conditions of Central America’s roadways are generally 
poor in all the countries, although Costa Rica’s roads tend to create the fewest 
difficulties.  The region does not have any controlled-access roadways, with the 
exception of some very short distances in urban areas, and almost all of the 
region’s rural highways have only two lanes.  Trucks carrying goods must 
negotiate congested and narrow streets in cities and villages because there are few 
bypasses for urban areas.  Additionally, because of the region’s mountainous 
terrain, many of the roads have sharp turns and steep grades, which are difficult 
for tractor-trailers to maneuver. 
The poor quality of the region’s roadway infrastructure further exacerbates 
other driving difficulties.  Paved rural roadways in Central America are almost 
always occupied by slow-moving vehicles, bicycles, and pedestrians, which create 
additional congestion and safety hazards.  Also, the driving habits of most Central 
Americans require that a person must drive very defensively and, thus more 
slowly, since the emphasis of the region’s drivers is on responding to the actions 
of others rather than driving according to a set of mutually accepted rules.  The 
combination of these obstacles means that vehicles must travel at substantially 
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slower speeds than they are capable of traveling and this adds significantly to the 
time and costs of trips within the region.    
 
Table 3.12: Length of Road and Railway Infrastructure 
 
 Roadway Rail 
Country Total Km Percent Paved Total Km 
Costa Rica 37,273.0a 21.0 581.0d 
El Salvador 10,029.0b 19.8 547.0d 
Guatemala 13,856.0a n/a 1,390.0d 
Honduras 15,400.0c 20.3 205.0e 
Nicaragua 18,000.0c 10.1 218.0d 
Note: a  1998 b 1997 c 1996 d 2000 e 1985 
 
Source:  CEPAL.  “Total Length of the Road Network” and “Total Length of the Rail Network.”   
Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean.  Santiago, Chile: United 
Nations, 2001: 697-699. 
 
The Central American rail network is limited and substantial segments of 
the network are not in operation.  In 2000, Guatemala had the most length of track 
in Central America, with 1,390 kilometers, but the only segment being used is 
between Guatemala City and the Caribbean ports of Puerto Barrios and Puerto 
Santo Thomás (about 322 km of track).  There are plans to restore other segments 
of Guatemala’s rail network, which connect to Mexico and El Salvador, but not 
until market conditions permit (Railroad Development Corporation 2002).  The 
territorial coverage of a country’s rail network varies among the CACM nations.  
In the case of El Salvador, the coverage is quite good, traversing from El 
Salvador’s western border with Guatemala to the city of La Unión at the Gulf of 
Fonseca on its eastern border, with several lines branching off to important 
Salvadoran cities along the way.  However, in the case of Honduras, the country’s 
rail network is confined to the northeastern Caribbean coastal region, primarily 
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serving the country’s banana-growing industry.  In fact, Honduras’ rail network 
provides no connections with neighboring countries nor does it connect with the 
country’s capital, Tegucigalpa.  Similarly, Nicaragua’s rail system also does not 
conjoin with neighboring countries and is only located on the Pacific side of the 
country.  Finally, Costa Rica’s rail network is surprisingly limited, given the 
country’s higher level of economic development.  Costa Rica’s rail network 
connects San José to the country’s Caribbean port of Puerto Limón and connects 
to Panama, along both the Caribbean and Pacific coasts, but it does not join 
Nicaragua’s rail network at any point. 
MARINE TRANSPORT 
Many of Central America’s extra-regional exports and imports are 
transported by shipping vessels in either containers or as dry or liquid bulk goods.  
Among the five countries, Costa Rica and Guatemala moved the most intermodal 
containers in 2000, at 571,957 and 540,028 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent units), 
respectively (See Table 3.13).3  Ports in Honduras moved 184,839 TEUs during 
2000, while El Salvador and Nicaragua ports moved considerably fewer, with 
14,815 and 10,494 TEUs, respectively.  Central America’s two most important 
container ports in 2000 were Puerto Limon in Costa Rica, which handled 570,000 
containers, and Santo Tomás de Castilla in Guatemala, which handled in 151,493 
containers (Degerlund 2002, 9).  With respect to the total tonnage moved through 
the ports of the five countries, Guatemala moved approximately 12.5 million tons 
in 2000, while Costa Rican and Honduran ports moved less than half this amount 
at approximately 6.6 and 5.4 million tons, respectively.  Ports in El Salvador and 
                                                 
3 As a point of reference, the Port of Houston moved approximately 1 million TEUs during the 
same year. 
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Nicaragua handled the least tonnage of cargo at 2.4 and 2.2 million tons, 
respectively.   
 
Table 3.13: Port Moves, Principal Totals 1999-2001 
 
Country 1997 TEUs 1998 TEUs 1999 TEUs 2000 TEUs 
Costa Rica 449,394 454,584 623,052 571,957 
El Salvador 12,508 14,117 11,132 14,815 
Guatemala 328,847 403,984 507,776 540,028 
Honduras 382,967 419,687 280,197 184,839 
Nicaragua 11,302 8,249 9,211 10,494 
Total 1,185,018 1,300,621 1,431,368 1,322,133 
     
 1997 Tons 1998 Tons 1999 Tons 2000 Tons 
Costa Rica 7,943,400 8,822,459 9,579,301 6,637,865 
El Salvador 3,668,500 3,976,800 2,304,946 2,487,549 
Guatemala 9,623,600 12,019,807 11,870,000 12,492,106 
Honduras 5,781,900 6,142,239 5,618,924 5,398,285 
Nicaragua 1,722,200 1,984,848 2,166,593 2,215,942 
Total 28,739,600 32,946,153 31,539,764 29,231,747 
 
Note:  One twenty-foot container = 1 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit), while one forty-foot 
container = 2 TEU 
Source: CEPAL.  “Port moves, National Total.”  
http://www.cepal.org/transporte/perfil/indexe.htm.  2001. 
 
AIR TRAVEL AND CARGO 
Commercial jet service in Central America is generally limited: to the 
capital cities; a few major secondary cities, such as San Pedro Sula; and tourist 
locations like Petén, Guatemala near the Tikal ruins.  The region’s smaller cities 
and towns are typically served by regional airlines or chartered planes.  
Commercial air transportation in Central America is centered at the San Salvador 
airport, which serves as a hub for the region’s only major airline and, in 1999 it 
had more than 1.6 million enplanements (See Table 3.14).  Costa Rica airports are 
also very busy, with more than one million enplanements in 1999, and largely 
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serve its tourism industry.  Guatemalan flights carried approximately one-half 
million enplanements in 1999, also serving a large tourism industry, in addition to 
a sizeable population.  The largest amount of air cargo in 1999 went through 
Costa Rica, much of which was likely related to a U.S. semiconductor 
manufacturing facility in San José.  El Salvador shipped about half that amount, 
but again this high value was likely due to its role as a regional air hub.  The 
remaining countries in Central America moved very little freight by air or the 
figures were not available. 
 
Table 3.14: Number of Airports, Aircraft Kilometers Traveled, and Number of 
Passengers Carried 
 
Country 
Paved 
Runway 
Airports 
Unpaved 
Runway 
Airports 
1999 
Enplanements 
(thousands)a 
1999 Ton-
Kilometers of 
Air Freight 
Costa Rica 29 123 1,055.3 84.8 
El Salvador 4 79 1,624.1 43.6 
Guatemala 11 466 506.2 2.6 
Honduras 12 107 n/a n/a 
Nicaragua 11 171 58.7 0.5 
 
a Scheduled international and domestic traffic. 
Source: Source:  CEPAL.  “Air Traffic.”  Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 2001: 706-711; and Central Intelligence 
Agency.  CIA World Factbook, 2000. 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html 
 
CONNECTIVITY TO OTHER REGIONS 
It is somewhat surprising, but Central America has relatively weak trade linkages 
with Latin America, despite its proximity and the lack of cultural and language 
barriers.  However, there are several reasons why this is so.  First, the U.S. has the 
largest economy in the hemisphere, so it is only natural that the Central American 
economies would gravitate towards the United States.  Central America provides 
 93
goods that the United States cannot produce domestically or cannot produce in 
sufficient supply (i.e. agricultural products like coffee and bananas), and products 
assembled using low-wage labor.  Second, the long-term economic prospects for 
growing trade are more stable for the United States than for any of the countries 
in Latin America.  The current economic and political instability in South 
America has reinforced Central American countries’ attitudes of turning towards 
the United States rather than the remainder of Latin America.  Finally, in addition 
to the inefficient transportation system within the region, it is difficult for Central 
American countries to reach their southern neighbors.  More specifically, there 
are no roadways linking Central America to South America, so all cargo must 
travel by ship or airplane.  This road-less region between Panama and Colombia is 
called the Darien Gap and it contains some of the densest and most formidable 
jungle remaining in the world.  Therefore, the likelihood of developing road 
linkages to South America in the foreseeable future is remote.  Finally, it is also 
important to realize that while Central America and has the perception of being 
close to South America, the continent is huge and the distances from Central 
American countries to most of South American countries can be significant.   
 Central America’s connectivity to North America, Europe, and Asia is less 
complicated, since most goods travel by ship, except for high value goods that 
might travel by air.  Maritime shippers have developed fairly reliable delivery 
services to and from Central America, although it may still require 10 to 14 days 
for door-to-door delivery between Central America and the U.S.  Because 
products to North America, Europe, and Asia are often able to go directly to their 
destination country or they cross borders more efficiently and travel on more 
efficient transportation systems, there are relatively few constraints to firms that 
want to ship between Central America and these locations. 
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TRANSPORTATION PLANS AND POLICIES 
 The governments of the Central American countries and Central 
America’s multinational institutions are well aware of their need to improve their 
transportation network and are actively planning for these improvements.  SIECA 
has taken the lead in planning for Central America’s transportation needs and is 
involved in a number of major transportation initiatives.  The most recent 
transportation plan completed by SIECA is the Central American Transportation 
Study (Estudio Centroamericano de Transporte- ECAT).  The ECAT is a regional 
multimodal study of Central America’s transportation system, which provides a 
master plan for improvements in the region.  The current ECAT was completed in 
2001 and covers a planning horizon from 2001 to 2010.  The plan identifies 
needed highway, maritime, air, and rail projects, taking into account financial and 
environmental sustainability.  Another plan is the Central American Logistic 
Corridor (Corredor Logístico Centroamericano – COLÓGICA), which seeks: to 
develop three highway corridors totaling 8,900 km in length; modernize ports and 
airports; and modernize border crossings.  The plan also seeks to develop 
paperless customs, create clusters of logistic operations with international 
linkages, and provide the necessary telecommunication systems to support these 
operations.  Other Central American transportation plans include a regional 
disaster plan for the transportation sector and the harmonization and 
modernization of technical norms for Central America’s roads and bridges 
(SIECA 2001). 
 One of the most exciting transportation policies for the region has been 
Plan Puebla Panama, which was introduced by Mexican President Vicente Fox in 
March 2001.  Plan Puebla Panama encompasses more than just transportation, it 
includes initiatives for sustainable development, human development, national 
disaster prevention and mitigation, tourism promotion, trade facilitation, road 
 95
integration, energy interconnection, and telecommunications development (Inter-
American Development Bank 2001).   
In July 2001, the Inter-American Development Bank made a $4 billion 
credit line available for the development of Plan Puebla Panama projects (Silver 
2002: 5), which includes two proposed highway projects that will cost an 
estimated $3 billion (Aguilar 2002).  The longest of these two roadway projects 
will extend from Puebla, Mexico down the length of Central America’s Pacific 
Coast to Panama City, Panama.  A second roadway would extend from Progresso, 
Mexico, along the Caribbean coast of the Yucután peninsula to Puerto Cortés, 
Honduras, and then straight south to the city of Cutuco on the Gulf of Fonseca 
(Inter-American Development Bank 2001).  It is hoped that these projects will be 
able to attract private funding to assist with their construction, although this hope 
may be a bit optimistic, given Mexico’s recent experience with privately financed 
tollroads. 
Summary 
Although the region is relatively small, the Central American isthmus 
possesses many variations, in terms of its natural and human characteristics.  The 
natural environment ranges from lush tropical lowlands to more temperate 
highlands and mountains.  Its human population is dominated by people of 
Spanish and Mayan ancestry, but is also home to a number of other indigenous 
populations who entered the region from Mexico and Colombia.  More recent 
migrants to Central America have included Blacks, Chinese, Germans, Arabs, and 
North Americans.  Together, this diversity of ethnicities has created a linguistic 
milieu that includes a multitude of indigenous languages, in addition to the more 
universal Spanish and English.   
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After being conquered by the Spanish, who had only a marginal interest in 
the region, Central America settled into its role as an agricultural colony of Spain.  
In this position, the region developed a stagnant export economy that was 
primarily based upon single crops and one that increasingly concentrated the 
ownership of land and wealth into the hands of a relative few.  Central America’s 
indigenous population became the workforce for this economy and was forced to 
live as the society’s underclass. 
Spanish rule of Central America continued until 1821, when Central 
America declared its independence.  However, the freedom was short-lived and, 
two years later, Central America once again declared its independence, this time 
from Mexico.  Initially the five countries formed a loosely tied Central American 
Federation, but less than 20 years later, the union disintegrated as the result of 
conflict between the region’s Conservative and Liberal parties.  After they 
became independent nations, each of the countries continued their own 
Conservative-Liberal battles, as well as becoming involved in conflicts with 
opposing parties in neighboring countries.  The region was also on the receiving 
end of foreign intervention by Great Britain and the United States.   Under 
colonial rule, Central America had suffered from attacks by British, French, and 
Dutch buccaneers and by the British government, which had colonized parts of 
Honduras and Nicaragua to antagonize the Spanish.  After Central American 
independence, Great Britain continued their colonization activities, as well as 
supporting insurrections by the Miskito Indians in Nicaragua and protecting their 
interest in a possible trans-isthmus canal.  United States intervention in Central 
America consisted of diplomatic and military actions.  The United States’ 
diplomatic efforts concentrated on maintaining stable, pro-U.S. governments in 
each of the countries, while its military efforts achieved what the diplomatic 
efforts had failed to do.    
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As independent nations, the Central American region continued to be 
dependent upon agricultural exports for most of its income and any modernization 
was primarily targeted towards improving its ability to expand these exports.  In 
terms of governance, with the exception of Costa Rica, none of the countries, 
between independence and the 1960s, had developed strong democratic traditions 
or institutions.  The other four countries tended to vacillate between elected 
leaders, dictators, military rulers, and ruling juntas.   
As Central America entered into the 1960s, its prospects appeared to 
improve, as the five countries entered into a period of regional economic 
integration.  During this period, the region’s economies showed strong economic 
growth and became more industrialized.  However, the CACM was weakened by 
the 1969 Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras and Honduras’ 
subsequent withdrawal.  By the 1980s, the situation had worsened and Central 
America was in total chaos, both politically and economically.  Major civil wars 
occurred in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and, to a lesser degree, in Guatemala.  
The five economies suffered from multiple economic crises and intra-regional 
trade fell dramatically.   Fortunately, the situation began to improve during the 
early 1990s and Central America’s civil strife was alleviated through regional 
peace agreements.  It was also during this period that the Central American 
countries were able to revive the CACM and produced several agreements that 
improved intra-regional trade.  
As Central America looks to its future, it faces a rapidly growing 
population that is becoming increasingly urbanized and one that increasingly 
expects economic opportunity and improvement of their social conditions.  These 
will be difficult tasks to accomplish for a region that is expected to double its 
population over the next 40 years.  During the past 40 years, Central America has 
shown a general movement towards greater prosperity, but the improvements 
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have not been uniform.  Among the five countries, Costa Rica has continued to 
maintain a relatively high standard of living; while Honduras and Nicaragua have 
remained the region’s poorest.  Overall, roughly half or more of Central 
America’s population lives in poverty and, among them, roughly one-fifth are 
considered indigent.  While the prospects for future economic growth appear to be 
available to the region, it remains heavily dependent upon foreign investment, 
external debt and foreign remittances to finance its economic growth, trade 
imbalance, and government spending. 
One aspect of improving Central America’s economic condition will be to 
address the inadequate network of roads, rail, ports, and airports that move its 
intra-regional and extra-regional trade.  In the case of intra-regional trade, it 
moves almost exclusively on trucks, which must traverse poor roadways and cross 
multiple borders to reach their destinations, adding significant time and costs to 
the transport of goods.  National governments and multinational institutions are 
aware of these problems, but they generally lack the funds needed for the 
infrastructure and the political strength, consensus or will to improve problems at 
the border.  Perhaps the best hope for Central America’s transportation woes will 
come from Mexican President Vicente Fox’s Plan Puebla Panama, which 
proposes extensive improvements to the transportation network in Central 
American and southern Mexico. 
As this chapter concludes, readers may have noticed that it did not contain 
a detailed discussion on the Central American Common Market or its economic 
history.  These topics have been intentionally avoided so far, but the next chapter, 
Chapter 4, will concentrate directly on the Central American Common Market, 
describing its creation, its institutional framework, and its successes and failures 
since implementation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON 
MARKET 
 
 The current process of regional integration in Central America has been 
functioning for more than 40 years, through periods of economic and political 
advancements and retrogressions.  The effort towards integration formally began 
with the General Treaty of Central American Integration during the early 1960s, 
along with several other important agreements and, since then, has significantly 
increased the value of intra-regional trade.  However, the CACM and its efforts 
toward regional integration are unquestionably incomplete and there is still 
considerable work to be done.  In their process of implementing regional 
integration, the five countries have developed a complex framework of 
institutions that seek to first unite the region economically, and then pursue 
gradual political and cultural integration.  This chapter will outline the origins of 
the Central American Common Market and its initial legal framework, review its 
performance over the last 40 years, and describe the major actors in its 
contemporary institutional framework. 
A Brief History of the Central American Common Market 
 The origins of the Central American Common Market began after World 
War II, when the idea was proposed by a group of Latin American economists 
(Chemical Bank 1968: 6; Business International Corporation 1969: 2).  The 
United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) pushed the 
idea forward and adopted a 1948 resolution to develop a “Latin American 
customs union” as a topic for future discussion (Cochrane 1969: 38).  At a 1951 
 100
ECLA meeting in Mexico City, a group of delegates representing the 
governments of the Central American countries introduced another resolution, 
stating their desire to pursue regional integration as a means of expanding their 
economies (Chemical Bank 1968: 6).  At that same meeting, the ECLA formed 
the Economic Cooperation Committee of the Central American Isthmus (CCE) 
whose responsibility was to assist the Central American countries “in devising 
policies of economic integration, developing intra-area trade, and using resources 
more rationally” (Wilford 1973: 6).   
The CCE’s task was to plan Central America’s integration by carrying out 
numerous studies that addressed integration issues and to prepare its necessary 
rules and policies.  As the CCE fulfilled this responsibility, it was assisted with its 
work by the ECLA and technical commissions of non-Central American experts.  
The members of the CCE were the economic affairs ministers of the five 
countries, along with other national appointees (Chemical Bank 1968: 6).  In the 
process of planning for the CACM, its designers developed a rationale for its 
existence that Wilford (1973) identified as having three primary goals:  
(a) accelerated and balanced growth of the five individual countries; 
(b) insulation of the region from cyclical activity generated from 
abroad due to fluctuations in the price of primary products and/or 
deterioration in the terms of trade; (c) improved allocation of existing 
resources through freer factor mobility and increased specialization 
with subsequent economies of scale attendant upon the larger market 
(Wilford 1973: 6).   
 
Nugent (1974), on the other hand, argued that one of the reasons for Central 
American integration was “a common interest in diminishing what had 
alternatively been regarded as excessive dependence on, domination by, or 
interference from the United States and other foreign powers” (Nugent 1974: 7).  
However, his argument is not one that has been identified in any other work 
written during this period. 
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The first modern effort at regional integration in Central America was the 
Organization of Central American States (ODECA), which was created in 1951 
and became operational in 1955 (Wilford 1973: 4).  More ambitious than the 
CACM, the ODECA sought the ultimate elimination of political boundaries in 
Central America that would occur as the region gradually integrated 
economically, politically, and culturally.  ODECA also sought collaboration 
between the countries on “economic and foreign affairs, education and cultural 
exchanges, juridical cooperation including a unified legal system, coordination of 
military practice, and liberalization of migratory barriers between states”.  It 
produced several organizations, including an Economic Council that was 
composed of the ministers of economy from each of the countries, which would 
eventually become more powerful than ODECA itself (Holbik and Swan 1972: 
16). 
 The efforts toward regional integration culminated between 1958 and 
1960, when eight different agreements were reached between the five Central 
American countries.   However, it was really only three of these eight and a later 
agreement would form what ultimately became the crux of the early CACM.  
Unlike other trade treaties, Central American integration is the product of 
numerous agreements rather than a single treaty.  The initial regional integration 
agreement was the Multilateral Treaty on Central American Free Trade signed in 
June 1958.  The countries also signed the Convention on the System of Central 
American Integration Industries at the same time (Wilford 1973: 6).  The 
Multilateral Treaty was the first treaty to eliminate tariffs between the five 
countries, allowing for the free trade of 200 goods grown or manufactured in the 
five countries.  The Multilateral Treaty also called for the elimination of all tariffs 
on intra-regional trade (with some exceptions) within 10 years, although it did not 
identify a schedule for achieving this goal (Chemical Bank 1968: 6).  The 
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Multilateral Treaty went into effect for Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua on 
June 2, 1959, while Honduras did not implement the agreement until April 29, 
1960 and Costa Rica on September 23, 1963 (U.S. Department of State 1969: 2).   
 After signing the Multilateral Treaty, the region’s efforts toward economic 
integration gained momentum and some of the countries felt the existing 
agreement was not moving them quickly enough.  In 1960, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras signed another agreement called the Tripartite Treaty 
of Association, which created immediate free trade for all but 50 natural and 
manufactured products produced in the three countries.  The tariffs on these 50 
goods would be automatically eliminated over a five-year period.  Additionally, 
the three countries’ external tariffs were to be unified within five years and, unlike 
the Multilateral Treaty, the Tripartite Treaty set up a concrete mechanism for 
doing so (Chemical Bank 1968, 8).   
 In response to the Tripartite Treaty, the CCE began drafting a new treaty 
to replace the existing Multilateral Treaty and to hasten the pace of Central 
American integration.  Its replacement was the General Treaty for Central 
American Integration and it still remains the primary instrument for the region’s 
integration efforts.  The agreement was signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua on December 13, 1960 and went into effect on June 3, 
1961, except for Honduras when it went into effect during April 1962.  Costa Rica 
did not sign the Treaty right away, waiting until July of 1962, and it did not ratify 
it until September 1963.  The new General Treaty was very similar to the 
Tripartite Treaty, but it did not immediately eliminate tariffs on the 50 items that 
accounted for about one-half of Central America’s intra-regional trade.  However, 
the agreement did produce a schedule to remove these tariffs within five years.  
The General Treaty also did not produce a timetable for eliminating the tariffs on 
sugar, coffee, cotton, and a few other products that were critical to national 
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economies and which accounted for approximately one-quarter of intra-regional 
trade.  Another significant component of the treaty was the creation of a number 
of institutions for carrying out Central American integration.  The new institutions 
formed by the General Treaty included the Central American Economic Council, 
the Executive Council, and the Permanent Secretariat (Chemical Bank 1968: 8-9). 
 It was the Convention on the System of Central American Integration 
Industries that created the early CACM’s development strategy of import 
substitution.  The intent of the treaty was to select and support specific 
manufacturing industries within each of the five countries for development (U.S. 
Department of State 1969: 2).  Each country was assigned an industry that would 
be protected by preferential intra-regional tariffs, common external tariffs, and the 
ability to move capital, raw materials, and intermediate and final goods around the 
region with minimal taxation.  The industry would be required to supply the entire 
Central American region, but the quality and price of its products would be 
dictated by the protocol that gave it these special market privileges (Cochrane 
1969: 56-58).  The protection created by this agreement was intended to allow 
specific industries to reach economies of scale and serve the entire Central 
American market, with the idea that they would eventually become competitive in 
the world market (Wilford 1973: 6).  The Convention of the System of Central 
American Integration Industries was implemented by Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua on June 4, 1961, but did not take effect for Costa Rica 
until September 23, 1963 (U.S. Department of State 1969: 2).   
 Along with the General Treaty, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua signed a separate treaty creating the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration “to promote the economic integration and balanced 
economic development of the member countries” (Chemical Bank 1968: 9).  The 
five Central American countries also signed an agreement in July 1961 to form a 
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Central American Clearinghouse, so that local currencies could be used for intra-
regional trade (Chemical Bank 1968: 9).  
 The final major agreement of Central American integration was the 
Central American Agreement on Equalization of External Tariffs, signed by all 
five countries on September 1, 1959.  This agreement moved the region toward a 
common tariff for all extra-regional exports and was based upon two sets of items.  
For the first set, the external tariffs were to be aligned immediately and for the 
second set, tariffs were to be equalized among the countries within five years 
(Chemical Bank 1968: 6-7).   
Each of these integration treaties was designed with different life spans 
and requirements for countries that wanted to withdraw.  The General Treaty and 
the treaty that founded the Central American Bank of Economic Integration were 
written to expire after 20 years.  After 20 years had passed, a country could only 
leave after it had denounced the Treaty and had given a five-year notice.  The 
Convention on the Equalization of Import Tariffs and the Convention for the 
System of Integration Industries had ten-year life spans, with continuous 
extensions.  A country could leave the Equalization of Import Tariffs agreement if 
it denounced the agreement at the time of extension, but to leave the System of 
Integration Industries agreement, a country would need to provide two years 
advance notice at the time of the extension.  The General Treaty and the treaty 
founding the Central American Bank of Economic Integration would remain in 
effect as long as there were two countries adhering to it (Wardlaw 1966: 10). 
THE EARLY SUCCESS 
It is a generally held view that Central America prospered during the 
1960s and that the region made considerable progress towards industrialization 
and regional integration.  Wilford (1973) found that between 1961 and 1968, 
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Central America’s “gross regional product rose by more than 45 percent, 
manufacturing output increased around 85 percent, and per capita income rose at 
an annual average rate of 3.4 percent a year” (Wilford, 1973: 8).  To some degree, 
the CACM agreement was responsible for the improvement of the Central 
American economies, although Alonso (1994) pointed out that Central America’s 
success in growing its GDP was primarily due to higher prices for coffee and 
sugar, rather than a significant increase of intra-regional exports (Alonso 1994: 
16). 
 Regardless of the limitations of the early CACM, the data show that intra-
regional trade grew significantly during the 1960s, rising from approximately $30 
million in 1960 to approximately $250 million in 1968.  The growth was 
especially strong starting in 1963, once all five countries had ratified and began 
participating in the CACM.  It is also discernible from these two charts that some 
countries in the CACM benefited more than others.  During the 1960s, El 
Salvador and Guatemala capitalized the most on the CACM and a substantial 
portion of Central America’s intra-regional trade was between these two 
countries.  Costa Rica and Honduras, on the other hand, were less interested or 
unable to take advantage of their membership in the CACM and their levels of 
intra-regional trade were substantially lower.  The growth of intra-regional trade 
came to a quick end in 1969, after war broke out between El Salvador and 
Honduras, which is visible in Graph 4.1 and Graph 4.2.   
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Graph 4.1: Value of Intra-regional Exports (Millions U.S. $), 1960-1969 
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Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Exportaciónes Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002. 
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
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Graph 4.2: Value of Intra-regional Imports (Millions U.S. $), 1960-1969 
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Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Importaciónes Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
 
 The growing importance of intra-regional trade to the CACM countries 
was not only in terms of total value, but also as a percentage of the countries’ total 
trade.  In 1960, approximately 7.0 percent of the CACM’s total exports were to 
countries in Central America.  By 1969, the value of intra-regional exports had 
risen to approximately 25.0 percent of the region’s total exports.  At the level of 
the individual countries, in 1968, slightly more than 40 percent of El Salvador’s 
total exports and 33 percent of Guatemala’s export trade went to other Central 
American countries (See Graph 4.3). 
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Graph 4.3: Intra-regional Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports, 1960-1969 
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Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Exportaciónes Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003; and SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Exportaciónes 
Totales.  www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
 
The Central American Common Market also became a growing source of 
the region’s imports.  In 1960, approximately 6.0 percent of Central America’s 
imports came from other Central American countries, but by 1969, this value had 
grown to about 23.0 percent (See Graph 4.4).  As with export trade, El Salvador 
and Guatemala imported a substantial portion of their total imports from other 
Central American countries.   
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Graph 4.4: Intra-regional Imports as a Percentage of Total Imports, 1960-1969 
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The CACM’s import substitution policy proved to be an effective tool for 
industrializing the Central American countries during the 1960s.  Wilford (1973) 
reported that the composition of Central America’s intra-regional trade changed 
significantly (See Table 4.1), with foodstuffs becoming a less important 
component of Central America’s intra-regional trade and manufactured items and 
chemical products becoming more important.  Specifically, in 1960, close to one-
half of Central America’s intra-regional trade consisted of foodstuffs, but by 1969 
the trade volume had fallen to less than one-fifth.  The value of intra-regional 
trade in manufactured items, however, grew from 28.2 percent of the total intra-
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regional trade in 1960 to 50.5 percent in 1969.  There was also considerable 
growth in the value of chemical products, many of which were likely household 
cleaners and detergents, from 7.4 percent of total intra-regional trade in 1960 to 
17.3 percent in 1969.   
 
Table 4.1: Composition of Intra-regional CACM Trade (Percent), 1960-1969 
 
Classification 1960 1963 1967 1969 
Foodstuffs 45.7 31.8 22.3 19.3 
Beverages and Tobacco 3.4 1.7 1.6 1.1 
Raw Materials 4.9 5.0 3.3 2.9 
Fuels and Lubricants 0.4 5.6 2.0 1.1 
Fats and Edible Oils 4.8 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Chemical Products 7.4 11.6 15.4 17.3 
Manufactured Items 28.2 38.0 48.4 50.5 
Machinery and Transportation 
Equipment 
4.6 3.4 4.5 5.2 
Others 0.6 0.5 -- 0.1 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Source:  Wilford, W.T.  “The Central American Common Market: Trade Patterns after a Decade 
of Union.”  Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business 12, no. 3 (1973): 16.  Table 
based upon data from Permanent Secretariat of Central American Integration, Carta 
Informativa, various issues, 1967-1972. 
 
STAGNATING GROWTH 
The rapid economic growth that Central America experienced during the 
1960s began to slow noticeably during the 1970s.  The causes of the slowdown 
were the result of external shocks, as well as structural problems within the 
CACM.  Bulmer-Thomas (1998) identified three major problems with the CACM 
that began during the 1960s and intensified during the 1970s.  First, the CACM 
led countries to divert their trade from buying cheaper extra-regional imports to 
buying more expensive intra-regional goods.  For countries that were not 
competitive, in terms of intra-regional trade, this led to growing balance of 
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payments deficit.  Honduras was the country that suffered the most from this 
condition.  Second, intra-regional tariffs had been an important source of income 
for the Central American governments and, when these tariffs were reduced or 
eliminated, the governments had to look to other sources of income to create 
public investment.  One of the early initiatives for addressing government funding 
shortfalls was the San José Protocol of 1968, which raised the CACM’s common 
external tariff to 30 percent.  Later, governments would have to borrow money to 
fund public spending.  Finally, the CACM countries were still a very small market 
of less than 11 million people in 1960.  Many of the consumers in this market 
were poor and relatively few had money available for the purchase of 
manufactured goods.  Additionally, the region’s small market size prevented 
many firms from reaching economies of scale.  As the CACM’s problems 
worsened during the 1970s, Central America’s economic growth also began to 
slow.  There were some efforts to address these issues, but there was not a 
concerted effort on the part of the region’s political elites.  Many of them 
approached greater regional integration with growing caution and suspicion, 
during a period when the Somoza’s rule was being threatened in Nicaragua and 
leftist were growing more politically powerful in El Salvador (Bulmer-Thomas 
1998: 315). 
Even with these problems, intra-regional trade continued to grow from 
about $300 million, in 1970, to approximately $900 million in 1979 (See Graph 
4.5).  The effects of the world oil crisis that began in 1974 are clearly visible, as 
the growth of intra-regional trade stopped abruptly and did not resume until 1976.  
Central America’s overall growth of intra-regional trade was also affected by the 
overthrow of the Somoza regime and another spike in oil prices that occurred in 
1979 (Minerals Revenue Management 2001). 
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Graph 4.5: Value of Intra-regional Exports (Millions U.S. $), 1970-1979 
 
$0.0
$100.0
$200.0
$300.0
$400.0
$500.0
$600.0
$700.0
$800.0
$900.0
$1,000.0
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Total Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
 
Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Exportaciónes Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
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Graph 4.6: Value of Intra-regional Imports (Millions U.S. $), 1970-1979 
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Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Importaciónes Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
 
 
 Fluctuating oil prices during the 1970s plagued the region in other ways as 
well.  One effect of the 1974 jump in oil prices was to create a world-wide 
recession, as well as increasing inflation.  Rising prices affected the demand for 
Central American exports and increased the costs of the goods imported from the 
rest of the world.  The inflation of the period not only raised the costs of finished 
imports, but also increased the prices of capital goods, raw materials, and 
intermediate products.  According to Alonso, rising import costs shifted the terms 
of trade against the Central American countries, so that they began to run large 
trade deficits, shown in Graph 4.7 (Alonso 1994: 18). 
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Graph 4.7: Balance of Total Trade (Millions of U.S. $), 1970-1979 
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Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Importaciónes Totales, 1960-2002.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003; and SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Importaciónes 
Totales, 1960-2002.  www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
 
The most serious blow to the CACM during the 1970s was Honduras’ 
withdrawal, which was a result of its structural inability to effectively compete in 
the region and its war with El Salvador in 1969 (Nugent 1974: 9).  The impacts of 
Honduras’ departure from the common intra-regional tariff were significant.  In 
1970, Honduras still sent 10.6 percent of its exports to CACM countries, by 1972 
that figure had dropped to only 2.9 percent.  Honduras’ import trade behaved in a 
similar manner.  In 1970, 24.9 percent of the country’s imports came from CACM 
countries but, in 1971, only 8.9 percent of Honduras’ imports came from other 
Central America countries.  
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THE LOST DECADE 
By almost any measure, the 1980s were catastrophic for Central America, 
including intra-regional trade.  In 1980, the value of Central America’s intra-
regional trade was approximately $1.1 billion, but by 1986 the total value had 
fallen to approximately $400 million (See Graph 4.8 and Graph 4.9).  Without 
question, the most damaging events of the decade were the civil wars in El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and, to a smaller scale, Guatemala.  In addition to the civil 
strife they created, these conflicts also seriously hindered the intra-regional flow 
of trade.  While El Salvador and Nicaragua suffered the greatest economic 
impacts, the economies of all the Central America countries faltered during the 
1980s and each experienced some level of economic contraction, including Costa 
Rica.   
Graph 4.8: Value of Intra-regional Exports (Millions U.S. $), 1980-1989 
 
$0.0
$200.0
$400.0
$600.0
$800.0
$1,000.0
$1,200.0
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Total Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua
 
Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Exportaciónes Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
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Graph 4.9: Value of Intra-regional Imports (Millions U.S. $), 1980-1989 
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In addition to war, the region also suffered from a multitude of economic 
shocks and crises that further pounded the already weak economies.  Bulmer-
Thomas (1998) argued that there were four major events that produced the 
economic crises of the 1980s.  The most significant of these events was the world 
recession that began in 1981 and had the effect of reducing Central America’s 
extra-regional exports, which, in turn, diminished the region’s intra-regional 
trade.  Falling exports in 1981, along with other events, produced a subsequent 
decline in the GDPs of all the Central American countries in 1982.  The second 
shock was created by various macroeconomic policies to deal with the region’s 
debt crisis.  Third, the countries invoked “a series of unilateral and ad hoc 
measures designed to aid each country’s balance of payments problems by 
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restricting CACM imports: these included exchange rate devaluations, exchange 
control and nonpayment  and nonpayment of intraregional arrears” (Bulmer-
Thomas 1998: 316).  Fourth, in addition to an overall decline in economic 
activity, the wars diverted government funds away from badly needed social 
spending, which made the countries even less competitive.  The region’s civil and 
political unrest also made it more difficult for the countries to produce exports 
and transport these goods to their customers (Bulmer-Thomas 1998: 315-316). 
In addition to these problems, Central America was racked by a debt crisis 
during the 1980s that had its origins in the 1970s.  Caballeros (1989) contends 
that Central America’s debt crisis was created by the need for government 
borrowing during the 1970s and 1980s, which was caused by diminishing levels 
of government revenue, the need to maintain social spending during a period of 
political unrest, and the need to finance a private sector that was suffering from 
capital flight.  The borrowing became unsustainable during the 1980s when 
interest rates began to rise and the various economic problems of the region 
prevented the Central American countries from meeting their payment schedules 
(Caballeros 1989: 114-115).  The eventual resolution of Central America’s debt 
crisis required the implementation of austerity programs, the negotiation of loans 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the renegotiation of commercial 
loans, and forgiveness for all or part of unpaid debts by public and private entities 
(Caballeros 1989: 117-118). 
The collapse of Central America’s regional currency clearinghouse in 
1986 was another major event that had a significant effect on intra-regional trade.  
The currency clearinghouse was a mechanism that improved trade flows by 
permitting importers and exporters from Central American countries to trade with 
one another using their own currencies.  For example, if a buyer in Honduras 
wanted to import a good from Guatemala, the buyer would make a payment to the 
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Honduran Central Bank in the local currency.  The Honduran Central Bank would 
then forward this payment to the regional currency clearinghouse, which would 
convert it into Guatemalan currency and send a payment to the Guatemalan 
Central Bank.  Finally, the Guatemalan Central Bank would pay the seller of the 
good in Guatemalan currency.  The problem with the system was that the 
currency clearinghouse was providing the central banks with a line of credit that 
some central banks were not repaying.  So, even though the Honduran importer 
had paid the Honduran central bank in their country, it did not always send the 
payment to the regional currency clearinghouse.  And, even though the 
clearinghouse had not received the payment from the Honduran central bank, it 
still paid the central bank in Guatemala, which would send the payment to the 
seller.  Over time, some of Central America’s central banks had built up 
substantial debts to the regional clearinghouse, but could not or would not repay 
them, which eventually caused the clearinghouse to collapse in 1986.  Once the 
clearinghouse collapsed, intra-regional trade became significantly more difficult 
and levels of intra-regional trade decline.1  Chart 4.8 and Chart 4.9 show that 
intra-regional trade was at its lowest point of the decade in 1986.2 
Although they were preoccupied with their domestic political and 
economic crises, Central America’s leaders and policymakers were not unaware 
or indifferent to the problems of the CACM during the 1980s.  In fact, according 
to Bulmer-Thomas (1998), efforts were made during the mid-1980s to revive the 
CACM, but these were largely unsuccessful for several reasons.  First, there were 
                                                 
1 This description of the Central American currency clearinghouse was provided by a study 
participant who works at the Central American Monetary Council, but due to the University’s 
Institutional Review Board policies, study participant cannot be identified in the study. 
 
2 Mexico was also a member of the regional currency clearinghouse (Business International 
Corporation, 1969:7) and there was a noticeable decline in the value of trade between Mexico and 
the Central American countries in 1986. 
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poor relations between Nicaragua’s Sandinista government and the governments 
of the other Central American countries.  Second, institutions like the World Bank 
argued the only way to truly improve the Central American economies was to 
expand extra-regional exports and discouraged the countries from “distracting” 
themselves with sideline efforts such as improving intra-regional trade.  Third, the 
Reagan administration was opposed to any initiative that might help Nicaragua’s 
Sandinista government.  Finally, the collapse of the regional currency 
clearinghouse left some Central American countries with outstanding intra-
regional debts and the countries awaiting payment were not interested in reviving 
trade until these accounts were settled (Bulmer-Thomas 1998: 316).   
THE REINCARNATION 
 During the 1990s, Central America’s political and economic situation 
began to improve dramatically: the region’s civil wars had ended; peace 
agreements were signed; and the economies of the individual countries had started 
to improve after implementing a stiff dose of economic austerity policies.  In 
response to these changes, Central America’s intra-regional trade grew 
significantly during the 1990s, as demonstrated by Graphs 4.10 and 4.11.  In 
1990, total intra-regional trade was approximately $650 million and, by 1999, this 
value had almost quadrupled to $2.5 billion.  Throughout the 1990s, all of the 
CACM countries increased their levels of intra-regional trade and, once again, 
Guatemala and El Salvador were the CACM’s primary beneficiaries. 
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Graph 4.10: Value of Intra-regional Exports (Millions U.S. $), 1990-1999 
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Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Exportaciónes Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
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Graph 4.11: Value of Intra-regional Imports (Millions U.S. $), 1990-1999 
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During the 1990s, there were resolutions to many of the issues that had 
prevented regional cooperation during the 1980s.  The replacement of 
Nicaragua’s Sandinista government with Chamarro’s UNO administration, in 
1990, made other Central American countries more open to working towards 
regional goals, as well as, allaying U.S. concerns.  There was also a strong trend 
towards growing extra-regional trade, which multinational lending and 
development institutions viewed as a favorable development.  Finally, large 
portions of Central America’s debt were forgiven, not only by lenders outside of 
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the region but also by Central American countries that were owed money by other 
Central American countries.   
According to Bulmer-Thomas, the revitalization of Central America’s 
cooperation occurred as the result of three major initiatives that once again made 
the CACM a significant tool for regional economic development.  The first of 
these initiatives was the Summit of Antigua, which was held in Antigua, 
Guatemala in 1990.  At the summit, the Central American Presidents outlined a 
plan that permitted Honduras to return to the CACM as a full member, re-
implemented a lower common external tariff, removed non-tariff barriers to trade, 
and incorporated agricultural products into the regional trading scheme.  The next 
major event was the signing of the Protocol of Tegucigalpa in 1991.  The Protocol 
of Tegucigalpa created the Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (SICA), 
which became the new legal and institutional framework for Central American 
integration.  The final initiative was the Protocol of Guatemala, which “updated” 
many aspects of the original General Treaty and developed a schedule for 
lowering the common external tariff (Bulmer-Thomas, 1998: 316). 
There were also changes to the attitudes of Central Americans during the 
1990s that permitted regional integration to resume, according to Lizano and 
Salazar-Xirinach (1997).  They believed that after Central America’s long period 
of political, military, and economic problems, the countries had become more 
interested in trying to make regional integration work.  Additionally, they saw 
Central Americas’ business sector as not only accepting but promoting regional 
integration, as did the region’s “civil society” (Lizano and Salazar-Xirinach, 
1997: 112-113). 
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2000 to Present 
During the early part of the 2000s, the Central American economies 
continued to grow their world exports and intra-regional trade.  This growth was 
partially related to the strong U.S. economy, which was, at this point, significantly 
fueled by speculation in the technology industries.  However, by early 2001 the 
U.S. economy was beginning to show weakness and the technology “bubble” had 
started to burst.  The U.S. economy then slipped into recession.  The European 
Union countries, which together are Central America’s second largest trading 
partner, also began to decline, influenced by the weakness of the German and the 
U.S. economies.  As a result, CACM trade with the rest of the world was lower in 
2001 than it was in 2000.  There was a modest increase in the value of extra-
regional trade in 2002, although 2002 trade was still below the 2000 levels. 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks pushed the weak U.S. economy 
down even further, but Table 4.2 suggests that the CACM countries were able to 
continue growing their intra-regional trade during the early part of the decade.  
Additionally, the Central American countries have continued pursing a number of 
regional policy initiatives and the most important of these has been the 
development of the customs union between El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua. 
Table 4.2:  Total CACM Trade (Thousands of U.S. $), 2000-2002 
 
 Exports Imports 
 
CACM 
Rest of the 
World Total CACM 
Rest of 
the World Total 
2000† 2,616,798 8,894,927 11,511,725 2,739,479 16,061,441 18,800,920 
2001† 2,829,179 7,356,127 10,185,305 2,935,744 17,582,376 20,518,120 
2002‡ 2,883,872 7,608,607 10,492,479 3,087,527 18,637,899 21,725,426 
 
† Preliminary figures ‡ Estimates 
 
Source:  SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución del Comercio, 1999-2002.  www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
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Immediately following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Central 
American officials were concerned that the United States would adopt an 
isolationist view and that the region would become neglected.  As time has 
passed, however, the situation seems to be the opposite.  Since the terrorist 
attacks, the United States has reached out to its allies in an effort to strengthen 
existing relationships.  In the case of Central America, the United States has 
proposed the development of a new free trade agreement with the CACM 
countries.  The prospect of the CAFTA (Central American Free Trade 
Agreement) has generated considerable excitement in the region and it is a topic 
that will be discussed further in subsequent chapters. 
The Current System and Institutions of Central American 
Integration 
 The process of integrating the Central American countries has required the 
creation of a number of bureaucracies to support the effort, which are not limited 
to economic integration, but also included initiatives to integrate the region 
politically, socially, and culturally.  In 1991, the Treaty of Tegucigalpa developed 
the System of Central American Integration (SICA), which manages the process 
of regional integration.  The SICA consists of five subsystems, which are 
political, economic, social, cultural, and ecological (See Table 4.3).  Among the 
five, the political and economic subsystems have become the most developed, in 
terms of resources, but there are institutions in each of the subsystems to further 
the mission of regional integration.   
The integration framework becomes even more complex at the subsystem 
level, where there are various advisory, inter-sectoral, and ad hoc committees.  As 
an example, Figure 4.1 shows the Secretariat of Central American Economic 
Integration’s (SIECA) perspective of the framework as it relates to the economic 
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subsystem of integration.  Note the large number of participating groups and also 
that this diagram does not include other components of the economic integration 
subsystem, such as the Central American Bank of Economic Integration or the 
Central American Monetary Council. 
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Table 4.3: Subsystems of the System of Central American Integration 
 
Political Economic Social Cultural Ecological 
Meeting of 
Presidents 
Councils of 
Ministers relevant 
to integration 
Councils of 
Ministers or 
equivalents that 
tend to the 
problems of 
family, work, 
health, and social 
security 
Councils of 
Ministers or 
equivalents that 
tend to education 
and culture, 
Educational and 
Cultural 
Coordination of 
Central America 
(CECA) 
With its own life, 
derived with 
respect to Article 3 
Section I of the 
Protocol of 
Tegucigalpa 
Central American 
Parliament 
(PARLACEN) 
Secretary General 
of Economic 
Integration 
(SIECA) 
Secretary of 
Central American 
Social Integration 
Superior Council 
Central American 
University  
Constituents for the 
Central American 
Commission of 
Environment and 
Development 
Central American 
Court of Justice 
(CCJ) 
Central American 
Bank of Economic 
Integration (BCIE) 
 Council of the 
Central American 
Isthmus of Sports 
and Recreation 
(CODICADER) 
Center of 
Coordination for 
the Prevention of 
Natural Disasters in 
Central America 
(CEDPREDENAC) 
Meeting of Vice-
Presidents 
Central American 
Monetary Council 
(CMCA) 
   
Council of 
Ministers 
    
The Executive 
Committee 
    
Central American 
Organization for 
Migration 
(OCAM) 
    
Permanent Central 
American 
Commission 
Against Narcotics 
Trafficking 
    
 
Source: Giammattei Avilés, Jorge Antonio.  Guia Concentrade de la Integración de 
Centroamerica.  Managua: Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sección de Publicaciones, 1999.  
pp. 63-64. 
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Figure 4.1: Organizational Framework of the Economic Subsystem of Central 
American Integration  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SIECA.  “Organigrama del Subsistema Económico en El Sistema de la Integración 
Centroamericana.  www.sieca.org.gt.  Accessed 11 May 2002. 
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 When its founders designed it, the Central American integration process 
was idealized to be like a living organism, with many parts that have specific 
roles, as the organs of a human body do.  While they perform independent 
functions, together, these organs form a system that keeps the body alive.  There 
are at least eight organs of Central American integration, which are shown in 
Table 4.4.  The Meetings of the Presidents is the most important organ of Central 
America’s integration process and represents the highest level of authority and 
decision making.  The Meeting of the Presidents approves and oversees all major 
policy initiatives in the CACM and it is where the most import issues related to 
regional integration are discussed and resolved.  In theory, the Meetings of 
Presidents is influenced by the Central American Parliament, which plans, 
analyzes and recommends policy directions, and the Central American Court of 
Justice, which represents the Central American conscious.  In reality, the 
influence of these two organizations on the Central American Presidents is 
minimal, since not all the Central American countries are members of the Central 
American Parliament or the Central American Court of Justice.  At the political 
level, there is the Executive Committee (which consists of each country’s 
Minister of Foreign Relations), the Meeting of Vice-Presidents, and the Council 
of Ministers.  Although these are less powerful organs, they are important 
nonetheless, because they hold considerable authority to develop policy and settle 
many of the region’s trade disputes.  Each of the various sectors of ministers (i.e. 
Economy, Transportation, Health, etc.) has their own regional meetings to jointly 
plan initiatives and policies for the region, as well as to address problems 
(Giammattei Avilés 1999: 71).  Finally, there is the Consultative Committee, 
which advises the Secretariat General of the SICA, at what is called the 
“participatory level”.  The Consultative Committee consists of “20 organizations 
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that represent business, labor, academic, cooperative, peasant, indigenous, and 
women” (Calvo-Drago 1997). 
 
Table 4.4: Organs of Central American Integration  
 
ORGAN RESPONSIBILITIES 
Meeting of the Presidents Is the supreme organ of the SICA System  
Central American Parliament Organ of planning, analysis, and recommendation 
Central American Court of Justice Represents the National Conscious of Central 
America and is considered the depository and 
custodian of what constitutes the Central American 
identity 
Executive Committee Is the permanent organ that represents the interests of 
the Central American community 
Meeting of Vice-Presidents Is an organ of advisement and consultation, that 
meets every semester and when necessary 
Secretary General of SICA Is in charge of the Secretariat General which is 
named by the Meeting of Presidents 
Consultative Committee Is an auxiliary organ of advisement and consultation 
Council of Ministers Represents the interests of the respective countries in 
the integration process 
 
Source: Giammattei Avilés, Jorge Antonio.  Guia Concentrade de la Integración de 
Centroamerica.  Managua: Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sección de Publicaciones, 1999.  
p. 71. 
 
MAJOR INSTITUTIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN INTEGRATION 
The many integration institutions that have been established in Central 
America demonstrate that a significant effort has been undertaken to unite the 
isthmus.  The most important institutions of Central American integration are the 
Secretary General of the Secretariat of Central American Integration, the 
Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration, the Central American 
Bank of Economic Integration, the Central American Parliament, the Central 
American Court of Justice, and the Central American Monetary Council.  The 
narrative below provides a brief discussion to the responsibilities and structure of 
each organization.  The narrative does not include discussions of the other 
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integration organs, such as the Council of Presidents or the Council of Ministers, 
because the CACM does not maintain separate bureaucratic institutions to support 
them. 
Secretariat General of the System of Central American Integration 
(Secretaría General del Sistema Integración Centroamericano – SG-SICA) 
 
 The process of integrating the Central American countries is overseen by 
the Meetings of the Presidents but it is supported and administered by the 
Secretariat General of the System of Central American Integration (SG-SICA).  
The SG-SICA was created by the Protocol of Tegucigalpa in 1991 and is 
responsible for assisting the Presidents as they work toward regional integration 
and the “gradual and progressive construction of a Central American Union” (SG-
SICA 2003).  The Secretariat General also assists the Councils of Ministers and 
Executive Committee in the implementation of their objectives.  The Secretariat is 
led by a Secretary General who is appointed by the Meeting of the Presidents for 
a four-year term (XI Reunión de Presidentes Centroamericanos 1991).  The 
Secretary General oversees several directors who coordinate matters concerning 
the region’s economies, political and legal systems, environment, tourism 
industry, and efforts toward social integration (SG-SICA 2003a).  The office of 
the Secretary General of SICA is located in San Salvador, El Salvador. 
Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration (Secretaría 
Integración Económico Centroamericano - SIECA) 
 
 The Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) is a 
technical organ of Central American integration that provides expertise and 
administrative assistance within the SICA process.  The SIECA works to support 
the Council of Ministers of Economic Integration to promote regional integration 
 131
and to provide technical support to the Council.  Additionally, SIECA coordinates 
with the Secretary General of SICA to promote economic development in the 
region that is harmonious and in equilibrium with the region’s political, social, 
and cultural goals.  SIECA also works to advance the integration of the Central 
American countries into the world economy and to expand their trade with the 
rest of the world (SIECA 2003).   
 SIECA was initially formed in 1960, within the General Treaty of Central 
American Economic Integration and, after changes in 1991; the 1993 Protocol of 
Guatemala established SIECA as a technical and administrative organ of Central 
American economic integration and giving it broad rights and responsibilities 
(SIECA 2003a).  The administrative leadership of SIECA comes from a secretary 
general and an executive directorship, who oversee several technical committees 
and offices that work on issues related to integration.  Presently, there are two 
committees: the General Coordination Committee and the Technical Committee; 
and four offices (Office of Integration and Trade, the Office of Research, 
Transport, and Trade Negotiation Support, the Office of Judicial Matters, and the 
Office of Technology and Information) (SIECA 2003b).  The SIECA 
headquarters is located in Guatemala City, Guatemala. 
Central American Bank of Economic Integration (CABEI) (Banco 
Centroamericano de Integración Económica - BCIE) 
 
 Perhaps, the largest of the region’s integrating institutions is the Central 
American Bank of Economic Integration.  As a regional development bank, the 
CABEI provide loans for both private and public sector projects.  Its strategy is to 
give priority to private sector businesses that generate high value, such as 
agribusiness, clothing and textiles, and tourism.  To support the private sector, the 
Bank funds public sector transportation, energy production, and 
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telecommunication infrastructure projects.  In addition to these activities, the 
CABEI also provides funding for poverty reduction in Central America and debt 
relief to Honduras and Nicaragua (CABEI 2001: 18-19).   
The Bank’s membership includes the five Central American countries and 
four extra-regional members, which are Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and 
Taiwan.  The government of Spain recently announced its intention to become an 
extra-regional member of the CABEI and the countries of Brazil, Chile, France, 
Sweden, Germany, and South Korea have also been invited to become extra-
regional members (CABEI 2001: 6-7).  CABEI is headquartered in Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras, but has regional offices in each of the Central American capitals.   
Central American Parliament (Parlamento Centroamericano – PARLACEN) 
 The purpose of the Central American Parliament is to represent the people 
of Central America in the regional integration process.  It seeks to provide a 
forum for deliberating political, economic, social, and cultural matters and to 
promote regional cooperation on these issues.  The Parliament also seeks to 
advance participatory democracy in the region and support peace and security 
(Parlamento Centroamericano 2003).  However, the authority of the Central 
American Parliament is limited because it is not allowed to pass binding 
resolutions.  Therefore, its contribution to the integration process is only 
consultatory.  The member nations of the Central American Parliament (or those 
who pledge to conform to its resolutions) are El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Panama and each of these countries is allowed to elect 20 deputies 
to the Parliament by direct popular vote.  Each country’s representation also 
includes their out-going President and Vice-President (Muoz 2001).  In addition 
to the participating countries (which does not include Costa Rica), there are four 
observer member states, which are the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Puerto Rico, 
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and Taiwan.  The observing member countries also send representatives, who 
serve in the Central American Parliament (Parlamento Centroamericano 2003a).   
The Central American Parliament is located in Guatemala City, Guatemala.   
Central American Court of Justice (Corte Centroamericano de Justicia - 
CCJ) 
 
 Article 12 of the Protocol of Tegucigalpa designated the Central American 
Court of Justice as a formal organ of the SICA.  The purpose of the Court is to 
provide rulings to resolve disputes between: member countries of the CACM; the 
CACM’s institutions; and Central American individuals, firms, and organizations 
and the integration apparatus.  The Court has six sitting members, two from each 
country, and six alternates, also two from each country.  Only three of the five 
Central American countries actively participate in the functions of the Court (El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua), which is why the court only has six justices.  
Guatemala and Costa Rica have refused to participate in the Court or to follow its 
rulings, even though the Court continues to assert that all countries, which ratified 
the General Treaty and the Protocol of Tegucigalpa, are subject to its decisions.  
The Court is led by a President, whose position rotates between the countries and 
their representatives, and a Vice-President who is always from a different country 
than the President.  Judgeships on the Court and the Court’s alternates are 
appointed for 10-year terms by their respective countries.   
 In addition to its legal functions, the Court also maintains a library that is 
responsible for publishing texts, investigative reports, and the Gaceta Oficial 
under the supervision of the Court’s Magistrates and its Secretary General.  The 
Gaceta Oficial is the official publication of the Court whose purpose is to provide 
an accurate reporting of the Courts activities, decisions, and findings.  The 
 134
permanent seat of the Central American Court of Justice is in Managua, 
Nicaragua (Corte Centroamericano de Justicia 2003).   
Central American Monetary Council (Consejo Monetario Centroamericano - 
CMCA) 
 
The objective of the Central American Monetary Council is to work 
towards a gradual and progressive monetary and financial integration of the five 
Central American economies and to contribute to the process of regional 
integration.  The Council conducts research, gathers statistics, and develops 
policies, which help Central American countries advance toward macroeconomic 
convergence, while also moving towards the adoption of international financial 
standards.  The Council does not and cannot impose these standards upon the 
member nations and is only able to provide them for each country’s guidance and 
recommendation.   Other functions include facilitating the free movement of 
capital, strengthening Central American capital markets, encouraging regional 
financial institutions to conduct business within the region, and preventing and 
counteracting speculative currency movements. 
   The direction of the organization is under the Council of Presidents 
which consists of the Presidents of each country’s central Banks and an Executive 
Secretary who manages technical and administrative issues.  The Monetary 
Council consists of three permanent committees: the Committee on Monetary 
Policy; the Committee on Capital Markets; and the Committee on Judicial 
Studies.  In addition to these permanent councils, there are temporary committees 
that study topics such as national accounts and national balance of payments in 
the region.  The Central American Monetary Council offices are located in San 
José, Costa Rica (Consejo Monetario Centroamericano 2001) 
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Summary Remarks 
Despite the establishment of these bureaucratic institutions to move 
Central American integration forward, their ability to directly influence the 
process has been limited.  First, none of these institutions (or any other integrating 
institutions in Central America) possess any means of enforcing compliance with 
their policies or in the case of the Central American Court of Justice, its decisions.  
All actions by the Central American integration institutions are taken under the 
advisement of the member nations, which then decide whether or not they wish to 
comply.  Second, not all the Central American countries participate in all the 
organizations.  For example, Costa Rica does not participate in the Central 
American Parliament or in the Central American Court of Justice.  Those 
institutions that do not have full involvement of the five countries tend to be the 
weaker than those have full involvement.  Third, the public’s perception of 
effectiveness and integrity varies among the institutions and, therefore, they are 
not necessarily perceived as a united front moving towards greater regional 
integration.  To some outside observers, the integration institutions appear 
separated and unrelated.  Finally, it is possible that these institutions are working 
towards a goal (regional integration) that may not truly be desired by the 
individual countries.  The national governments have maintained their authority in 
the CACM by strategically subverting the efforts of the integration institutions, 
which further diminishes the effectiveness of these institutions.   
This chapter has described the process of Central America’s regional 
integration and the operations of the multinational institutions that are responsible 
for its implementation.  This chapter has also introduced some of the issues that 
have affected and will continue to affect the CACM and these will be discussed in 
further detail in Chapters 6 and 7.  The conclusion of this chapter also ends the 
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report’s introductory material.  Chapter 5 returns to the original research questions 
identified in Chapter 1 and describe the methodologies and data sources that were 
used to understand whether the Central American Common Market has affected 
the national sovereignty of the Central American countries.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGIES AND DATA SOURCES 
 
 The first question this study seeks to answer is whether the CACM has 
created a supranational “border” around its member countries during the process 
of regional integration.  Establishing the existence of this border is a necessary to 
demonstrate whether there even exists a condition where the CACM trade bloc 
has taken on the characteristics of a supra-national entity.  If this condition can be 
shown to exist, then a second question is whether the CACM has successfully 
challenged the authority of the member nation-states, thus demonstrating the 
supremacy of its sovereignty.  A third question is whether regional identity or 
regional economic integration has provided a supportive role to the CACM’s 
institutions during these conflicts or challenges.  These last two questions give 
some idea of where the CACM exists upon the spectrum of national versus supra-
national authority.  In other words, have the countries of the CACM only given up 
the minimal amount of authority necessary to allow the CACM to exist or has the 
CACM and its institutions acquired sweeping authority so that they act as a 
supranational entity or are they somewhere in between.  To address these 
questions, the study employed several quantitative and qualitative research 
techniques.  The quantitative analysis was directed towards the first question and 
produced empirical evidence to determine whether there was a trend towards 
greater economic integration and the existence of a supranational border.  The 
study’s qualitative research responded to the second and third inquiries, which 
permit an understanding of the CACM’s ability to challenge the authority of the 
nation-state and to what level the Central American identity permits the CACM to 
challenge the nation-state. 
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Quantitative Analyses 
There were three components to the study’s quantitative effort: an analysis 
of the Central American countries’ trade patterns; an analysis of their intra-
industry trade (IIT); and a statistical analysis to determine the existence of a 
supranational boundary around the CACM countries.  Before attempting to 
determine the existence of a supranational border, it made sense to investigate 
whether or not the CACM countries had actually grown their levels of trade with 
one another.  It would be difficult to argue that a supranational boundary exists, if 
there was not evidence showing countries in the region were trading more.  It also 
would be logical to determine whether or not there has been an increase in intra-
industry trade, since this would demonstrate whether economic integration was 
occurring. 
The analysis of Central America’s trade patterns was performed by simply 
aggregating and presenting the data in various formats.  Since this analysis is self-
explanatory, there will not be a discussion of the methodology.  However, the 
analysis of intra-industry trade and the analysis for determining the existence of a 
supranational boundary required more sophisticated techniques, so these 
methodologies will be described in the sections below. 
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE ANALYSES 
There is considerable data to suggest that the Central American countries 
have become more economically integrated with each other and with the rest of 
the world during the past two decades.  However, increases in total trade alone do 
not necessarily prove there has been a trend towards greater economic integration.  
Therefore, it is necessary to look to other types of proof.  One characteristic of a 
region’s growing economic integration is an increase in the level of its intra-
industry trade.  While there exists a perception among many economists that most 
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intra-industry trade occurs primarily between industrialized countries, 
Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983) and Lee (1989) demonstrated that developing 
countries could also engage in these types of activities (Lee and Lee 1993: 159).   
Techniques for Measuring Intra-industry Trade 
Economists have developed several techniques for measuring intra-
industry trade and Balassa (1966) produced one of the first.  Balassa wanted to 
determine whether the European Economic Community was creating an inter-
industry or an intra-industry trade specialization, so he developed the formula for 
measuring intra-industry trade shown below. 
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where: SB is the value of intra-industry trade 
 Xi and Mi are exports and imports of commodity i 
 and n is the sample size 
 
The problem with Balassa’s model was that it assumed that all industries have 
equal weight, regardless of their share of total trade, and it did not correct for 
trade imbalances between countries (Bano 1991: 37). 
 Unsatisfied with the technique, Grubel and Lloyd (1975) devised what has 
become the most commonly used measure of IIT.  They viewed intra-industry 
trade as being “the value of exports of an industry that is exactly matched by the 
value of imports of the same industry” for the same period in the same currency, 
with the remaining value of trade being the inter-industry trade.  Their model 
reports the value of the intra industry trade as a percentage of total trade.  The 
equation for Grubel and Lloyd’s calculation of intra-industry trade was: 
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where:  Xi and Mi are the same as defined earlier 
 Bi is the value of intra-industry trade as a percentage of total trade 
 
One requirement of their model is that the value of Bi must lie between 0 and 100.  
A value of zero would mean that there is no IIT or simply that one country is 
importing or exporting within an industry, without any reciprocal trade, while a 
value of 100 would mean that the amount of trade that is being imported and 
exported in an industry is equal between the two countries. 
Grubel and Lloyd also developed a summary measure, which calculates 
the percentage of intra-industry trade across countries or industrial sectors.  This 
equation weights the average values of Bi for each commodity to the value of total 
trade, creating a more accurate measure of the IIT in the economy.  This formula 
is particularly useful because it also allows researchers to compare the levels of 
intra-industry trade between countries or regions. 
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As with the previous equation, it too produces values that lie between 0 and 100, 
with higher values demonstrating more intra-industry trade (Bano 1991: 38-39). 
Aquino (1978) argued that the Grubel-Lloyd index failed to account for 
trade imbalances, so he recommended the use of the following corrective formula: 
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and where iqM  is analogously defined (Nilsson 1999: 107). 
 
However, Greenaway and Millner (1981) questioned whether it was appropriate 
to adjust the index to account for trade imbalances.  They said, 
…we have no a priori knowledge of the particular set of transactions that 
will be balanced in an equilibrium nor do know the nature and the effects 
of the (balance of payments) adjustment forces initiated by imbalance 
(Greenaway and Miller 1981 quoted in Nilsson 1999: 108). 
 
They also questioned Aquino’s equal/proportional spreading of the trade 
imbalance across industries.  Tharakan (1984, 1986) found that the Aquino 
adjustment produced the values that were “highly correlated with unadjusted 
Grubel-Lloyd indices”, so there was little, if any, benefit to using it (Nilsson 
1999: 108).  Vona (1991) “argued the need for the correction argument is 
theoretically unsound and leads to unreliable adjustment procedure.  His example 
actually suggested that the more plausible values are generated with the 
unadjusted Grubel-Lloyd index” (Lee and Lee 1993: 161).  Finally, Lee and Lee 
(1993) maintained there have been no adjustments made to the Grubel-Lloyd 
index to account for trade imbalances that do not have their own problems 
(Havrylyshyn and Kunzel 1997: 8). 
From a theoretical perspective, because Grubel and Lloyd challenged the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model’s assumption that trade occurs between countries based 
upon their factor endowments, critics of the Grubel-Lloyd measure have said that 
its findings only measure the results of aggregations in the data.  If the data were 
disaggregated to its proper level, they would show the differences in factor 
endowments.  Gray (1978) found that disaggregating the data does lower the 
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value of the IIT, but the IIT phenomenon does not disappear.  Bhagwati (1994) 
contends that scale economies at firms and imperfect competition are what create 
IIT, rather than factor endowments or intensities (Havrylyshyn and Kunzel 1997: 
5).   
Some Recent Studies 
Over the recent past, researchers have used the Grubel-Lloyd measure in a 
variety of studies to investigate the levels of intra-industry trade occurring 
between countries and regions.  Bano (1991) used the Grubel-Lloyd technique to 
investigate Canada’s levels of intra-industry trade with OECD countries, EEC 
countries, and some of the world’s lesser-developed countries.  Bano’s research 
also examined Canada’s intra-industry trade with the United States.   She found 
that Canada had higher levels of IIT with developed countries and that Canada 
had increased its IIT with developing countries that specialize in manufactured or 
semi-manufactured goods.  Canada’s lowest Grubel-Lloyd values were found 
with the oil-exporting countries of the world.  Her results showed that Canada’s 
IIT trade with the United States was not much higher than it was with some 
countries in Europe and Asia.  However, Canadian-U.S. IIT did grow between 
1962 and 1987, with the most growth occurring in the machinery and equipment 
sector.  Lee and Lee (1993) examined intra-industry trade between South Korea 
and the rest of the world.  They found that between 1977 and 1985, South Korea 
increased the level of its intra-industry trade with the world and that South 
Korea’s most intensive IIT was with Panama and other Asian countries.  Murshed 
and Noonan (1996) used the Grubel-Lloyd method to study the patterns of IIT 
between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and between the Republic 
of Ireland and Great Britain.  The researchers found the level of IIT between the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland had decreased between 1978 and 1992, 
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but had risen between the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain.  In a study of 
industrial specialization in Arab countries, Havrylyshyn and Kunzel (1997) found 
that the level of industrial specialization increased in Arab countries as they 
developed, but overall, their levels of specialization were low.  Rodas-Martini 
(1998) analyzed intra-regional trade between the Central American countries in 
1994 and found relatively low levels of intra-industry trade, but among the 
Central American countries, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica were 
engaged in the most IIT.  He also reported Grubel-Lloyd indices for Honduras and 
Nicaragua to be negligible.  Finally, Wyzan (1999) used the Grubel-Lloyd 
measure to determine that Macedonia engaged in considerably less intra-industry 
trade with the European Union than did Slovenia and that the overall level of 
Slovenia’s IIT was declining.   
Analysis of CACM Trade 
Despite the substantial debate that has occurred over the best method for 
measuring IIT, the Grubel-Lloyd measure was judged to be the most appropriate 
tool for determining if there has been a general movement towards more IIT in the 
Central American region.  The results of the Grubel-Lloyd analysis and recent 
trade patterns in Central America will be used to make a case that the Central 
American countries have become more economically integrated. 
THE GRAVITY MODEL ANALYSES 
In order to demonstrate the existence of a “supra-national border” around 
the CACM, a model was created to simulate the flow of goods between the 
countries.  The mechanism of this model is based upon what is called a gravity 
model.  Gravity models are called such, because their origin is derived the 
Newtonian concept of gravity.  The idea of using a gravity paradigm to explain 
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social phenomena was first proposed by H.C. Carey in the mid-nineteenth 
century, while an early version of the gravity model was empirically demonstrated 
to explain retail trade by William Reilly in 1931 (a University of Texas at Austin 
business school professor).  The first significant progress, according to Isard 
(1960), in making the gravity model a useful tool for the social sciences came 
simultaneously from the works of Stewart and Zipf during the late 1940s and the 
1950s (Isard, 1960: 499).  Regardless of the gravity model’s true founder, it has 
become a common tool for economists and regional planners who want to 
estimate the flow of goods between regions.  
In its most basic form, the gravity model is represented by the following 
equation: 
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Where, Iij represents the interaction between two bodies and is expressed as the 
product of their respective masses PiPj divided by their physical distance squared 
dij2 multiplied by a gravitational constant G.  Therefore, in the case of a trade 
gravity model, the two bodies in the equation would be two countries and the 
interaction value would be measured in terms of trade.  The model would show 
that the larger two regions are and the closer the distance between them, the more 
likely they are to trade with one another.  
The explanatory power of a gravity model can often be improved by 
introducing other variables into the equation.  This can be done by applying a 
weight or weights to the masses.  These weights are represented as w in the 
equation below, so that the gravity equation becomes: 
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Another possible adjustment is to raise the distance variable to some power other 
than two.  Raising the distance variable to the second power is consistent with the 
Newtonian theory of gravity, but if there are reasonable reasons to do so, the 
distance variable could be raised to the power of some other more appropriate 
number (Isard 1975: 48).  However, most trade gravity models do not raise the 
distance variable to any pre-specified power, simply using the empirically 
estimated distance value as is.  Additionally, the equation is often specified in 
terms of logarithms, to account for the attenuating effect of distance (Isard, 1975: 
49). 
Theoretical Foundations 
 While the gravity model has had success as a spatial allocation tool, there 
has been concern about its lack of a theoretical underpinning when used to model 
trade flows.  International trade researchers have also expressed this concern and, 
as a result, many have attempted to demonstrate that gravity models could be 
reconciled with trade theory.  Bergstrand (1985) maintained that gravity models 
were a “reduced form from a partial equilibrium subsystem of a general 
equilibrium model with nationally differentiated products” (Bergstrand 1985: 
474).  Deardorff (1995) demonstrated that a simple gravity model could be 
reconciled with two extreme cases of the Heckscher-Ohlin model: frictionless 
trade and complete specialization.  In the study, Deardorff also questioned 
whether any empirically successful theoretical model of trade would not be 
similar to the gravity equation.  Perhaps, he mused, the success of the gravity 
model is “just a fact of life” (Deardorff, 1995: 1-9).  In another study, Evenett and 
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Keller (1998) found support for both the Heckscher-Ohlin and Increasing Returns 
models to explain the empirical success of the gravity model, when production 
was not perfectly specialized across countries (Evenett and Keller, 1998: 1).  But 
most recently, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) reaffirmed the argument that 
the gravity model does not have a theoretical foundation and, they further 
maintain, that it produces biased estimates of variables and does not permit 
comparative static exercises.  However, they presented a new specification of the 
gravity model to eliminate these two problems, giving it a theoretical foundation.  
Recent Studies   
Researchers have used gravity models to investigate many types of social 
science problems.  However, if concentrating on studies that have used the gravity 
model or other econometric methods to determine the existence of border effects, 
there is a small but growing body of work.  Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995) used a 
gravity model with bilateral trade flows to show the existence of “natural” 
regional trading blocs in the Western Hemisphere.  McCallum (1995) modeled 
trade among the Canadian Provinces and between Canadian Provinces and U.S. 
States.  He found that Canadian Provinces were 20 times more likely to trade with 
other Canadian Provinces than with U.S. States of equal distance and economic 
size (Helliwell 1996: 508).  Helliwell (1996) used a gravity model with 1988-
1990 data to model commodity flows among Canadian Provinces and between 
Canadian Provinces and U.S. States to determine the Canadian-U.S. border effect.  
His research found that Quebec was 20.0 times more likely to trade with other 
Canadian Provinces than with U.S. States of similar size and distance.  Engels and 
Rogers (1996) found that national borders partially contributed to differences in 
the consumer prices of similar goods in Canadian and U.S. cities.  Helliwell 
(1998) examined the border effect among Canadian Provinces and between 
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Canadian Provinces and U.S. States between 1988 and 1996.  He found that 
Canadian Provinces were approximately 12.0 times more likely to trade with 
other Provinces of similar distance and economic size in 1996, but the border 
effect had diminished over the study period from its high of 18.5 in 1990.  
Ceglowski (2000) re-examined the Canadian-U.S. border between 1988 and 1996, 
in light of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and found that there had not 
been a significant decline in the border effect after 1989, despite the agreement.  
Finally, Parsley and Wei (2001) found a measurable border effect that accounted 
for price differentials between the United States and Japan.  To a substantial 
degree, these price differentials were explained by distance, unit-shipping costs, 
and exchange rate variability, but elements of a border effect still remain. 
The Research Models 
Two models were specified for this study.  The first model used cross-
sectional datasets and permitted an analysis of the CACM border effect on a year-
by-year basis.  The second group of models used panel datasets, which combined 
all the years of trade data into a single dataset, and this produced estimates of the 
CACM’s border effect for the entire span of the study period.  Each model was 
tested using eight different specifications to determine the effect of certain 
variables.  Table 5.1 identifies the dependent variable and each of the independent 
variables included in the two models, their values, and the expected signs of the 
parameter estimates. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables found in the Cross-Sectional and Panel Dataset 
Analyses 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Type of 
Variable 
Type of 
Value 
Natural Log 
of Value 
Expected 
Sign 
T Trade between Country I and Country J for 
a single SITC Group 
Dependent Discrete Yes n/a 
GDP Gross Domestic Product of Country I or 
Country J 
Independent Discrete Yes (+) 
DIST Distance between Country I and Country J Independent Discrete Yes (-) 
CACM CACM Border Effect Independent Dummy No (+) 
SITC Standard Industrial Trade Classification of 
the commodity 
Independent Dummy No (+) or (-) 
YEAR Year of Trade Data (panel dataset model 
only) 
Independent Dummy No (+) or (-) 
COUNTRY Exporting Country Independent Dummy No (+) or (-) 
 
CACM*SITC CACM Intra-regional Trade Specialization Independent  Interaction 
Term 
No (+) 
COUNTRY*SITC Country Trade Specialization Independent  Interaction 
Term 
No (+) 
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Cross-Sectional Model and Specifications 
The cross-sectional analysis consisted of a series of regressions and 
datasets for each year between 1980 and 1997.  The simplest specification of the 
cross-sectional dataset model is shown below as Specification 1.  The dependent 
variable of Specification 1 is the value of trade between two countries for a 
specific commodity during a single year.  The independent variables are the value 
of GDP for the importing and the exporting countries (GDPi and GDPj) for that 
same year, the distance between the two countries (DISTij), the CACM policy 
variable (CACM), and an error term (εij).  The CACM policy variable was a 
dummy variable, which was assigned a value of one when trade occurred between 
two Central American Common Market countries and assigned a value of zero 
when either the importer or exporter was not in Central America.  
 
(1) ijijjiij CACMDISTGDPGDPT εββββα +++++= 4321 lnlnln  
The second specification for the cross-sectional analysis included a dummy 
variable for each SITC group.  It was believed that trade patterns and 
competitiveness would vary by commodity and that this variable would capture 
these differences. 
 
(2) ijijjiij SITCCACMDISTGDPGDPT εβββββα ++++++= 54321 lnlnln  
Similarly, it was thought that, perhaps, differences between each country’s 
exports might explain the patterns of Central American trade.  Therefore, the 
appropriate dummy variable had a value of one when the exporting country was a 
member of the CACM and a zero if it was not. 
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Specification 4 includes both the SITC and the COUNTRY dummy variables into 
the base model to determine whether accounting for the type of commodity and 
the exporting country would produce a better fit to the data. 
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Specification 5 contains an interaction term between the CACM and SITC 
dummy variables to identify which goods the CACM countries specialized in 
under the trading arrangement. 
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Specification 6 has the same specification as Model 5, but also controls for the 
exporting CACM country. 
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Specification 7 adds an interaction term between the SITC and the COUNTRY 
dummy variables to Specification 6.  This interaction term should account for any 
commodity specialization among the Central American countries relative to the 
control country. 
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Specification 8 is the fully saturated model containing all the independent 
variables.  It is worth noting that the fully saturated model does not contain an 
interaction term between the CACM and COUNTRY dummy variables, since this 
creates a situation of multicollinearity. 
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As mentioned earlier, the primary benefit of the cross-sectional analysis is that it 
produces estimates of a border effect for each year and, thus, the ability to 
determine how the CACM’s border has changed over time.   
Panel Dataset Model and Specifications 
The models for the panel dataset were identical to the cross-sectional 
models, except that a dummy variable was added for each year.  The output of 
these models differed in that they produced only one parameter estimate of the 
CACM’s border effect for the entire 18-year study period.  Because there were 
many more observations using the panel datasets, as opposed to the cross-
sectional datasets, one could have more confidence in the existence of a CACM 
border.  The specifications for the eight panel dataset specifications are provided 
below: 
 (1) ijijjiij YEARCACMDISTGDPGDPT εβββββα ++++++= 54321 lnlnlnln  
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6
54321 lnlnlnln  
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Geographic Organization of the Data 
The various cross-sectional and panel dataset models were arranged into 
several geographic organizations.  One was designed to determine whether a 
supra-national border existed between the CACM and the rest of the world.  The 
second geographic organization examined whether a supra-national boundary 
existed between the CACM and the United States, the region’s single largest 
trading partner.  The third geographic organization examined Central America’s 
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relationship with Mexico.  In addition to Mexico’s proximity and despite the 
relatively low volume of trade between the two, it seemed worthwhile to examine 
this relationship, since Costa Rica has already signed a free trade agreement with 
Mexico and the other Central American countries are seeking similar agreements.  
Finally, Plan Puebla-Panama, if executed, should bring Central America and 
Mexico much closer together in economic terms. 
QUANTITATIVE DATA SOURCES AND PREPARATION 
A number of data sources were reviewed and considered for the Grubel-
Lloyd and gravity model analyses in this study.  The Grubel-Lloyd analyses 
required import and export data for each Central American country with the 
remaining four Central American countries, the world, the U.S., and Mexico.  The 
gravity model analyses needed this same information, but also required data for 
each country’s GDP and the distance between the Central American countries and 
their trading partners.  Among these different data needs, a number of 
characteristics were determined to be necessary: detail; consistency; reliability; 
coverage, and accessibility.   
Trade Data 
The dataset chosen for the Grubel-Lloyd analyses and for part of the 
gravity model analyses was the World Trade Flows Database.  Trade data for the 
individual countries were difficult to find and were almost always provided at a 
level that was too aggregated to be useful.  There were also concerns about the 
reliability and consistency of the datasets, as well as the number of years of 
coverage that were available.  After reviewing the data that were available from 
multinational organizations like the UN and the World Bank, the World Trade 
Flows Database was determined to be the best available option.  
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The World Trade Flows Database is derived from data produced by the 
UN’s Statistical Office.  The UN collects the trade data from individual countries 
by providing them with a classification system, which they are asked to fit to their 
own trade data, as they are best able.  The UN then publishes the data in 
summarized form in the Yearbook of International Trade Statistics and in full 
detail in its Commodity Trade Statistics.  Although it publishes this data yearly, 
the UN does not attempt to supplement the data or make it consistent across 
countries or years.  Statistics Canada takes the UN data and recompiles it 
according to the Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 2 
format.  In doing so, Statistics Canada modifies the UN data to match Canada’s 
classification system and attempts to address some of the variations in the data.  
These adjustments to the trade data include a reconciliation of the import and 
export data between the countries.  The governments of most countries keep good 
records of their imports, because they often charge tariffs or have quotas on them.  
Countries will typically keep less accurate records of their exports unless they 
charge an export tax or the product has been banned for export (both cases are 
rare).  As a result, the records of Country A’s exports to Country B are typically 
different than the records of Country B’s imports from County A.  The World 
Trade Flows Database resolves this issue by simply using the import values from 
County B to estimate the value of trade for Country A’s exports.  Accepting the 
assumption that Country B has the greater incentive to keep more accurate trade 
records between the two countries, Statistic Canada’s method likely produces the 
most accurate trade figure.  The final modified dataset is called the World Trade 
Analyzer (WTA) dataset and it was this dataset that was used for the analyses in 
this study.   
The WTA dataset provides annual coverage of imports and exports for 
most countries in the world between 1980 and 1997 in U.S. dollars (the 1997 data 
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are considered to be preliminary).  The trade data is reported by 4-digit SITC 
code, which was judged to be adequate for any of the planned analyses.  The 
database is distributed on a CD-ROM in ASCII format, so it was easily pulled 
into statistical software for data management and analysis. 
Gross Domestic Product Data 
The data for Gross Domestic Product by country were obtained from a 
CD-ROM containing the UN’s Statistical Yearbook data.  This data source 
provided GDP values in U.S. dollars for the period spanning 1980 to 2000.  The 
UN dataset did not provide GDP estimates for Taiwan (since Taiwanese 
independence is not recognized by the UN), so figures were obtained from the 
World Bank’s Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators 
dataset that was downloaded from a file on their website.  This dataset provided 
annual GDP estimates for Taiwan from 1980 to 1997 at market prices in current 
U.S. dollars.3  Taiwan is an important trading partner with Central America, 
which justified this effort.  Additionally, in a few instances, it was necessary to 
aggregate the GDP of countries or territories so that the format of the GDP figures 
matched the format of the WTA trade data.  Table 5.2 shows the instances when 
GDPs required aggregation.   
                                                 
1 Taiwan’s GDP was not subtracted from the China’s GDP estimate because it was not clear how 
or if the UN included Taiwan’s GDP in the estimate of China’s GDP and because the estimates of 
GDP came from two different sources.   
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Table 5.2: Conversion of GDP Values from the UN Statistical Yearbook Data 
Format to the World Trade Analyzer Database Format 
 
UN GDP Data 
Country 
World Trade 
Analyzer Country 
UN GDP Data 
Country 
World Trade 
Analyzer Country 
Armenia USSR Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau 
Azerbaijan  Cape Verde  
Belarus  Czech Republic Czechoslovakia 
Estonia  Slovakia  
Georgia  Dominica St Kitts Nev 
Kazakhstan  Grenada  
Kyrgyzstan  Montserrat  
Latvia  Saint Kitts and Nevis  
Lithuania  Saint Lucia  
Republic of Moldova  St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
 
Russian Federation  Ethiopia Ethiopia 
Tajikstan  Eritrea  
Turkmenistan  New Caledonia New Caledonia 
Ukraine  French Polynesia  
Uzbekistan  Vanuatu  
Belgium Belgium-
Luxembourg 
Kiribati Kiribati 
Luxembourg  Tonga  
Bosnia-Herzegovina Former Yugoslavia Tuvalu  
Croatia  Guadeloupe Guadeloupe 
Slovenia  Martinique  
Macedonia  United States United States 
Yugoslavia  Puerto Rico  
 
Distance Data 
The data used for the distance variable in the regression analyses were 
obtained from commercial atlas software.  The software provided estimates of 
Great Circle distances from capital to capital.  Great Circle distance is the 
straightest line between two points, taking into account the curvature of the 
Earth’s surface.  This measurement does not take into account the transportation 
networks by which most goods travel, such as highways or shipping routes, which 
typically do not follow a straight line.  This measurement also does not account 
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for the different time requirements of each mode, the efficiency of the 
infrastructure, or the time required for crossing borders.  The unit of measurement 
for the distance variable was in miles and it was the distance from each capital of 
a Central American country to the capitals of all other countries in the world.   
Data Preparation 
The analysis of the World Trade Flow data in this study necessitated that 
the original dataset be manipulated to perform the Grubel-Lloyd and the gravity 
model analyses.  The data on the World Trade Flow CD-ROM are provided in a 
flat ASCII format by year.  The datasets are large (ranging from approximately 
3.0 to 10.0 megabytes per file) and each year is broken into three separate files.  
To make these files useful for the analyses, they were manipulated using data 
management programs written for SAS statistical software.   
For the Grubel-Lloyd analyses, the data from the three annual World 
Trade Flow files were combined into a single file that was then truncated, so it 
only contained the imports and exports for the five Central American countries 
with the rest of the countries of the world.  After which, it was necessary to 
aggregate the 4-digit SITC data into 3-digit SITC groupings.  At this point, the 
data were ready for their final preparation, before being analyzed by the Grubel-
Lloyd equation.  Depending on the geographic unit or the country studied, only 
the data relevant to the analysis were extracted for the final data file.  For 
example, if the purpose of the analysis was to determine the level of intra-industry 
trade between Guatemala and the Central American Common Market, the 
program would only select Guatemala’s imports and exports with the remaining 
four countries of the CACM.  This final dataset could then be pulled into a 
program, which would determine the annual Grubel-Lloyd index for each 3-digit 
SITC group, as well as the weighted mean for the economy as a whole. 
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Similar manipulations of the data were necessary to perform the gravity 
model analyses.  The data preparation began by pulling and combining the three 
annual trade files from the World Trade Flows CD-ROM and extracting the 
imports for the five CACM countries and for whichever unit of geographic 
analysis was being performed.  For example, if the data were needed for the 
CACM-Mexico gravity model analyses, then all the imports for the six countries 
were extracted into this preliminary file.  Remember that the export and import 
values between countries had been reconciled, so it was only necessary to use the 
relevant import values.  At this point, the data were still at the 4-digit SITC level, 
so they were aggregated and made available at the 1-digit SITC and 2-digit SITC 
levels.  Finally, the trade data were merged with another data file containing the 
values for the other independent variables needed for the models (i.e. GDP, 
distance, dummy variables for SITC groups, etc.) and the natural log was taken of 
the dependent and the appropriate independent variables.  These final datasets 
were then available for the 1-digit and 2-digit gravity model analyses. 
Data Issues and Limitations 
Despite the value of the WTA data, there were several limitations to its 
usefulness.  First, the coverage of the data spanned 1980 to 1997, which makes 
even the most recent years somewhat dated.2  Second, users of the WTA dataset 
must assume that the data provided from each country are collected and reported 
with equal accuracy, which is unlikely to be true.  Third, the database did not 
include information for every country in the world.  The countries that were 
known not be included in this database are shown below in Table 5.3, but it is also 
possible that there are others.  Most of the omitted countries were islands in the 
                                                 
2 In late 2001, the Center for International Data at the University of California at Davis reported 
there had been no updates to the World Trade Flows Database and there were no plans, at that 
time, to revise it with newer trade data. 
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West Indies and the South Pacific, principalities in Europe, and countries in 
Africa.  It is possible that the trade data for these countries were aggregated with 
other countries, but if this was case, it was not reported in the dataset’s 
documentation.  Fourth, if the WTA provided trade data for a province or territory 
of a country and the UN database did not provide GDP data, then the trade data 
for the province or territory were deleted (e.g. Greenland).  However, this was 
only necessary in a few circumstances and it is not believed that these exclusions 
had any significant effect on the study’s final findings. 
 
Table 5.3: Countries Known Not to Be Included in the World Trade Analyzer 
Database 
 
Andorra Federated States of Micronesia 
Anguilla Monaco 
Antigua & Barbuda Namibia 
Botswana Nauru 
British Virgin Islands Palau 
Cook Islands Samoa 
Holy See San Marino 
Lesotho San Tome and Principe 
Liechtenstein Swaziland 
Marshall Islands  
 
There were several assumptions and adjustments made to the GDP data 
that were discussed earlier, so they will not be repeated.  However, it is worth re-
emphasizing a limitation that was pointed out earlier, which is the Great Circle 
distance does not take into account the transportation network by which most 
goods travel.  Using this measure certainly does not produce an accurate picture 
of the true distance of a trading partner, in terms of physical distance, time and 
cost.  For example, while the Central American countries are in close proximity to 
one another, they require a significant amount of time and cost to travel between 
them.  This is due to the region’s poor roadway infrastructure, the time spent at 
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border crossings, and the lack of viable roadway or travel mode alternatives.  
Additionally, by only considering the distance between capitals, the assumption 
was made that a country’s entire economic activity occurs in the capital city.  
Obviously, this is not true, especially in a country like the U.S. where there are 
many cities located across a large area engaged in significant economic activity.  
Despite these problems, the Great Circle technique used in this study is consistent 
with other gravity model studies and there did not appear to be any reasonable 
options for addressing these concerns. 
Data Acquisition 
Finally, it is worth noting that all proprietary data used for this study were 
purchased by the Center for Inter-American Studies at the University of Texas at 
Austin and the researcher.  The World Trade Flows Database was purchased on 
CD-ROM from the University of California at Davis, which is the distributor of 
the data to secondary users, under an agreement with Statistics Canada.  The 
United Nations GDP data was purchased directly from the UN’s Publications 
Office and the commercial atlas software was purchased from a retailer of the 
product. 
Qualitative Analysis 
 The qualitative analysis in this study sought to provide additional evidence 
to determine whether the CACM produced a credible threat to the national 
sovereignty of the Central America countries.  The tool used to gather this 
information was a semi-structured interview of persons representing national 
governments, business organizations, and the multinational institutions that 
advance Central American integration.  Among the universe of possible 
interviewees, the persons who represent these types of organizations were 
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believed to have the firmest grasp of the political and technical issues surrounding 
the region’s trade policy, as well as an understanding of Central American 
attitudes towards national sovereignty and regional identity.  These are also the 
persons who are most involved in trade policy at the operational level.  Politicians 
and other individuals or organizations representing strongly partisan views were 
not interviewed, because there was a concern about whether or not they could 
provide knowledgeable, reliable, and accurate information.  Additionally, these 
individuals are seldom directly involved with such issues at a practical level.   
DATA SOURCES 
The interview data were collected during three field visits to Central 
America during the Fall 2001 and Summer 2002, with interviews conducted in: 
Guatemala City, Guatemala; San Salvador, El Salvador; Tegucigalpa, Honduras; 
Managua, Nicaragua; and San José, Costa Rica.  In total, 31 persons were 
interviewed during the three trips.  The organizations represented by the 
participants and the interview locations are located in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6.  In a 
few instances, more than one study participant represented the same institution or 
organization and the tables note when this occurred.  Eleven of the interviewees 
represented multi-national institutions, eight represented national governments, 
and twelve represented private industry groups.3 
The interview participants differed, in terms of their years experience and 
their positions working on Central American integration and trade issues.  Some 
participants held very senior positions, such as a member of a cabinet or an 
executive director of a trade organization, while other participants held more 
                                                 
3 The University of Texas at Austin’s Institutional Review Board does not allow study participants 
to be identified without their permission.  The permission to identify participants was not obtained 
during this study.  As a result, none of the data collected from the interviews are reported in a 
manner that would allow any information to be directly attributed to an individual by name. 
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junior positions.  Regardless of their work experience, each of these individuals 
proved themselves to be appropriately knowledgeable of trade issues in their 
country.  Additionally, the disciplines of the participants varied and this diversity 
was thought to have broadened the perspective of the research. 
 
Table 5.4: Multinational Institutions with Study Participants 
 
INSTITUTION LOCATION 
Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration 
(SIECA) 
Guatemala City, Guatemala 
Secretariat General of the System of Central American 
Integration (SG-SICA) (2 interviews) 
San Salvador, El Salvador 
Central American Bank of Economic Integration (CABEI)  
(2 interviews) 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras 
Central American Monetary Council San Jose, Costa Rica 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)  
(2 interviews) 
Guatemala City, Guatemala 
Central American Parliament (PARLACEN) Guatemala City, Guatemala 
Central American Court of Justice Managua, Nicaragua 
 
 
Table 5.5:  National Governments with Study Participants 
 
MINISTRY OR INSTITUTION LOCATION 
Costa Rican Ministry of Foreign Trade (2 interviews) San Jose, Costa Rica 
Nicaraguan Ministry of Promotion, Industry, and Commerce Managua, Nicaragua 
Salvadoran Ministry of Foreign Relations – General Office of 
Promotion and Economic Relations 
San Salvador, El Salvador 
Salvadoran Ministry of Agriculture and Ranching San Salvador, El Salvador 
Salvadoran Ministry of Economy San Salvador, El Salvador 
Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Relations (2 interviews) Guatemala City, Guatemala 
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Table 5.6: Private Industry Organizations with Study Participants 
 
ORGANIZATION LOCATION 
Foundation for Investment and the Development of Exports 
(FIDE) 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras 
National Chamber of Milk Producers  San Jose, Costa Rica 
National Association of Industrialists Tegucigalpa, Honduras 
Costa Rican Chamber of Industries San Jose, Costa Rica 
Salvadoran Association of Poultry Growers (AVES) San Salvador, El Salvador 
Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce and Industry San Salvador, El Salvador 
Salvadoran Association of Rice Beneficiaries San Salvador, El Salvador 
Unified Association of Exporters of Non-Traditional Products Guatemala City, Guatemala 
Guatemalan Chamber of Industries Guatemala City, Guatemala 
Nicaraguan Chamber of Industries Managua, Nicaragua 
Foundation for the Entrepreneurial Development of Small 
and Medium Businesses 
Managua, Nicaragua 
Honduran Association of Medium and Small Industries Tegucigalpa, Honduras 
 
Readers interested in additional detail on the study’s interviewing 
technique should refer to Appendix A of this report. 
DATA LIMITATIONS 
There are potential limitations to the data collected during the semi-
structured interviews.  First, the use of the interviews assumes that the individuals 
did not provide information that was biased by their own perspectives or opinions, 
unless they were specifically asked for this information.  Second, there may have 
been errors created by the interviewees incorrectly recalling a fact or an event or 
they may have even purposely provided a misleading answer.  Third, with the 
exception of one participant, none of the interviews were conducted in the native 
language of both the interviewer and interviewee.  Therefore, opportunities 
existed for the misunderstanding of both the questions and the responses during 
the interviews.  Fourth, because the researcher was not a fluent speaker of the 
Spanish language, it was not possible for him to fully understand the content of 
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the Spanish interviews and to ask follow-up questions, which was done during the 
interviews conducted in English.  Therefore, generally, more specific information 
was collected from the English-speaking participants than from the Spanish-
speaking participants.  Despite these potential limitations, it is still believed that 
the information collected during these interviews provided accurate information 
about Central American integration, national sovereignty, and regional identity 
that could not have been gathered using any other technique. 
Summary 
 To determine the effects of the CACM agreement on the national 
sovereignty of the Central American countries, this study chose to approach the 
issue using a battery of analytical tools.  The quantitative analysis consisted of 
three methods: a basic trade analysis to show the region’s trade patterns during 
the study period; an analysis of intra-industry trade to determine if the Central 
American economies were becoming more integrated, using the Grubel-Lloyd 
technique; and a gravity model analysis to estimate the existence of a supra-
national boundary around the CACM.  The study’s qualitative analysis was based 
upon a series of semi-structured interviews of individuals at multinational 
institutions, national governments, and at organizations representing Central 
America’s private sector. 
Each of these four techniques required collecting large amounts of data 
and assembling them for analysis.   For the quantitative methods, a significant 
effort was put into building the computer datasets needed to calculate the Grubel-
Lloyd measure and to execute the gravity model.   These datasets included Central 
America trade data for all commodities and countries between 1980 and 1997 at 
various SITC levels, GDP data for every country in the world between 1980 and 
1997, and distance data between every Central American county’s capital and the 
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capital of every other country in the world.  Data collected for the qualitative 
method required making several field visits to Central America, to carry out 31 
interviews with individuals of various ranks, from Ministers of Foreign Trade to 
junior level government bureaucrats.  The overall effort produced a set of strong 
datasets for each type of analysis and provided greater confidence in the final 
research findings.   
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CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 The discussion in Chapter 4 indicated there has been a significant and 
sustained political effort to achieve economic integration in Central America.  
However, it is also necessary to produce empirical evidence that demonstrates the 
countries have become economically integrated, before one can argue that a 
supra-national boundary might exist around them.  This chapter will first discuss 
the results from the trade analysis of the World Trade Analyzer (WTA) data, 
which partially describe Central America’s integration between 1980 and 1997.  
This analysis of Central America’s trade patterns may seem somewhat repetitive, 
since historic intra-regional trade data were discussed in Chapter 4.  However, the 
WTA trade data presented in this section also shows the CACM’s extra-regional 
trade with the rest of the world, the United States, and Mexico.  These results 
create a basic context for understanding the Grubel-Lloyd analysis and the gravity 
model results.  The Grubel-Lloyd analysis results will show the asymmetry of the 
CACM’s development, which resulted in some countries growing their intra-
industry trade with the region while other countries did not.  Finally, the existence 
of a supra-national boundary around the CACM countries is revealed during the 
presentation of the gravity model results.  However, the responses of the study 
participants during the field interviews challenge the gravity model’s empirical 
findings and question the existence of the supra-national CACM border. 
  The Economic Integration of Central American, 1980-1997 
 Between 1980 and 1997, the total value of Central America’s intra-
regional and extra-regional trade grew substantially, but it was not a period of 
steady or symmetric growth.  In 1980, the total value of intra-regional exports was 
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approximately $1.2 billion and, subsequently, fell every year after that until 
reaching its lowest point of $446 million in 1986.  Starting in 1987, intra-regional 
trade began to grow again and was approximately $1.8 billion by 1997 (See Chart 
6.1).  The aggregated WTA data reflected some of the major events in Central 
America that were discussed in Chapter 4: the world recession of 1981, regional 
debt crisis, and general economic malaise of the early 1980s; the collapse of the 
regional currency clearinghouse in 1986; and the revival of trade after 1991, with 
the signing of the regional peace agreements and the efforts to reinvigorate the 
CACM.   
Among the five countries, each increased their total value of exports to 
other CACM countries, with the exception of Honduras.  In 1980, Honduras’ 
intra-regional exports were approximately $87.6 million and eventually fell to 
$70.0 million in 1997 (See Graph 6.1).  The greatest beneficiary of the CACM 
was El Salvador, which more than doubled its intra-regional exports from $281.1 
million in 1980 to $581.3 million in 1997.  Guatemala also benefited from the 
CACM, increasing its intra-regional exports from $458.7 million in 1980 to 
$695.6 million in 1997.  Although Costa Rica was usually the largest export 
economy in Central America during this period, the country emphasized extra-
regional markets for its exports.  However, Costa Rica’s intra-regional exports 
still grew from $288.1 million in 1980 to $400.0 million in 1997.  Finally, 
Nicaragua’s intra-regional exports, which were $82.9 million in 1980, reached 
their lowest point of $16.0 million in 1986, but then rose afterwards to reach 
$123.0 million in 1997. 
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Graph 6.1: The Value of Exports to CACM Countries, 1980-1997 
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Source: Robert Feenstra.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 - World Trade Analyzer Database.  
Center for International Data, Institute for Governmental Affairs, University of California 
at Davis, 2000. 
 
The pattern for total intra-regional imports between the Central American 
countries is identical to the pattern shown for CACM exports, because the WTA 
trade data set reconciled import and export figures (See Graph 6.2).  However, 
there are differences in the values of imports for the individual countries.  El 
Salvador and Guatemala are the largest importers of goods produced within the 
region at $527.0 and $402.7 million in 1997, respectively.  The third largest 
importer of Central American goods was Honduras, which imported $379.2 
million worth of goods in 1997.  Nicaragua’s imports placed it fourth at $292.5 
million in 1997, while Costa Rica imported only $267.3 million of goods from 
Central America for that same year, placing it last.   
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Graph 6.2: The Value of Imports from CACM Countries, 1980-1997 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
M
ill
io
ns
 U
S$
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Total
 
Source: Robert Feenstra.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 - World Trade Analyzer Database.  
Center for International Data, Institute for Governmental Affairs, University of California 
at Davis, 2000. 
 
THE CACM’S SHARE OF CENTRAL AMERICA’S TOTAL TRADE 
 Although the total value of Central America’s intra-regional exports 
increased between 1980 and 1997, its percentage share of the region’s total 
exports fell (See Graph 6.3).  In 1980, almost 25.0 percent of the region’s exports 
went to Central American countries but, by 1997, this figure had dropped to 17.7 
percent.  Comparing the country data for the period between 1980 and 1997, only 
El Salvador increased the percentage of its total exports to CACM countries, 
contrary to the trend for the remaining countries that reduced their dependence 
upon the CACM.  In the case of Honduras, by 1997, the CACM became an almost 
insignificant market for the country’s export goods, purchasing less than 6.0 
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percent of them.  A Costa Rican policy of concentrating on export markets outside 
of the region is also evident, by the small percentage of exports that went to other 
CACM countries.  In 1997, less than 9.0 percent of Costa Rica’s exports went to 
intra-regional trading partners. 
 
Graph 6.3: Percentage of Total Exports to CACM Countries, 1980-1997 
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Source: Robert Feenstra.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 - World Trade Analyzer Database.  
Center for International Data, Institute for Governmental Affairs, University of California 
at Davis, 2000. 
 
 The percentage of total imports coming from Central America countries 
also declined between 1980 and 1997.  In 1980, the Central American countries 
imported approximately 20.0 percent of their goods from other Central American 
countries, but by 1997, that figure had dropped to just under 12.0 percent (See 
Graph 6.4). 
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Graph 6.4: Percentage of Total Imports from CACM Countries, 1980-1997 
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Source: Robert Feenstra.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 - World Trade Analyzer Database.  
Center for International Data, Institute for Governmental Affairs, University of California 
at Davis, 2000. 
 
CACM TRADE WITH THE WORLD1 
 The value of exports from the CACM countries to the rest of the world 
increased substantially between 1980 and 1997.  In 1980, the value of extra-
regional exports was approximately $3.6 billion, rising to almost $8.7 billion in 
1997.  As a percentage of its overall trade, the CACM’s extra-regional exports 
also increased between 1980 and 1997, as is shown in Graph 6.5 (which is simply 
an inverse of Graph 6.3).  The WTA data show that CACM-World trade during 
the early 1980s grew as a percentage of total trade, in part due to declining intra-
                                                 
1 Note that the figures in this discussion do not include intra-regional trade.  Therefore, the 
characteristic decline in trade during the 1980s, caused by a fall in intra-regional trade, is less 
pronounced. 
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regional trade and occasionally due to higher commodity prices.  After its highest 
share of total CACM trade in 1986, CACM-World trade declined modestly as 
trade linkages were reestablished in the region.  The overall trend during the study 
period, with the exception of El Salvador, was for all the Central American 
countries to send a greater share of their total exports outside of the region, 
demonstrating their proportionately deeper involvement in the global economy. 
 
Graph 6.5: Percentage of the CACM’s Exports to the Rest of the World,        
1980-1997 
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Source: Robert Feenstra.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 - World Trade Analyzer Database.  
Center for International Data, Institute for Governmental Affairs, University of California 
at Davis, 2000. 
 
Central America has demonstrated an even stronger demand for imports 
from the rest of the world.  In 1980, the region imported $4.8 billion of goods 
from the rest of the world, while in 1997 the value of those imports had grown to 
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$13.7 billion (See Graph 6.6).  In fact the increase of Central America’s imports 
has outstripped the growth of its exports, creating a large imbalance of trade.  This 
trade imbalance has been sustained in part, by the remittance of wages from 
Central American workers, borrowing and foreign aid.  As with its extra-regional 
exports, Central America’s extra-regional imports made up a larger share of the 
total imports in 1997.  This same pattern was true for each of the Central 
American countries. 
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Graph 6.6: Percentage of the CACM’s Imports from the Rest of the World, 
1980-1997 
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Source: Robert Feenstra.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 - World Trade Analyzer Database.  
Center for International Data, Institute for Governmental Affairs, University of California 
at Davis, 2000. 
 
CACM TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES 
 By 1997, almost half of Central America’s exports were going to the 
United States.  During the 18-year study period, the percentage of total Central 
American exports to the United States grew, although not steadily.  There was a 
noticeable spike in 1986, when coffee prices were high, and a noticeable dip 
during the late 1980s, when the United States imposed a trade embargo on 
Nicaragua (1986-1989).  The effects of the embargo were significant and, by 
1988, Nicaragua exports to the United States totaled only $67,000 (See Graph 
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6.7).  After Nicaragua transitioned from the Sandinista regime to the UNO 
government, the country’s export trade with the United States began to grow 
rapidly.  With the exception of El Salvador, the percentage of each country’s total 
exports being sent to the United States grew for each of the countries between 
1980 and 1997, including Nicaragua.  Among the Central American countries, 
Honduras was the most dependent upon the United States, which served as a 
market for approximately 65 percent of its total exports in 1997. 
 
Graph 6.7: Percentage of the CACM’s Total Exports to the U.S., 1980-1997 
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Source: Robert Feenstra.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 - World Trade Analyzer Database.  
Center for International Data, Institute for Governmental Affairs, University of California 
at Davis, 2000. 
 
 Similarly, more than half of Central America’s imports were from the 
United States in 1997.  Between 1980 and 1997, each of the Central America 
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countries imported an increasing share of their goods from the United States.  In 
the case of Honduras, these goods accounted for approximately 65 percent of total 
imports in 1997, up from 42.5 percent in 1980 (See Graph 6.8).  As with exports, 
there was sharp drop in the value of Nicaragua’s imports from the United States 
during the trade embargo between 1986 and 1989, but the value rose dramatically 
after 1989.  
 
Graph 6.8: Percentage of the CACM’s Total Imports from the U.S., 1980-1997 
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Source: Robert Feenstra.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 - World Trade Analyzer Database.  
Center for International Data, Institute for Governmental Affairs, University of California 
at Davis, 2000. 
 
CACM TRADE WITH MEXICO 
 Mexico was a minor export market for most of the Central American 
countries between 1980 and 1997, which is surprising due to their proximity to 
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one another.  In fact, in 1997, less than 2.0 percent of Central America’s total 
exports went to Mexico (See Graph 6.9).  On the other hand, this is not 
necessarily unreasonable because many of the products that the Central American 
countries export are also grown or manufactured in Mexico.  In 1980, the total 
value of the region’s exports to Mexico was $26.2 million, rising to $195.5 
million in 1997.  During this period, Guatemala and Nicaragua generally sent the 
largest share of their exports to Mexico.  
 
Graph 6.9: Percentage of the CACM’s Total Exports to Mexico, 1980-1997 
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Source: Robert Feenstra.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 - World Trade Analyzer Database.  
Center for International Data, Institute for Governmental Affairs, University of California 
at Davis, 2000. 
 
 Mexico has a more important role in Central American trade as a producer 
of goods.  Central American imports from Mexico increased significantly in 
monetary terms between 1980 and 1997, but as a percentage of total trade, the 
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growth has been modest.  In 1980, the five Central American countries imported 
approximately $229.0 million worth of goods from Mexico, while in 1997 this 
figure was more than $1.26 billion or about 8.0 percent of total imports (Graph 
6.10).  During the early 1980s, the percentage share of Central American imports 
from Mexico was growing at a rapid pace, but they dropped sharply in 1986 (after 
a decline in global oil prices and the collapse of the regional currency 
clearinghouse) and rose very slowly from that point onward.  Guatemala imported 
the most products from Mexico during this period, which totaled $527.6 million 
in 1997.   
 
Graph 6.10: Percentage of the CACM’s Total Imports from Mexico, 1980-1997 
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INTRA-INDUSTRY INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE 
The Grubel-Lloyd analysis was performed to determine whether the 
growth of Central American trade has also been accompanied by an increase in 
the level of intra-industry trade.  If intra-industry trade did grow, this would 
provide additional evidence of an increasing level of economic integration in the 
region.  Chart 6.11 shows the weighted Grubel-Lloyd indices for each of the five 
Central American countries, with the remaining four CACM countries, between 
1980 and 1997.  Perhaps what is most obvious from this chart is the disjuncture 
between the countries in terms of intra-industry trade.  The more economically 
developed Central American countries, which are Costa Rica, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala engaged in substantially higher levels of intra-industry trade than the 
less developed Central American countries of Honduras and Nicaragua.   
El Salvador experienced the greatest increase of intra-industry trade over 
the 18-year period (its 1980 Grubel-Lloyd index of 47.5 rose to 55.7 in 1997), 
followed by Guatemala (a 1980 Grubel-Lloyd index of 47.8 that increased to 
53.5).  Costa Rica, on the other hand, engaged in less intra-industry trade with its 
Central American neighbors in 1997 than it did in 1980.  Its Grubel-Lloyd index 
fell from 53.4 in 1980 to 48.3 in 1997, as the country expanded its trade linkages 
with countries outside of Central America.  Honduras also experienced a decline 
in intra-industry trade with the remaining four countries from 1980 to 1997.  In 
1980, Honduras’ Grubel-Lloyd index was 30.9, falling as low as 14.6 in 1987, 
before rising again to a value of 24.4 in 1997.  Nicaragua, on the other hand, was 
able to improve its overall level of intra-industry trade, but it experienced two 
dips during the early and mid-1980s and the early 1990s.  During its conflict with 
the U.S. in the mid and late-1980s, the country was forced to replace its lost trade 
with imports from Central America, which may account for some of the rise 
between the dips in Graph 6.5.  By 1997, Nicaragua’s Grubel-Lloyd index value 
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had improved, but it was still the lowest in the region at 21.2.  Overall, the results 
of the aggregated Grubel-Lloyd analysis for the 1980 to 1997 period show mixed 
results.  Three of the five countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua) 
improved their intra-industry trade, while the other two countries became less 
integrated (Costa Rica and Honduras).  A more detailed country-by-country 
Grubel-Lloyd analysis is available in Appendix B and Appendix C. 
 
 Graph 6.11: 3-Digit SITC CACM-CACM Grubel-Lloyd Indices, 1980-1997 
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The Existence of a Supranational Boundary 
The gravity model analysis of this study did provide evidence that a supra-
national border existed around the CACM.  The strength of this border, however, 
differed, depending upon the specification of the model and the geographic unit of 
analysis.  This section provides the gravity model results for each of the 
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geographic units that were studied (CACM-World, CACM-U.S., and CACM-
Mexico) for both the cross-sectional dataset analyses and the panel dataset 
analyses.  The regression results included in the body of this report are 
summarized into tables and charts, but more detailed findings by model 
specification and by year can be found in the appendices.  It was not possible to 
provide the complete results of each parameter estimate for each specification, 
since doing so would have required several thousand pages.  The cross-sectional 
data regression analysis summaries are found in Appendix D and summaries of 
the panel dataset regression analyses are located in Appendix E.  
CACM-WORLD 
 The cross-sectional analysis of CACM-World trade demonstrated 
that there was a border effect between the countries of the CACM and the 
remainder of the world, between 1980 and 1997.  However, the strength of this 
border fluctuated on a frequent basis and was essentially non-existent between 
1988 and 1990.  Table 6.1 provides a summary of the cross-sectional analysis 
results for each of the 18 years of data for the fully specified model (Specification 
8).  Additionally, Chart 6.12 provides a year-by-year graphical representation of 
the parameter estimates for the CACM variable for the fully specified model.   
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Table 6.1: CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis – 
Specification 8 
 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 334 5702 0.3410 1.60791 0.74728 2.15 0.0315 
1981 331 5722 0.3048 0.88592 0.87863 1.01 0.3134 
1982 328 5535 0.2979 0.59601 1.04876 0.57 0.5699 
1983 327 5507 0.3155 2.16961 1.05179 2.06 0.0392 
1984 318 5468 0.3236 1.37999 1.90064 0.73 0.4678 
1985 316 5652 0.2746 1.74057 1.19660 1.45 0.1458 
1986 313 5707 0.2716 0.39495 0.85059 0.46 0.6424 
1987 346 5946 0.2793 1.71596 0.80114 2.14 0.0322 
1988 336 6440 0.2632 -0.41864 1.09755 -0.38 0.7029 
1989 348 6557 0.2861 -0.22097 0.63257 -0.35 0.7269 
1990 347 6807 0.3001 -0.31015 0.74619 -0.42 0.6777 
1991 346 6883 0.3013 0.56097 0.66139 0.85 0.3964 
1992 349 7313 0.3174 1.77095 0.66080 2.68 0.0074 
1993 373 7762 0.3327 1.75127 0.76943 2.28 0.0229 
1994 361 8026 0.3365 0.94392 0.73292 1.29 0.1978 
1995 363 8286 0.3317 1.68054 0.81064 2.07 0.0382 
1996 369 8769 0.3299 1.24314 0.78288 1.59 0.1123 
1997 375 8796 0.3556 0.02103 0.79411 0.03 0.9789 
 
The variation in the parameter estimates for the cross-sectional data 
analysis is a reflection of the turbid economic and political conditions that existed 
in Central America during most of the study period.  These conditions also 
affected the model’s ability to predict the parameter coefficient, which is reflected 
in the low R2 values for the fully specified model and poor p-values for many of 
its parameter estimates.  Despite these limitations, the parameter estimates appear 
to have captured some of the effects of major economic events that affected 
Central America (See Graph 6.12).  The immediate decline of the parameter 
estimates in 1981 and 1982 was the likely result of a world recession that began in 
1981 and reduced both intra-regional and extra-regional trade.  When the 
recession was over, intra-regional trade continued to fall due to civil unrest and 
macroeconomic problems during the early and mid-1980s, although extra-
regional imports and exports began to recover.  The downward movement of the 
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parameter estimate, after 1983, was exacerbated by two major events in 1986: 
first, the regional currency clearinghouse collapsed, with intra-regional trade 
declining to its lowest point of the decade; and, second, world coffee prices 
spiked as the result of a drought in Brazil (Food and Agriculture Organization 
2000).  These events caused an increase in the value of extra-regional trade and 
decline in the value of intra-regional trade, which together reduced the value of 
the CACM parameter estimates.  In addition to these events, during the early and 
mid-1980s, Central America’s trade patterns were also being affected by currency 
devaluations and a regional debt crisis that likely had a diminishing effect on 
intra-regional and extra-regional trade.  However, the most visible decline of the 
CACM-World parameter estimates occurred between 1988 and 1990, when 
Nicaragua was deeply embroiled in its civil war and the country was under a U.S. 
imposed trade embargo.  Nicaragua was also hit by Hurricane Joan in 1988 and 
there were estimates that the effects of the storm reduced Nicaragua’s annual 
GDP by 40 percent (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 2003).  
Factors impacting the CACM parameter estimates during the late 1980s were the 
large amounts of intra-regional debt that stifled intra-regional trade and 
encouragement from multinational lending institutions to focus their export 
strategies on markets outside of the CACM.  The trade embargo by itself would 
have caused the border effect to increase, rather than decrease, so other factors 
must have been more influential.  The model estimated a large increase for the 
parameter estimate in 1992, which began to diminish every year thereafter.  
Perhaps not coincidentally, this jump in 1992 followed the signing of the Protocol 
of Tegucigalpa, which revived intra-regional trade.  There was a downward spike 
of the CACM parameter estimate in 1994, followed by another increase of the 
parameter estimate in 1995, before it fell to value of almost zero in 1997. 
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 The final chart shows the transformed parameter estimates of the CACM 
variable, which becomes the “border effect” or the likelihood of trade to occur 
within the CACM instead of with a non-CACM country (See Graph 6.13).  To 
find the border effect, the parameter estimates were transformed by calculating 
the value of their antilog.  Graph 6.13 shows that at its highest point during the 
study period, the border effect between the CACM and the rest of the world was 
about 9.0 in 1983, which means that the CACM countries were nine times more 
likely to trade with themselves than with the rest of the world.  Between 1988 and 
1990, during the U.S. embargo of Nicaragua, the border effect fell below 1.0, 
which implies that the countries were more likely to buy goods in the world 
market than from within the CACM.  IN 1992, the CACM-World border effect 
rose to a value of about 6.0, after the signing of the Protocol of Tegucigalpa, but 
ended the study period with value just above 1.0, meaning CACM countries were 
just as likely to trade within the region as they were extra-regionally. 
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Graph 6.12: CACM Parameter Estimates - CACM-World 2-Digit Analyses, 
1980-1997
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Graph 6.13: CACM Border Effect with the World, 1980-1997
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 The panel dataset analysis provided additional evidence of a CACM 
border, with each model producing a parameter estimate that showed a border 
effect greater than 1.0 for the period between 1980 and 1997 (See Table 6.2).  
When the parameter estimates of the various specifications for the panel dataset 
model were transformed, the border effect between the CACM and the rest of the 
world was estimated to range from 1.71 to 3.64, which are fairly modest values.  
Similar to the cross-sectional analyses, the adjusted R2 values for all of the 
specifications were relatively low, with the SITC variable substantially boosting 
the explanatory power of the model.  Each of the specifications produced 
estimates of the CACM variable that were highly significant (at more than the 
99.99 percent level of confidence), but this is not surprising, given the large 
number of observations (120,895).   
 
Table 6.2: Results of CACM Variable Using Panel Data Set – CACM-World 
Analysis 
 
Model Adjusted R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Border 
Effect 
Specification 1 0.1280 0.53705 0.02523 21.29 <0.0001 1.71 
Specification 2 0.2254 0.60437 0.02390 25.29 <0.0001 1.83 
Specification 3 0.1288 0.55284 0.02621 21.09 <0.0001 1.74 
Specification 4 0.2265 0.65265 0.02483 26.28 <0.0001 1.92 
Specification 5 0.2509 1.19865 0.14278 8.40 <0.0001 3.32 
Specification 6 0.2521 1.29138 0.14296 9.03 <0.0001 3.64 
Specification 7 0.2786 0.87232 0.02441 35.73 <0.0001 2.39 
Specification 8 0.3054 0.85076 0.17906 4.75 <0.0001 2.34 
 
CACM-UNITED STATES 
 The results of the CACM-US regression analysis produced significantly 
larger estimates of the CACM coefficient during many of the years, than was 
found in the CACM-World analysis (See Graph 6.14).  As would be expected, the 
CACM parameter estimates increased during the recession of the early 1980s 
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when total trade with the United States was falling, but then began a downward 
movement during the mid-1980s as civil unrest and macroeconomic conditions 
diminished the level of intra-regional trade and extra-regional exports recovered 
slightly.  The abrupt changes that occurred during 1986 and 1987 likely reflect the 
collapse of the regional currency clearinghouse and the spike in coffee prices that 
was mentioned during the discussion of the CACM-World results.  Central 
American exports of coffee were a significant percentage of total exports to the 
United States at the time.  Surprisingly, the CACM border effect fell during the 
United States trade embargo with Nicaragua, even though total U.S.-CACM trade 
fell initially.  Nicaragua’s intra-regional trade grew modestly during the embargo, 
assumedly as a replacement for some of its trade with the United States, so it 
would seem logical for the border effect to have risen (i.e. less extra-regional 
trade and more intra-regional trade).  The exact reason for the observed effect is 
not fully understood, but as pointed out earlier, there were many other economic 
issues that existed at the time that may have been responsible for this change.  
After 1990, the CACM-U.S. border effect started a steady downward decline and, 
by 1996, the parameter estimates had acquired negative values. 
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Table 6.3:  CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis – 
Specification 8 
 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 330 1225 0.5690 3.98437 1.17479 3.39 0.0007 
1981 326 1213 0.5735 5.55029 1.27464 4.35 <0.0001 
1982 325 1177 0.5629 5.95889 1.38936 4.29 <0.0001 
1983 319 1161 0.5148 6.47116 1.53785 4.21 <0.0001 
1984 314 1119 0.5379 4.77031 1.21690 3.92 <0.0001 
1985 309 1065 0.4653 5.86566 1.65247 3.55 0.0004 
1986 303 1007 0.5259 -3.37757 1.49501 -2.26 0.0242 
1987 324 1056 0.4789 12.69257 2.19469 5.78 <0.0001 
1988 326 1092 0.5885 3.52199 1.38047 2.55 0.0109 
1989 338 1152 0.6217 3.87694 0.95892 4.04 <0.0001 
1990 339 1230 0.6282 6.68539 1.14439 5.84 <0.0001 
1991 341 1288 0.6248 2.95947 0.94113 3.14 0.0017 
1992 344 1326 0.6362 2.60649 0.95376 2.73 0.0064 
1993 369 1454 0.6780 2.53430 0.96042 2.64 0.0084 
1994 359 1438 0.6601 3.20845 0.90493 3.55 0.0004 
1995 359 1464 0.6841 2.36844 0.87303 2.71 0.0068 
1996 368 1509 0.6789 -0.16352 0.97678 -0.17 0.8671 
1997 371 1553 0.6742 -0.82817 1.09343 -0.76 0.4490 
 
Chart 6.15 provides the transformation of the CACM parameter estimates.  
The chart is displayed on a logarithmic scale, due to the high values of some of 
the transformed values.  In 1980, the fully specified model (Specification 8) 
predicted that the CACM countries were approximately 54 times more likely to 
trade with one another than with the United States.  This figures rose to a high of 
646 in 1983, before plummeting in 1986 to less than 1.0, before rising to the 
incredibly high value in 1987 of 325,322.  In 1988, the border effect dropped 
again, despite the U.S. trade embargo with Nicaragua and growing intra-regional 
trade, before rising again in 1990.  After 1990, the CACM-U.S. border effect 
began to decline significantly and by 1997 was less than 1.0, meaning the CACM 
countries were more likely to trade outside of the region than within it.
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Graph 6.14: CACM Parameter Estimates - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit Analyses, 1980-1997
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Graph 6.15: CACM Border Effect with the United States, 1980-1997
0
0
1
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
C
A
C
M
-
U
.
S
.
 
B
o
r
d
e
r
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
Border Effect
 192
 The results of the panel data analysis also demonstrated the existence of a 
CACM-U.S. border effect.  The estimates of this border effect covered a broad 
range, depending upon the model specification.  Specification 3 of the model 
estimated the smallest border effect at 3.60, while Specification 5 estimated the 
largest at just over 67.0.  All of the parameter estimates of the CACM variable 
were statistically significant at a greater than 99.99 percent level of confidence.  
As with the cross-sectional analysis, the adjusted R2 values for the CACM-U.S. 
models were better than for the CACM-World analysis, with the SITC variable 
adding considerable explanatory power. 
 
Table 6.4: Panel Data Results – CACM-U.S. Analysis 
 
Model Adjusted R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Border 
Effect 
Specification 1 0.2276 2.42154 0.15420 15.70 <0.0001 11.26 
Specification 2 0.3978 2.44696 0.13654 17.92 <0.0001 11.55 
Specification 3 0.2395 1.28228 0.17983 7.13 <0.0001 3.60 
Specification 4 0.4120 1.28729 0.15843 8.13 <0.0001 3.62 
Specification 5 0.4535 4.20484 0.23276 18.07 <0.0001 67.01 
Specification 6 0.4705 2.89387 0.24286 11.92 <0.0001 18.06 
Specification 7 0.5330 1.50753 0.14204 10.61 <0.0001 4.52 
Specification 8 0.5939 2.52393 0.24941 10.12 <0.0001 12.48 
 
 
Despite these findings of some very strong border effects between the 
CACM countries and the United States in this analysis, the true border effect is 
probably not as high as was estimated by the regression models.  Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) demonstrated that gravity models tend to estimate a larger 
border effect for smaller countries, when studying trade between a large and a 
small country (or in this case a group of countries).  This is because the 
proportional impacts of any trade fluctuations have a greater effect on the smaller 
countries than on the larger ones.  One could assume, if the model used trade data 
from the U.S. perspective instead of the Central American perspective, that the 
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estimated border effects would have been much smaller.  At a more general level, 
the fact that the United States is Central America’s largest trading partner 
challenges the notion that the Central American countries are much more likely to 
trade with one another than with the United States.  Therefore, the results of the 
parameter estimates shown here are likely an artifact of the gravity model’s 
limitations and the type of trading relationship that exists between the Central 
American countries and the United States, as well as unique historic events.  More 
specifically, U.S. trade with Central America is driven by commodity prices and 
the demand for offshore manufactured goods, which affects the value of the 
region’s exports and how much income is available for importing goods.  Central 
American exports to the U.S. are primarily found in a few obvious sectors, most 
notably coffee, fruit, textiles, and apparel.  The volatility of prices for the 
agricultural products may also partially explain the fluctuations observed in the 
results.  In addition, the data studied for this research included a period when 
there were numerous Central America crises and, if it were to only include data 
from the 1990s, the results would likely be less chaotic. 
CACM-MEXICO 
 The analysis of CACM-Mexico trade produced a pattern of CACM 
parameter estimates that were similar to the CACM-U.S. trade, in the sense that 
there were wide swings in the estimate of the CACM-Mexico border effect 
between 1986 and 1987 and that there was a trend towards a falling CACM-
Mexico border effect after 1990 (See Graph 6.16).  There was sharp drop in the 
CACM-Mexico border effect, between 1981 and 1982, that was likely caused by a 
spike in oil prices, which increased the value of Central America’s petroleum 
imports.  The CACM parameter estimate rose again in 1983, but then began to fall 
sharply, particularly in 1986 when the regional currency clearinghouse and oil 
 194
prices collapsed.  The former event was relevant to CACM-Mexico trade because 
Mexico was also a member of Central America’s currency clearinghouse.  This 
fall was followed by a spike in the value of the parameter estimate that was 
similar to the CACM-U.S. border effect in 1987 and then a subsequent decline in 
1988.  After 1990, the value of the CACM parameter estimate began to diminish, 
almost reaching zero in 1997.  The pattern of the parameter estimates for CACM-
Mexico trade was similar to the pattern for CACM-U.S. trade, although the values 
of the estimates were lower.  From the perspective of Anderson and van Wincoop, 
the smaller border effects could be explained by the smaller value of Mexico trade 
versus U.S. trade, but there were still large fluctuations of the parameter estimates 
because Mexico’s total trade volume is still much larger than Central America’s. 
 
Table 6.5: CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis – 
Specification 8 
 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 308 1006 0.6333 4.53621 0.93390 4.86 <0.0001 
1981 309 1004 0.5338 0.94661 1.09637 0.86 0.3882 
1982 307 977 0.5514 1.31916 1.16708 1.13 0.2588 
1983 294 926 0.5818 6.05908 1.17608 5.15 <0.0001 
1984 292 881 0.5822 3.82036 1.52890 2.50 0.0127 
1985 279 840 0.5145 3.31107 1.35981 2.43 0.0152 
1986 275 809 0.4691 2.03012 1.24823 1.63 0.1045 
1987 299 868 0.4998 10.45451 1.49117 7.01 <0.0001 
1988 307 961 0.5815 2.90653 0.99307 2.93 0.0035 
1989 319 1030 0.5581 2.56687 0.87081 2.95 0.0033 
1990 318 1056 0.6131 3.91974 1.07569 3.64 0.0003 
1991 322 1106 0.5520 1.29984 0.76781 1.69 0.0909 
1992 331 1184 0.5635 2.21899 0.74498 2.98 0.0030 
1993 353 1286 0.6216 1.90861 0.80034 2.38 0.0173 
1994 347 1279 0.6391 1.32245 0.75524 1.75 0.0803 
1995 348 1309 0.6739 3.42940 0.72202 4.75 <0.0001 
1996 354 1365 0.6645 3.39726 0.67704 5.02 <0.0001 
1997 359 1421 0.6767 0.46471 0.66432 0.70 0.4844 
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 After transforming the parameter estimates, Specification 8 of the model 
estimated the CACM-Mexico border effect to be approximately 93.0 for 1980.  
Thereafter it fluctuated, rising to about 428 in 1983, then falling to 7.6 in 1986 
(See Graph 6.17).  The sharp rise that followed in 1987 produced an estimated 
border effect of 34,700, which was followed by a sharp fall in 1988 to 
approximately 18.  After 1990, when the CACM-Mexico border effect was 
approximately 50.0, the overall movement was downward, ending at a value of 
1.59 in 1997.   
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Graph 6.16: CACM Parameter Estimates - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit Analysis, 1980-
1997
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Graph 6.17: CACM Border Effect with Mexico, 1980-1997
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Finally, the panel dataset analysis of CACM-Mexico trade gives the last 
piece of corroborative evidence of a supranational border around the CACM 
countries (See Table 6.6).  The CACM-Mexico border effect estimates for the 
models ranged from the 8.50 to 39.65.  The CACM parameter estimates for each 
of the models were statistically significant at a level greater than 99.99 percent.  
 
Table 6.6: Panel Data Results – CACM-Mexico Analysis 
 
Model Adjusted R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Border 
Effect 
Model 1 0.0812 2.39519 0.09331 25.67 <0.0001 10.97 
Model 2 0.3184 2.66213 0.08073 32.98 <0.0001 14.33 
Model 3 0.0821 2.14021 0.11186 19.13 <0.0001 8.50 
Model 4 0.3198 2.37978 0.09657 24.64 <0.0001 10.80 
Model 5 0.3826 3.68008 0.21941 16.77 <0.0001 39.65 
Model 6 0.3842 3.39742 0.22486 15.11 <0.0001 29.89 
Model 7 0.3768 2.40348 0.09271 25.93 <0.0001 11.06 
Model 8 0.4001 2.40348 0.09271 25.93 <0.0001 11.06 
 
INTER-SECTORAL ANALYSIS 
Another source of information produced by the gravity model results were 
the coefficient values of the CACM*SITC interaction term, which identify intra-
regional industry specialization relative to a base industry.  A review of the 
CACM-World analysis identified relatively large negative coefficient estimates 
for those industries which the CACM countries exported a high value of goods, as 
well as for those industries in which they were significant importers.  A few 
examples of the higher estimates are provided below in Table 6.7.  The model 
estimated the parameter coefficient for coffee, for example, which is the CACM’s 
major export crop to the world, to be –3.11.  In the case of natural energy 
resources, which Central America lacks, the parameter estimates of the 
CACM*SITC interaction term for gas, coal, and petroleum were -2.53, -2.13, and 
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-1.91, respectively.  There was also a large negative parameter coefficient for 
textile fibers (-2.56), which is an input for the many off-shore manufacturing 
facilities located primarily in Honduras and Guatemala.   
 
Table 6.7: Examples of Industries Not Benefiting from Intra-regional Trade 
 
Industry Represented Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and 
manufactures thereof 
cacmsitc07 -3.11102 0.20745 -15.00 <0.0001
Textile fibers (except wool 
tops) and their wastes 
cacmsitc26 -2.55912 0.22993 -11.13 <0.0001
Coal, coke and briquettes cacmsitc32 -2.12630 1.01116 -2.10 0.0355
Petroleum, petroleum products 
and related material 
cacmsitc33 -1.90587 0.22918 -8.32 <0.0001
Gas, natural and manufactured cacmsitc34 -2.53243 0.75630 -3.35 0.0008
 
Table 6.8 shows some of the industrial sectors that produced positive 
estimates of the CACM*SITC parameter.  A positive value for the interaction 
term suggests that the CACM developed a specialization in these industries 
relative to the base CACM industry.  The industries identified in the analysis as 
having this specialization were generally consistent with those identified in the 
literature on Central American industrialization, comments from study 
participants, and the results of Grubel-Lloyd analysis.  They included industries 
producing foodstuffs, medicine and pharmaceutical products, household cleaners 
and chemicals, textiles, and footwear.  The analysis also demonstrated that 
Central America has been able to specialize in some non-consumer good 
industries, such as the manufactures of rubber products, paperboard, metals, and 
electrical machinery.  Overall, however, the region remains highly dependent 
upon imports of manufactured goods from the rest of the world. 
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Table 6.8: Examples of Industries that Received Some Benefit from Intra-regional 
Trade 
 
Industry Represented Variable
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value
Cereals and cereal preparations cacmsitc04 1.00776 0.22444 4.49 <0.0001
Miscellaneous edible products 
and preparations 
cacmsitc09 1.86218 0.22497 8.28 <0.0001
Electric current cacmsitc35 1.75451 0.88515 1.98 0.0475
Medicinal and pharmaceutical 
products 
cacmsitc54 1.37588 0.21236 6.48 <0.0001
Essential oils and perfume 
materials; toilet cleansing 
material 
cacmsitc55 2.04529 0.21547 9.49 <0.0001
Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. cacmsitc62 1.76189 0.22936 7.68 <0.0001
Paper, paperboard, articles of 
paper, paper-pulp/paperboard 
cacmsitc64 1.64780 0.21691 7.60 <0.0001
Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up 
art., related products 
cacmsitc65 1.47013 0.20891 7.04 <0.0001
Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. cacmsitc69 1.27313 0.21302 5.98 <0.0001
Electrical machinery, apparatus 
& appliances n.e.s. 
cacmsitc77 1.37749 0.22220 6.20 <0.0001
Footwear cacmsitc85 1.09439 0.22835 4.79 <0.0001
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 
cacmsitc89 1.46623 0.21053 6.96 <0.0001
 
Synthesis of the Quantitative Results 
The gravity model analysis produced empirical evidence that a supra-
national boundary did exist around the CACM countries.  The strength of this 
boundary has tended to fluctuate greatly over the study period and by the unit of 
analysis, but has shown a general downward movement during the mid-1990s, as 
the CACM countries became more active in the world economy.  The value of 
intra-regional trade increased substantially among the Central American countries 
between 1980 and 1997.  At the same time, Central America’s trade with the rest 
of the world, the U.S., and Mexico also grew rapidly.  In fact, Central America’s 
extra-regional trade grew at a faster rate than its intra-regional trade.  Therefore, 
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trade between the Central American countries has become less important to 
Central America as a whole than has its trade with the rest of the world.  Because 
of this trend, it is not surprising that supranational borders around the CACM 
diminished, as the Central American countries became more engaged in the world 
economy.  The Grubel-Lloyd analysis showed that the movement towards greater 
economic integration in Central America was asymmetric during this period.  
Some countries of the CACM became more integrated (El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Nicaragua), while others did not (Costa Rica and Honduras).  These findings 
question whether there actually was an overall tendency towards greater economic 
integration in the region or whether such arguments were simply political and 
institutional rhetoric.  This is a difficult question to answer and the responses from 
the study’s participants were mixed.  Some believed that regional integration was 
occurring and the process was moving forward, while others simply viewed the 
CACM as a trade agreement.  At the same time, intra-regional trade, regional 
integration, and the Central American Common Market are still important to the 
Central American countries and they will likely continue their efforts to improve 
trade flows and regional integration.  The qualitative component of this study will 
question whether the supranational borders shown by gravity models did indeed 
exist or whether they were nothing more than econometric mirages. 
National Sovereignty in the Central American Common Market 
 The empirical evidence showing the existence of a supranational border 
around the Central American countries contradicts the reality of the CACM that 
was revealed during the interview process.  The individuals interviewed at 
multinational institutions, national governments, and private sector organizations 
identified numerous issues related to the exercising of national sovereignty that 
have diminished the authority of the Central American Common Market and its 
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institutions.  These issues included: limited participation in the CACM; territorial 
disputes; the lack of a dispute resolution process; national oligopolies and 
monopolies; and uneven benefits from the CACM.  Many of these issues have 
existed for some time and, despite repeated attempts to do so, the region has been 
unable to solve them.  Their continued existence will provide multiple 
opportunities for the individual countries to pursue policies of national self-
interest and will weaken regional integration. 
PARTICIPATION IN THE CACM 
Central American countries regularly limit their participation in the 
CACM agreement by avoiding membership in multinational institutions or 
agreements and through regularly flouting the rules of the common tariff.  The 
unwillingness of some countries to become members in the CACM’s 
multinational institutions has weakened these organizations, which makes them 
incapable of solving some of the problems of the integration.  However, many 
would argue this capability would be tenuous, even if all the CACM’s 
multinational institutions had the full support of all five countries.  Costa Rica has 
been the country to most often decline membership in Central America’s region-
wide institutions and agreements and, when it has decided to join them, it has 
frequently been the last country to ratify them.  Costa Rica is not a member of the 
Central American Court of Justice nor is it a member of the Central American 
Parliament.  Costa Rica also does not participate in the CA-4 intra-regional 
migration agreement nor is it involved in the discussions to form a Central 
American customs union.  Costa Rica’s reluctance to become involved with some 
of Central America’s multinational institutions has been based upon their 
concerns about corruption and, in the case of the Central American Court of 
Justice, protecting the country’s national sovereignty.    In other areas, such as the 
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CA-4 agreement, Costa Rica’s lack of participation has likely been to limit 
migration into the country.  Their reluctance to participate in a Central American 
customs union is being driven by concerns that it could lower the standards of the 
products imported into the country and create a risk to public health and safety.  
While these concerns are not without merit, to a significant degree, Costa Rica’s 
limited participation in the integration of Central America is based upon their 
inherent belief that they are exceptional among the Central American nations.  
There is a fear among Costa Ricans that too much contact with the other countries 
of Central America will invite their problems into the country.  Costa Rica was 
the only country to maintain a stable democracy in a region that suffered civil war 
and severe economic crises during the 1980s and that experience has hardened 
these beliefs.  To be fair, Costa Rica is not the only country that has refused to 
participate in a multinational institution.  Guatemala is also not a member of the 
Central American Court of Justice.   
The history of the CACM has been replete with instances of member 
countries ignoring the region’s common tariff schedule and typically, their actions 
have been protectionist or retaliatory in nature.  The domestic industries in most 
Central American countries are relatively small and many are not very 
competitive in open markets.  Naturally, they face enormous pressure when more 
efficient firms or producers enter their market from another Central American 
country.  When this happens and if a firm or group of producers is unable to 
compete effectively, they will often take the most direct method to gaining relief, 
which is to pressure their national governments into creating barriers to the 
competing foreign goods.  This pressure may come collectively, such as from a 
group of agricultural producers, or it may come from individuals or organizations 
that represent groups of firms.  These individuals or groups often have direct and 
significant influence with government officials and force their governments to 
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take action.  For their part, Central American governments have used a variety of 
techniques to limit or stop the inflow of foreign products.  Increasing the tariff for 
a competitive good is the most direct route of protectionism, but it usually causes 
the effected country to retaliate.  In addition, unilaterally increasing a tariff is a 
very blatant mechanism that can invite multinational criticism for failing to 
comply with the CACM agreement.  Therefore, many times, goods are prevented 
from entering into a country under the guise of sanitary standards, disease control, 
product labeling, standards compliance, etc.  While the intent of these restrictions 
is usually transparent, they often create situations that can require months of 
discussion and negotiation to either prove or disprove the allegations and to take 
action, if any action is warranted, thereby having the desired protectionist effect. 
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
 According to several of the study participants, one of the most significant 
drivers of nationalism and the choice of exercising national sovereignty over 
regional cooperation in Central America has been the region’s many territorial 
disputes.  National anger or frustration over territorial disputes often manifests 
into other areas of public policy that are not related to the issue at hand.  One 
outlet for frustration over territorial disputes in the region has been for a country 
to raise tariffs and create other barriers to trade against the “offender” nation.   
A recent example of such behavior began in 2001.  Nicaragua became 
angry when Honduras signed a treaty recognizing Colombia’s right to the San 
Andres Islands.  Although this issue was unrelated to trade, Nicaragua “punished” 
Honduras for signing the treaty, by unilaterally raising the tariff on all Honduran 
imports to 35 percent.  Such action was clearly in violation of the CACM 
agreement and the Central American Court of Justice said so as well.  Despite 
this, Nicaragua continues to ignore a ruling to return to the CACM tariff scheme, 
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citing Honduras’ previous refusal to obey a ruling by the Court on an unrelated 
matter.  This type behavior is not atypical in the region, since tariffs are one of the 
few non-military weapons available to a country that cannot afford and probably 
does not want a war.  In response to the Nicaraguan tariff, Honduras has since 
raised its tariff on Nicaraguan imports to 35 percent.   
Trade-related strategies like these will sometimes lead the countries into 
discussions or negotiations, but they also hinder both countries economically and 
politically.  Additionally, they weaken the spirit of cooperation within the CACM, 
which makes the integration process that much more difficult.  Finally, the ability 
of individual countries to take unilateral actions on their tariff rates, citing 
national sovereignty as the justification and without any real consequence from 
other Central American countries (other than possible political pressure), means 
that Central America’s economic integration is constantly under strain. 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES 
 The most commonly cited problem of the CACM agreement, among the 
study participants, was the lack of an effective dispute resolution process.  In fact, 
participants in each of the three groups (multinational institutions, national 
governments, and private-sector organizations) raised this topic as an issue.  Most 
trade disputes in the CACM are resolved at the Vice-Ministerial or Ministerial 
level, although, at times, a trade issue may require negotiations at the Vice-
Presidential or even the Presidential level before it is resolved.  But solving trade 
problems through the political process, as opposed to a multinational 
administrative system, is undesirable for at least two reasons.  First, it is very 
time-consuming.  Although Central America’s political leaders meet numerous 
times each year, they have set agendas and it may take some time for a particular 
trade issue to be discussed.  During this period, firms are not exporting their 
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goods or paying higher tariffs and consumers may have fewer choices and are 
likely paying higher prices.  Second, when trade problems enter into the political 
arena for resolution, it is much easier for the offending country to barter 
compliance with an issue unrelated to trade.  Over the long-term, the politicization 
of trade makes it a convenient and effective foreign policy tool for pressuring 
other countries on a wide range of matters.   
There has been an attempt to resolve the existing dispute resolution issue 
by creating a separate administrative body, which would be independent of the 
Central American Court of Justice.  However, the Court of Justice ruled that this 
was not permissible without first amending the Protocols that formed the CACM.  
In response to the Court, the Council of Presidents produced an amendment to 
form a separate multinational administrative body to settle trade disputes and two 
of the five Central American countries have ratified this amendment.  However, it 
still awaits ratification by one more CACM country, before it can take effect. 
 Another problem of the CACM agreement is the inability of the Central 
American Court of Justice, or any other institution, to enforce any of the CACM 
rules.  There are no multinational institutions in the CACM agreement, including 
the Court of Justice, that are able to levy fines or impose any types of sanctions to 
force any of the Central American countries to abide by the Court of Justice’s 
rulings or by the terms of the CACM agreement.  As a result, countries in the 
CACM are able to accept or dismiss the Court of Justice’s rulings and CACM 
trade rules at will.  This does not mean that rules are regularly ignored, but as 
many study participants pointed out, individual countries will impose their 
national sovereignty over the rule of the Court and the CACM agreement, if they 
believe it is to their advantage.  Additionally, because only three of the five 
countries participate in the Court, Guatemala and Costa Rica do not accept the 
Central American Court of Justice’s authority in matters where they are a party.  
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Therefore, the Court of Justice’s true power lies in its ability to regulate Central 
America’s institutions of integration and it has been relatively successful in that 
regard.  It has made numerous decisions on matters that have affected the roles 
and authority of SICA, SIECA, and the CABEI, as well as other multinational 
integrating institutions. 
 A third institutional problem of Central American integration is the 
weakness of the Central American Parliament.  Among the unaffiliated study 
participants who broached the topic, the Central American Parliament was widely 
perceived as ineffective, serving only a ceremonial function and it is incapable of 
passing enforceable legislation.  The Parliament is also a significant consumer of 
the limited funds available for integration and most Central Americans do not 
perceive it to create many benefits.  Detractors of the Parliament also accuse it of 
providing opportunities for politicians to avoid corruption or other charges in their 
home countries.  This is unfortunate, because the Central American Parliament 
would be the logical institution for rule-making, if there were political integration 
in the future, but this seems unlikely given the reputation that it has already 
developed. 
OLIGOPOLIES AND MONOPOLIES 
Informal agreements, the import-substitution policies that the Central 
American countries pursued during the 1960s and 1970s, and subsequent 
protectionist policies have had the effect of creating a number of national 
oligopolies and, in some cases, monopolies in the region.  One set of monopolies 
created in the region that was mentioned most often during the interviews is that 
of the beer industry.  According to several participants, beginning in the 1960s, 
the families who owned the breweries in each country agreed to avoid 
competition by only selling their beer domestically as part of a “gentleman’s 
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agreement”.  Even in 2002, it was only possible to purchase domestically 
produced Central American beer in each country, although U.S. and Mexican 
beers are available throughout the region.  The benefit of systems like these to the 
owners of Central America’s monopolistic and oligopolistic firms has been the 
opportunity to accrue great wealth and political power, which have been used to 
preserve these favorable market conditions.  However, these monopolies and 
oligopolies are being weakened by the region’s involvement in various free trade 
agreements.  Local producers are being forced to compete with foreign producers 
and many are losing the economic and political power they once had.    In the case 
of the beer industry, a South African firm has purchased the breweries in 
Honduras and El Salvador and it is questionable whether they will be willing to 
remove themselves from competing in the other Central American markets.  
Under these circumstances, global free trade has begun to restructure the 
economic and political structure of Central American, so that in the future, the 
region’s leaders may be influenced less by the power of the traditional elites. 
UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS 
 The benefits of the CACM agreement have not been the same for all 
countries and, within the economies of the CACM countries, the benefits have not 
been the same for all sectors.  In those countries that do not perceive there being 
substantial benefits from their membership in the CACM, there is weaker support 
for further regional integration.  Among the Central American countries, the 
general perception of the study participants was that El Salvador and Guatemala 
have benefited the most from Central American Common Market.  Costa Rica is 
perceived to have benefited to a lesser degree and Honduras and Nicaragua have 
benefited the least of all.  In a few cases, it was felt that the economies of 
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Honduras and Nicaragua have actually been hurt by their membership in the 
CACM.   
El Salvador is likely the strongest proponent of expanding intra-regional 
trade in Central America, since this trade makes up a significant percentage of the 
country’s GDP.  Additionally, given the small size of the country’s land area and 
its large population, El Salvador must pursue industrial development, if it is to 
employ its population and improve their living standards.  It is also easier for El 
Salvador to compete in the Central American market than in the global market, 
which has contributed to their enthusiasm for more Central American trade.  
Guatemala’s position is similar to El Salvador’s and, while it does not have the 
same constraints of density, it still has a large population and manufacturing base 
that need economic opportunities.  
 Although Costa Rica benefits less from its involvement in the CACM 
agreement now than it has in the past, the CACM agreement has had profound 
effects on the Costa Rican economy.  During the 1960s and 1970s, the CACM’s 
strategy of import substitution and preferential trade with the other Central 
American countries permitted Costa Rica to develop the most diverse and 
strongest industrial sector in the region.  The strength of Costa Rican industry has 
allowed it to enter into global economy as an exporter of industrial goods, which 
is a feat that has proven more difficult for the other Central American countries.  
Over the recent past, the government’s emphasis has been to concentrate its 
efforts on expanding the country’s export trade outside of the region.  However, a 
change in presidential administrations in 2002 has brought a new willingness to 
improve Central American trade and to pursue further economic integration 
within the region. 
 Some of the participants interviewed for this research project believed that 
the CACM agreement has created a negative impact to the economies of 
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Honduras and Nicaragua.  Both countries are poorer than their neighbors and have 
substantially smaller industrial bases.  Some participants argued that firms in 
Honduras and Nicaragua were not competitive within the region because their 
manufacturers did not have access to the appropriate technology.  At the same 
time, their populations are among the least educated in the region and, therefore, 
they do not have the knowledge to take advantage of most technological 
improvements, even if they were to become available.  One Honduran participant, 
while a supporter of the CACM, pointed out that many industrialists in his 
country are less interested in competing on a regional basis and would prefer to 
maintain and protect their domestic markets.  However, this is becoming an 
increasingly more difficult strategy for CACM countries to follow, since the same 
trade agreements that allow them to export the agricultural and manufactured 
products to support their economies also require them to open their markets to 
foreign goods.  
Summary 
 The analysis of the WTA data show that, between 1980 and 1997, Central 
America generally became more integrated in the global economy and, 
proportionately, the CACM became less important.  In the case of Honduras, by 
1997, less than 6.0 percent of its total exports went to other CACM countries.  At 
the other end of the spectrum was El Salvador, which became more dependent 
upon the CACM in 1997 than it was in 1980. In 1997, almost 40 percent of El 
Salvador’s exports went to intra-regional trading partners.  The trade patterns 
were even more asymmetric for intra-industry trade.  Between 1980 and 1997, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua grew their intra-regional, intra-industry 
trade, while Costa Rica and Honduras diminished theirs. 
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 The gravity model analyses provided evidence of a supra-national border 
around each of the three geographies that were examined in this study: CACM-
World; CACM-U.S.; and CACM-Mexico.  The CACM border effect was 
relatively modest between the CACM countries and the rest of the world, but the 
model estimated fluctuated and sometimes produced very large values for the 
CACM-U.S. and CACM-Mexico border effects.  While some of these 
fluctuations can be explained by economic events, there may also be limitations to 
the gravity model identified by Anderson and van Wincoop that caused it to 
overestimate the border effect between large and small countries. 
 Despite the findings of a supranational border around the CACM, in 
economic terms, there was significant evidence gathered during the interviewing 
process to question whether this border actually exists.  The Central American 
countries have not been willing to give up more than the minimal amount of 
national sovereignty necessary to make the CACM work and one could 
reasonably question whether they even do that.  This would certainly put the 
CACM nation-states in the least restrictive end of the continuum defined in 
Chapter 2.  In light of all of this, the question then becomes, can the CACM 
countries and the region as a whole prosper in this condition or will there be a 
need for changes and reforms to propel the region forward? 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
 The analysis in this report has produced evidence that there does indeed 
exist a “border” around the five CACM countries, which is supranational in 
nature.  However, when the question is asked, “Does the trade bloc possess the 
strength to compete and challenge the authority of the nation-states of Central 
America”, the answer is an unequivocal, no.  In fact, on numerous occasions, it 
has been the governments of the Central American nation-states, which have 
successfully challenged the authority of the Central American Common Market 
and its institutions.  They have done this by: refusing to follow its rules and tariff 
schedules; by not relinquishing national authority in regional agreements; and, in 
some cases, by refusing to participate in the region’s integration institutions.  
These actions have been deliberate and conscious efforts by the Central American 
countries to promote their national self-interest and to avoid losing national 
sovereignty.  Additionally, the region’s population does not support the trade bloc 
in its challenges by the nation-state, because most of the region’s population only 
has a vague Central American identity.  Any Central American identity that does 
exist is secondary to a much more powerful national identity or in some cases, an 
ethnic identity.  Finally, the uneven benefits of regional economic integration 
have eroded some public support for the CACM and its institution.  Given this 
experience, it is unlikely that citizens in some countries would favor a unified 
Central America over their own nation-state. 
The findings of this research do not necessarily disprove the argument that 
multinational trading blocs threaten the authority of the nation-state.  This is 
because it would be difficult to argue that the CACM provides an optimal 
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example of multiple countries acting as a single economic unit.  In fact, how the 
Central American countries have protected their national sovereignty in the case 
of the CACM is somewhat of an extreme.  Nevertheless, the countries of Central 
America are engaged in a sincere effort toward economic integration and, 
although conflict and the pursuit of national self-interest has hampered this 
process, the five countries are, at least in some ways, acting more like a single 
economic unit than five separate ones.  Over the past forty years, Central 
American integration has not been a complete success, but it has realized a 
number of significant accomplishments.  Therefore, the findings of this study do 
contribute to the understanding of how regional trading blocs affect national 
sovereignty, but is certainly not definitive. 
The remainder of this chapter will offer some final thoughts about the 
future prospects of Central American integration and the likelihood of Central 
American unification.  It will also make some policy recommendations to the 
Central American countries for improving the regional integration process, with a 
parallel argument that these recommendations will also strengthen national 
sovereignty. 
Future Prospects for Central American Integration 
 During field visits to Central America in mid-2002, most of the study 
participants believed that the Central American countries were working towards 
greater economic integration.  However, the driving force behind this movement 
was not so much an internal desire among the Central American countries to 
become more integrated with one another.  Instead, it was in a response to the 
U.S. government’s desire that the countries align themselves on trade issues, so 
that it will be easier to negotiate a trade agreement with the region.  While each 
Central American country would just as well sign a unilateral agreement with the 
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United States, the United States has told the Central American countries that it 
will only negotiate with them as a region.  The short-term effect of this policy has 
been a renewed interest and greater efforts toward Central American integration 
by the individual countries.  Although it was already in the process of being 
negotiated, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua hope that a 
functioning customs union by the year 2004 will demonstrate their commitment to 
regional alignment on trade policies. 
 In addition to pressure from the U.S. government to strengthen the 
region’s integration efforts, there is also pressure coming from the EU and from 
the private sector.  The EU has provided considerable funding and technical 
assistance to the Central American countries to assist them in their integration 
efforts.  In fact, according to some of the study participants, the EU is pushing the 
Central American countries to adopt a political and economic system that is 
similar to their own.  Although their technical and financial assistance is 
welcomed, the Central American countries generally do not want to follow the 
EU model.  It is also unlikely that the U.S. would support a policy that pushed 
regional integration to a level similar to the EU (historically, U.S. policy has 
vacillated between an integrated and a separated Central America).  Finally, 
private-sector firms have expressed a desire to see the region become more 
integrated, so that it would be easier for them to invest and serve the region with 
their goods and services.   
 Therefore, at present, the future prospects for Central American 
integration appear to be good.  The region’s integration efforts advanced nicely 
during the 1990s, after the signing of the regional peace agreements and several 
protocols during the early 1990s.  The volume of trade during the 1990s increased 
dramatically and there is evidence that at least some of the countries have become 
more integrated in terms of their intra-industry trade.  The region is also working 
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towards creating a customs union that should be operational within the next few 
years.  The prospect of a free-trade agreement with the United States has created 
an additional stimulus to the region’s integration efforts and there was renewed 
interest on the part of Costa Rica’s current administration (in mid-2002) to make 
further Central American integration and trade a top priority.   
However, despite the relatively positive outlook for Central American 
integration over the near term, there are potentially hindering issues that may arise 
over the longer-term.  There is the possibility that the countries will become even 
more oriented towards the United States, if they are able to negotiate free-trade 
agreement, and intra-regional trade could suffer.  This could mean a concentration 
of export goods that are targeted for the U.S. market, which have historically been 
agricultural products and goods manufactured in maquiladora facilities, which do 
not lead to a sustainable industrialization of the countries.  At the same time, more 
consumption goods might be imported from the United States, which would 
compete with the consumer goods produced by Central American firms.  The real 
benefit to a free-trade agreement with the United States, as one study participant 
stated, is not the possibility of lower tariff rates and more trade, but the 
opportunities it would create for foreign direct investment in Central America.  
Under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the countries of Central America 
already have very low tariffs with the United States, so a U.S.-CACM free-trade 
agreement would only lower those already low tariffs.  However, new foreign 
investment could significantly benefit the Central American economy and its 
efforts to industrialize.  Issues that could negatively affect Central America’s 
current move towards greater integration would be if hostilities intensified 
between Nicaragua and Honduras or if there was a radical regime change in any 
of the countries.  
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Future Prospects for Central American Unification 
If the participants of this study have typical views for Central Americans, 
there are two commonly held and distinct perspectives about the likelihood of a 
Central American reunification.  Those two viewpoints are “sometime, many 
years in the future” or “never”.  A future unification of Central America would 
only occur if there were a number of successfully executed steps of regional 
integration.  In addition to finally establishing a free trade zone and a customs 
union, the region would also need to integrate in terms of its monetary policy (or 
adopt a common currency), social policy, and political policy.  Economic 
integration is the first step towards political integration (or in this discussion 
unification) and it may well be the easiest, since there can be very tangible 
benefits to doing so.  Other types of integration, such as with social and political 
policy, offer fewer tangible benefits.  This is where the difficulties of Central 
American unification could begin, because the countries have different and 
sometimes conflicting points of view on a variety of issues.  For example, it 
would be particularly difficult for Costa Rica and the remaining four countries to 
reconcile their social policies, given the Costa Rican government’s commitment 
to this matter over the past 50 years, which has not been matched by the other 
countries.  
 Despite the problems, there could be potential economic benefits derived 
through a reunification of the Central American countries.  First, combining the 
five countries into one larger nation would immediately create a market area of 
more than 40 million people.  With a population of this size, it would be easier for 
the region to develop a broader industrial base, because it could support a greater 
variety of producers and products than presently exists.  A unified Central 
America would also allow firms to reach economies of scale and it would be more 
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likely to encourage competition.  On the other hand, many of the persons living in 
this nation would be poor and, therefore, would have a limited ability to purchase 
consumer goods.  A second benefit is that reunification would create a common, 
overarching taxing and legal framework, which could make it easier to invest in, 
import from, and export to the region.  Third, a unified Central America could 
potentially have greater macroeconomic stability, since the region would have a 
common currency and only one macroeconomic policy, rather than five separate 
ones. 
 The ultimate question, however, is whether Central Americans even desire 
unification and whether it is worthwhile for researchers and foreign or 
international development institutions to promote such an idea.  Based upon the 
responses of the participants at various organizations, there appears to be no 
strong desire for unifying the region at present.  It is also unlikely that this opinion 
will change much over the near or intermediate term and it will likely remain 
unchanged well into the future.  From a historical perspective, Central America’s 
initial unification was not a successful endeavor more than 180 years ago.  Even 
when the countries did not have their own identities and there may have been 
more reasons to stay together than to separate, they tended to squabble amongst 
one another and prevented unification from working.  After more than 160 years 
of developing separate identities and engaging in considerable conflict and 
antagonism with one another, the concept of Central America reunification seems 
to be more residual and nostalgic than a sincere desire to the vast majority of the 
population.  Additionally, in the case of Guatemala, many in its indigenous 
population still resist the development of a true Guatemalan identity, so it is 
unlikely that these same groups would accept an even broader Central American 
identity.  Another significant hindrance is Honduras’ historic mistrust of its 
neighbors, having had its territory attacked from within the region only three 
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decades ago.  Finally, Costa Rican’s firmly hold to their idea of being different 
than the rest of Central America and this idea is very pervasive in their society 
and culture.  The civil and political conflict of the 1980s and the continued 
disparity of social conditions between Costa Rica and the rest of the region have 
strongly reinforced this notion.  It is very possible that Costa Ricans will never 
seriously consider Central American unification as a desirable goal.  Given these 
formidable obstacles to Central American reunification, it is almost certainly an 
idea that does not require significant attention in the near future. 
Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 The nation-states of Central America can take heart in knowing that they 
have not lost more than a negligible amount of their national sovereignty under 
the CACM agreement.  However, as a number of the study participants have 
pointed out, that has been part of the problem in the region’s development.  If one 
accepts the notion that a nation-state actually gains power by relinquishing a part 
of its authority to a trading agreement or a regional integration effort, then 
arguably there are policy initiatives the Central American countries could pursue 
that would strengthen the nation-state, improve regional trade, and strengthen the 
regional integration effort and its supporting infrastructure.  The sections below 
outline a few policy recommendations for accomplishing these goals.  Although 
there is nothing particularly new or dramatic about them, the unwillingness of the 
Central American countries to give up even the smallest amount of their national 
sovereignty makes the implementation of any of these suggestions in the 
foreseeable future, unlikely.  It also assures that they will not see significant 
improvement to their national economies nor to their efforts at regional 
integration. 
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STRENGTHEN WEAK CENTRAL AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 
 If integration is going to move to a deeper level in Central America, than 
where it is at present, there are certain institutions within the integration system 
that will need to be strengthened.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the region does have 
a quasi-legislative body, called the Central American Parliament, but it only 
provides a consultative role to the integration process.  If there is ever to be a 
supra-national rule making body with sovereign powers in Central America, it 
will likely take on the form of a legislative body.  However, the Central American 
Parliament has little respect in the region and is commonly viewed as a 
mechanism for politicians to avoid prosecution for the crimes they committed 
while in national office.  An important step in restoring confidence in the Central 
American Parliament would be to eliminate this right to immunity, so that it no 
can no longer be viewed as a resting ground for those few politicians who are 
waiting out the statute of limitations in their home countries.  Most members of 
the Central American Parliament serve with distinction, but it is difficult for their 
efforts to be recognized when general public opinion is that the institution is 
corrupt.  This opinion is further strengthened by the large amount of funding that 
the Parliament receives in relation to the other Central American integration 
institutions, which are believed to produce results that are more tangible.  
Therefore, another positive step would be a substantial reduction of the 
Parliament’s budget.  However, the likelihood of either of these reforms in the 
near term is slight.  The Parliament serves as a convenient lightening rod for 
opposition parties and ruling parties will be reluctant to tamper with its potential 
benefits.  The situation is unfortunate, since a certain amount of effort has already 
been expended into creating the present institution.  It would make better sense to 
reform it and keep it for possible future use, rather than to abolish it. 
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 The Central American Court of Justice is a second integration institution 
that could benefit from a strengthened role.  The Court is a weak institution for at 
least two reasons.  First, only El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua are members 
of the Court, while Costa Rica and Guatemala have refused to participate.  
Therefore, at best, the Court can only have relevance to three-fifths of the CACM.  
Second, the Court does not possess any means to enforce its rulings, so nations 
comply at will.  According to staff at the Court, nations typically comply with the 
Court’s rulings, but not always.  When a country does ignore a ruling from the 
Court, the affected country has no recourse within the Central American 
integration system.  The problem then must be dealt with at a political level 
(which obviously did not work in the first place because they went to the Court), 
which often means threats and reprisals.  Knowing they can do nothing, the 
Court’s attitude in these situations is that they have made the decision that they 
were asked to make and now it is up to the parties involved to abide by the ruling.   
Despite the significant weaknesses of the Central American Court of 
Justice, there seems to be potential for improving it and making it a stabilizing 
force in Central America.  This would entail participation by all five countries of 
the CACM and developing a system to enforce court rulings.  Obviously, 
convincing the Central American countries to participate under these 
circumstances would be a monumental task, especially because the primary issue 
here is national sovereignty.  Costa Rica is said to be the more reluctant of the two 
non-participant countries to join the Court, because it perceives the Court as 
having supranational authority.  However, none of the countries probably want 
the Court to have enforcement power, since that would remove their ability to 
ignore the Court’s rulings arbitrarily, which has been a political tool used in the 
region for years.  However, if the countries could learn to accept these limitations, 
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they might find that the benefits of stability it would bring to the CACM would 
outweigh the relatively minor loss of national sovereignty. 
DEVELOP A FUNCTIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS WITH PUNITIVE 
MEASURES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE 
 When asked which problem created by the Central American Common 
Market that was in the most need of being fixed, the overwhelming majority of 
the participants said the lack of an effective dispute resolution process.  Most 
trade problems between the Central American countries are settled through 
negotiations, threats, and reprisals.  Often, if trade disputes cannot be settled at the 
administrative level, they must be settled at the political level between the Vice-
Ministers and Ministers of Economy and Trade.  If there is a particularly stubborn 
issue, then it may require resolution during a meeting of the Vice-Presidents or a 
meeting of the Presidents.  One problem with using these political methods to 
solve trade disputes is that they can become part of the negotiations for other 
unrelated issues.  It can also take a significant amount of time to solve the 
problem, because there are many other issues that Ministers or Presidents must 
discuss during these meetings, in addition to trade disputes.  The region 
desperately needs an effective, independent dispute resolution process that is 
supported by the all the countries of the CACM. 
Recently there was an attempt to create a dispute resolution tribunal for 
trade issues within the SIECA, but the Central American Court of Justice ruled 
that it was not appropriate within the CACM’s legal framework.  In response, the 
Presidents of the Central American countries drafted an amendment to the 
integration protocols that would have permitted the creation of this tribunal.  
However, the amendment requires ratification by at least three of the five 
countries and, thus far, only two of the Central American countries have been 
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willing to do so.  Therefore, the situation in Central America, with regard to 
dispute resolution, has remained unchanged over the past 40 years. 
The Central American Court of Justice would be the obvious institution 
for resolving trade issues but, for the reasons stated earlier, this is unlikely to 
happen.  If the Central American countries ever do develop a mechanism for 
dealing with their disputes, either through the Court or through a separate 
institution, it is critical that it have some ability to apply punitive measures when 
countries do not comply with its decisions.  While voluntary compliance works 
some of the time in Central America, a dispute resolution process is inherently 
weak if it does not possess the ability to enforce its decisions.  Obviously, to 
achieve this level of effectiveness, the Central American nations must relinquish 
some sovereignty to the supra-national institution and none of them perceives this 
as being desirable.  However, as stated before, it would seem that the stability this 
could bring to trade in the region would counter the loss.  The number of trade 
disputes within the CACM is significant, given the relatively small value of goods 
that are traded, and it will be difficult for regional integration to move forward if 
it is constantly being hindered. 
PURSUE A “SUM OF SOVEREIGNTIES” POLICY INSTEAD OF REUNIFICATION 
As was pointed out during an earlier discussion in this chapter, the 
prospects for Central American reunification are slight, but the region is still very 
interested in further economic integration and, perhaps at a later time, some 
degree of social and political integration.  However, given Central America’s 
previous experience with unification and the ongoing suspicions that exist within 
the region, it would appear that pursuing a policy similar to federalism would be 
more practical than one of unification.  This idea seemed to have support among a 
number of the study participants, although their use of the term “federalism” was 
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probably closer to the idea of a confederacy in practice.  Nevertheless, even a 
confederacy of Central American states would require them to give up some of 
their national sovereignty and this does not seem to be a plausible alternative at 
the present.  One idea presented during the study interviews that appeared to have 
the most likelihood of being accepted was the idea of a “sum of sovereignties”. 
The idea behind the sum of sovereignties is that the region can be more 
effective if they coordinate their policies and act together than if they were unified 
into a single country.  For example, if the region wants to affect policy in a 
multinational organization like the Organization of American States, they are 
better off coordinating their positions and voting as a bloc of five than if they 
were unified and could only vote once.  The argument is that by approaching 
issues as a unified group of five countries, they are able to better leverage their 
positions than if the five countries became one large country.   There is logic to 
this concept and it avoids the complicated issues of national sovereignty.  On the 
other hand, the Central American countries typically hold differing opinions on a 
number of issues, so there is likely a limit to how far this strategy could go.  
However, given the reality of the situation, the sum of sovereignties strategy is 
probably the best for the region at present. 
INVEST IN INFRASTRUCTURE AND PEOPLE 
 If the Central American region ever hopes to improve its condition 
significantly, it will need to make major investments in its infrastructure and in its 
people.  Without major investments in infrastructure, the Central America 
countries will find it increasingly difficult to integrate their roadways, electrical 
transmission and communication networks, as well as provide adequate water and 
wastewater services.  As discussed in Chapter 3, Central America’s surface 
transportation network is particularly bad, with poorly maintained and congested 
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roadways and an almost complete lack of rail transport.  In many parts of Central 
America, the electrical generation and transmission infrastructure operates at 
substandard levels and many cities experience frequent blackouts and brownouts.  
The region also lacks sufficient piped water, which means that many homes do 
not have piped water in their neighborhood, much less in the home itself.  Even 
fewer homes in Central America are connected to sewer systems and when they 
are, the sewage is often not sufficiently treated before being released into the 
environment. 
The Central American countries also need to make major investments in 
education and health care.  Among the five countries, only Costa Rica has made a 
significant attempt to educate its population over the last 50 years.  The result of 
this effort has been the creation of a wide gap between the living standards in 
Costa Rica and the rest of the Central America.  Many children in Central 
American countries receive no more than a few years of formal education before 
they must begin working to help support their household.  Another problem with 
the education system in Central America is that even when it is accessible, the 
quality varies and it is often substandard.  For example, there are a number of 
private colleges and universities in Central America but their facilities are often 
limited to a single building (or a floor in a building) and they often do not have 
libraries.  Faculty research is almost or is completely nonexistent in these types of 
institutions.  Health care in Central America is generally poor for most of the 
population because of inadequate resources.  Many of the diseases the population 
suffers from are treatable, if the resources were available, and others would be 
avoidable, if there was adequate preventative medicine.  In addition to 
unpleasantness of chronic illness, which many Central Americans must live with, 
from an economic perspective, sick or generally unhealthy people are 
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unproductive workers and this makes the region less attractive to foreign 
investors. 
 While probably no one would dispute the benefits of increasing the 
spending on infrastructure, education, and healthcare in Central America, the 
region’s countries are not capable of financing the levels of investment that are 
necessary to show significant improvement.  Government inefficiency and 
corruption are part of the problem, but even if these problems were under control, 
there would still be a lack of resources.  As one study participant said, “Central 
America needs the equivalent of the Marshall Plan to improve its condition.”  The 
United States, the EU, and international lending institutions are prime candidates 
for providing this assistance, but even if there existed a political will to do so, the 
aid would be unlikely to come without binding commitments from national 
governments to solve many of their most difficult fiscal problems.  The Central 
American countries could benefit themselves by looking at these problems from a 
regional perspective rather than a country perspective, as one study participant 
pointed out.  This would mean a commitment from all of the countries to direct 
aid to the areas of greatest need, regardless of the country.  Unfortunately, taking 
this position would be a difficult for most politicians: to ignore the problems of 
one’s own country, so that another country could benefit.   
SUPPORT SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS 
 Central America’s business elite drive the region’s political decisions and 
when they experience a problem with exporting products to another Central 
American country or when their firm needs protection from a competitor, they can 
usually find a sympathetic ear in government.   However, the region’s small and 
medium-sized firms do not receive the same attention nor are they often able to 
influence government policy in a way that protects them.  As result, according to 
 226
some of the participants in this study, most small and medium-sized firms in 
Central America have not participated in regional trade and some participants 
believe that these firms have even been hurt by the CACM. 
Central American governments could begin addressing these problems by 
providing support to small and medium-sized firms that want to export within the 
region.  In Costa Rica, some small firms begin their exporting careers by 
exporting products to countries in the CACM before they try exporting to other 
markets outside of the region, because there are no language barriers and the 
markets are familiar.  The other Central American countries should support this 
idea of using the CACM as a training ground for their small and medium-sized 
firms, by providing them with technical support and, perhaps, with small loans.  
Through their support for small and medium-sized firms, Central American 
governments can maintain social order by providing opportunities for upward 
economic mobility.  Additionally, job growth in Central American countries can 
be sporadic even during the best of times, thus by promoting the expansion of 
small and medium-sized firms, they may be providing employment for the 
increasingly large number of persons entering into the Central America job 
market. 
Topics for Future Study 
If researchers of trade and sovereignty issues find the argument and 
findings of this study of value, then similar analyses could be performed for trade 
blocs throughout the world.  Fortunately, with the coverage provided by the 
World Trade Analyzer database, such an endeavor would be possible for almost 
all the world’s trade blocs, although such an effort would certainly be time 
consuming.  The EU has created the most fascinating topic on this subject, but it 
cannot be studied until more time passes and more data are released.  It might also 
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be possible to research the existence of borders on particular segments of the 
economy, since there are likely differences in the border effect between, say, 
agriculture and manufacturing.  In fact, some of this study’s participants were 
particularly interested in the border effect of the agriculture industry in Central 
America.  It is hoped that this type of analysis could be performed in the near 
future, so that the findings could be added to the discussion raised in this study.  
Another useful exercise would be to re-specify the gravity models in this study to 
take into account the improvement suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop to 
eliminate variable bias.   
While the emphasis of this analysis has been to determine the affects of 
multinational trade blocs on national sovereignty, the analysis performed to 
answer this question has created opportunities for investigating a number of other 
tangential topics.  One of the more interesting topics would be to investigate 
Central America’s intra-industry trade and its intra-regional trade specialization.  
This information could be related to the existing supply chains in the region.  
Detailed work, such as this, would help researchers more fully understand the 
level of economic integration in Central America.  Since the gravity models used 
for this study already take into account trade by SITC group and county, along 
with an interaction term between the two, there is a rich source of data that could 
be further refined for analysis.  Coupled with the study’s Grubel-Lloyd analysis, 
there should be sufficient data to provide a convincing account of Central 
America’s intra-regional trade. 
 Academic literature about Central America is not abundant and most of 
the existing literature on Central American integration was written during the 
1960s and the early 1970s.  While the majority of this research was of good 
quality, little has been written about Central American integration since then.  
During the 1980s, researchers mostly wrote about the region’s civil unrest and 
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how it fit into U.S.-Soviet geopolitics at the time.  Generally, they ignored the 
CACM and Central American integration because, at that point, the CACM had 
ceased to operate effectively.  The renewal and success of the CACM during the 
1990s was not followed by a renewed interest from U.S. scholars.  Therefore, 
almost any well-researched topic on Central American integration would make a 
solid contribution to the literature on the region. 
 During the interviews with the study participants, they raised a number of 
issues affecting development and integration in Central America that deserve 
further investigation.  For example, as mentioned earlier, a number of participants 
were concerned about the lack of an effective dispute resolution process within 
the CACM framework.   Additionally, some of the participants discussed the 
effects of territorial disputes on the implementation of CACM, while others were 
concerned about corruption and the cumbersome border crossing processes in the 
region.  Individually, each of these issues could produce an entire research study 
and together they could form a research portfolio that would begin to discuss 
some of the major issues affecting Central American integration.  Additionally, 
producing this research in English would be another significant contribution, 
since much of the recent information on the Central American Common Market 
and its institutions is only available in Spanish.  Researchers could also benefit if 
there were English translations of the CACM’s major treaties and protocols, as 
well as the rulings of the Central American Court of Justice.  Creating more, 
accessible information on the region to North American and European researchers 
could certainly increase interest in Central America and the Central American 
Common Market. 
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FINAL COMMENTS 
The purpose of this report has been to investigate the perceived conflict 
between international trade and national sovereignty at a regional level, by 
analyzing the impacts of a regional trading agreement in Central America on the 
sovereignty of its member nation-states.  While researchers typically study these 
types of questions using qualitative methods, the primary contribution of this 
research has been to carry out an empirical study.  If other researchers judge the 
effort as having been fruitful, then investigations of related topics will certainly 
provide additional insight into question of international trade and national 
sovereignty.  A second benefit of this study has been to produce a significant 
amount of trade analysis on the Central American region, which could be useful 
to researchers and policymakers.  Hopefully, both products of this effort will have 
a positive influence and impact on the public policies of the Central American 
countries and their multinational institutions.  
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As with quantitative methods, qualitative methods also require an 
understanding of relevant issues and techniques, to insure accuracy and to 
understand potential biases.  In this study, there were special circumstances to 
consider beyond those typically associated with the interviewing process, such as 
the elite status of some participants, as well as cross-cultural elements.  Even 
mundane aspects of the interviewing process became worthy of assessment, such 
as the taping and transcribing of the interviews, as pointed out by Poland (2002). 
 Some of the individuals interviewed for this research were considered 
elites in their home country, occupying important positions in their nation’s 
government or having significant prestige in their country’s business community.  
The experience of interviewing these elites varied, but the overall experience was 
very similar to those described by Odendahl and Shaw (2002), who interviewed 
philanthropic elites in the United States.  Each meeting was relatively difficult to 
schedule and, typically, they were arranged with the assistance of another study 
participant.  These participants had a relationship with the elite individual and 
were able to verify the legitimacy of the researcher.  Odendahl and Shaw call 
these individuals “gatekeepers” and their assistance was critical in scheduling 
these appointments.  The elite participants were as equally forthcoming with 
information and opinions as were the other study participants, but the 
interviewing process was more constrained by time availability and was more 
likely to be interrupted by phone calls and the like. 
Overall, however, it was relatively easy to gain access to individuals who 
were willing to participate in this study, considering the lack of available contacts 
before the initial trip to the region.  Requesting interviews as an Anglo, U.S. 
citizen, Ph.D. candidate from a familiar U.S. university probably made it easier to 
gain access to many of the participants.  White collar and elite Central American’s 
are often suspicious of unknown individuals who wish to speak with them at the 
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workplace, since they may be asking for special favors or may even have 
intentions of victimizing them in a crime.  During the fieldwork, several native 
Central Americans commented on the ease, by which the researcher was able to 
obtain access to elites, government officials, and other individuals, that would 
have been unlikely had the same effort had been made by a Central American 
doctoral student.  The foreigner status along with the student status likely raised 
the participant’s comfort level during the interviews and made them willing to 
speak of topics that they would be less likely to discuss, if the researcher had been 
a Central American. 
The difficulties of cross-cultural interviews were immediately obvious to 
the researcher, who is not a fluent Spanish speaker (but can speak basic Spanish).  
Fortunately, twenty-one of the interviews were conducted in English and only ten 
were conducted in Spanish.  In cases where the participant spoke only Spanish, 
the questions were read in Spanish and the participant was asked to respond.  
With the participant’s permission, their responses were recorded using an audio 
tape recorder and translated upon the researcher’s return by a native Spanish 
speaker.  In a few instances, even though they spoke English, the participants 
preferred to speak in Spanish during the interview or needed assistance in 
translating their ideas, in which case another individual attending the interview 
served as a translator.   
The need to transcribe and translate the interview recordings, by 
individuals other than the researcher created opportunities for information to be 
omitted or misinterpreted.  Unfortunately, under the circumstances, this was an 
unavoidable risk.  However, even when the interviews were conducted in English, 
there was a similar opportunity for omission and misinterpretation, since an audio 
tape recorder was also used to record these discussions (again with the 
participants’ permission).  Because the participants, in all but one case, were non-
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native English speakers, there is the possibility that they may have misinterpreted 
the questions or that they may have misspoken or were misunderstood by the 
researcher.  Overall, however, this risk was judged to be relatively small, since the 
participants who chose to speak in English were fluent speakers of the language. 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
Because the study participants had different responsibilities and missions 
at their workplace, three sets of questions were designed to guide the interviews.  
The instruments used for each of the three types of participants are provided in 
Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3.  During the fieldwork, there was a general format to the 
semi-structured interviews, which began with introductions of the researcher and 
the study participant.  The researcher explained the purpose and goal of the 
interview and then provided a consent form to the participant for their signature, 
in compliance with University of Texas’ Internal Review Board requirements.1  
After completing these formalities, the researcher generally followed the 
interview instrument most appropriate for the organization the participant 
represented.  Additional questions were asked, when the researcher needed to 
clarify an answer or if the study participant introduced a new topic of interest.  
Although there was a general format for the interview procedure, it was not 
always possible to maintain.  In some cases, the responses to earlier questions 
omitted the need to ask some later questions, while in others, the responses to 
questions made a reordering more logical.  Questions were also removed or 
rephrased, if the participant began to express sensitivity to a particular topic or 
question.  Frequently, the researcher omitted questions because of the 
participant’s limited availability of time.  All of the interviews were conducted at 
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the convenience of the participants in their work offices, but two interviews were 
conducted via e-mail.   
 
Table A.1: Interview Instrument for Persons Representing Multinational 
Organizations 
 
 QUESTION 
1. Please describe, in your opinion, what are the characteristics of the CACM agreement 
and what are they not.  How would you define the current Central American identity?  
Has this identity changed over the recent past? 
2. Do you believe that Central American countries have mostly maintained their political 
sovereignty under the CACM agreement or do you believe they have lost political 
sovereignty?  
3. In your experience, has the CACM agreement limited the ability of the member 
nations to pursue national development strategies or to enter into trade agreements 
with other nations outside the CACM.  Please give examples, if possible. 
4. Do you anticipate a deepening of the CACM, similar to the European Union, where 
countries actually give up a large degree of their national sovereignty so that closer 
economic relationships can be formed?  Do you believe there is any desire for this type 
of relationship?  If the answer is yes, when or under what circumstances would this 
occur? 
5. If they wanted membership, do you think the CACM agreement would be expanded to 
include countries like Panama?  Do you think there would be any support for the 
CACM to be absorbed into another agreement like NAFTA? 
6. Have there been any serious attempts or sentiments by political leaders in any country, 
either now or in the recent past, to leave or dismantle the CACM agreement? 
7. Do you believe it is possible that the Central American nations would reunify, either in 
the near future or ever? 
8. In which industries do you think the CACM has been successful in creating intra-
industry trade?  In which industries has it been ineffective or has it harmed the nation's 
industries?  Please provide specific examples. 
9. There is a distinct difference between the economies of Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Costa Rica and the economies of Honduras and Nicaragua.  Do you think the CACM 
agreement has exacerbated these differences or do you believe it has improved them? 
10. Do you know of any attempts or desires to enact policies that would strengthen 
economic integration among the CACM countries or to reduce the disparities among 
its members. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
1 In compliance with the University of Texas at Austin’s IRB requirements, every effort has been 
made to maintain a separation between a participant’s response and their identity.  Therefore, the 
names of participants are not cited in the text of this report or in the bibliography.    
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Table A.2: Interview Instrument for Persons Representing National Governments 
 
 QUESTION 
1. In your opinion, please describe what the characteristics of the CACM agreement are 
and what they are not.  How would you define Central American identity in your 
country at present?  Has this identity changed in your country over the recent past? 
2. Generally, do members of your country's legislative or executive branch believe that 
membership in the CACM has limited their authority to create and implement legislation 
on trade or other domestic or international matters? 
3. Could you provide one or more examples of how the requirements of the CACM 
agreement have prevented your country's government from implementing a desired 
policy? 
4. What types of changes, if any, would members of your country's government like to see 
to the CACM agreement?  Please include viewpoints from different parts of the 
political spectrum. 
5. At what frequency does your government encounter problems with other governments 
due to the requirements of the CACM agreement?  How are these problems resolved?  
Please provide examples. 
6. During periods of political instability in your country, has your country’s membership in 
the CACM been an issue of contention?  Does or has CACM membership produced any 
political stability in your country?  For example, have other CACM nations actively 
supported democratic institutions in your country during periods of instability? 
7. Have there been any serious attempts or sentiments by political leaders in your country, 
either now or in the recent past, to withdraw your country from the CACM agreement? 
8. If they wanted membership, do you think the CACM agreement would be expanded to 
include countries like Panama?  Do you think there would be any support for the 
CACM to be absorbed into another agreement like the NAFTA? 
9. Do you anticipate a deepening of the CACM similar to the European Union, where 
countries in the CACM would actually give up a large degree of their sovereignty so 
that closer economic relationships would be formed?  Do you believe there is any 
desire for this type of relationship?  If the answer is yes, when or under what 
circumstances would this occur? 
10. In general, do you believe your country's membership in the CACM has been beneficial 
or detrimental? 
11. Do you believe the countries of Central America will ever re-unify?  Do you believe 
there is a strong and sincere desire for Central American reunification in your country? 
12. Which industries in your country have benefited from the CACM agreement and 
which have not?  Please provide examples. 
13. Which nations in the CACM does your country trade with the most?  Which products?  
With which of the five countries do you believe your country has the weakest 
relationship? 
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Table A.3: Interview Instrument for Persons Representing Private Industry 
Organizations  
 
 QUESTION 
1. In general, do you believe the CACM agreement has benefited or harmed Central 
American industry?  Which industries in your country have benefited the most and 
which the least? 
2. At what frequency do you or your organization encounter problems because of the 
terms of the CACM agreement?  How do you or does your organization resolve these 
problems? 
3. In cases where the CACM agreement has had negative impacts on an industry or 
company, has your national government made any attempt to help? 
4. Have there been occasions when your government has tried to enact unilateral policies 
(such as quota laws or tariffs) to protect an industry or business, but were prevented 
from doing so by the terms of the agreement?  Please explain?  Have there been 
occasions when other countries tried to enact policies against the industries in your 
country? 
5. What changes to the CACM agreement could be made to improve business 
relationships and interactions? 
6. Do you believe there is any political will in your country or among the five countries to 
enact these changes? 
7. Would your organization support extending membership in the CACM to other 
countries in Central America or even beyond? 
8. Do you anticipate a widening or deepening of the CACM similar to the European 
Union, where countries in the CACM would actually give a large degree of their 
sovereignty so that closer economic relationships could be formed?  Do you believe 
there is any desire for this type of relationship?  If the answer is “yes”, when or under 
what circumstances would this occur? 
 
Some of the study participants were also asked the question, “Do you 
consider yourself generally liberal or generally conservative?”  The purpose of 
this question was to determine whether there has been a change in the political 
ideology that supported Central American integration.  Historically, during the 
19th Century, it was the Liberals who had supported reunification.  Towards the 
end of the interviewing process, this question was eliminated, because almost 
everyone identified their self as a liberal.  Additionally, it appears that the terms 
liberal and conservative in Central America are taking on connotations that are 
similar to those in the United States.  Finally, there was a concern that the 
question made some private sector participants uncomfortable. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF GRUBEL-LLOYD VALUES BY 
COUNTRY, 1980 & 1997 
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The following pages present a more detailed view of intra-industry trade at 
a country-by-country level, through a series of bar graphs showing the number of 
industries within a range of Grubel-Lloyd scores.  More specifically, the 
horizontal axis of each graph shows the complete range of possible Grubel-Lloyd 
scores, which lie between 0 and 100.  The continuum of scores has been divided 
into 20 equal and successive subsets.  In other words, the first bar represents the 
number of industries with a Grubel Lloyd score from 0 to 5, the next bar 
represents the number of industries with scores from 5 to 10, the next bar from 10 
to 15, and so on until reaching the highest score of 100.  The vertical axis 
represents the number of 3-digit SITC industries with that particular score.  Those 
industries with low scores have little, if any, intra-industry trade, while those 
industries with higher scores engage in more intra-industry trade.  For example, in 
Chart A.1, the number of Costa Rican 3-digit SITC industries with a Grubel-
Lloyd score of 0 to 5 in 1980 was 47, while the number of industries with same 
range of scores in 1997 was 44.  Their low index values mean that these industries 
engaged in little or no intra-industry trade.  Likewise, in 1980, five industries had 
a Grubel-Lloyd score between 95 and 100, which meant there is a significant 
amount of intra-industry trade occurring in these industries.  In 1997, the number 
of industries in the 95 to 100 range had increased to six. 
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Graph B.1: Costa Rica-CACM, 1980 & 1997: Grubel-Lloyd Frequencies 3-Digit 
SITC Groups 
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Graph B.2: El Salvador-CACM, 1980 & 1997: Grubel-Lloyd Frequencies 3-Digit 
SITC Groups 
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Graph B.3: Guatemala-CACM, 1980-1997: Grubel-Lloyd Frequencies 3-Digit 
SITC Groups 
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Graph B.4: Honduras-CACM, 1980 & 1997: Grubel-Lloyd Frequencies 3-Digit 
SITC Groups 
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Graph B.5: Nicaragua-CACM, 1980 & 1997: Grubel-Lloyd Frequencies 3-Digit 
SITC Groups 
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APPENDIX C 
GRUBEL-LLOYD RESULTS - INDUSTRIES WITH THE 
HIGHEST LEVELS OF INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE BY 
COUNTRY, 1980 & 1997  
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Table C.1: Costa Rica’s Intra-Industry Trade with the Remaining CACM 
Countries – Industries with the Ten Highest Grubel-Lloyd Indexes 
 
1980 Costa Rica Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
98.28 3,089 847 Clothing accessories of textile fabrics 
97.92 17,598 591 Disinfectants, insecticides, fungicides and weed killers 
97.78 135 721 Agricultural machinery and parts 
97.71 131 744 Mechanical handling equipment and parts 
95.55 13,817 553 Perfumery, cosmetics, and toilet preparations 
94.12 323 047 Other cereals, meals and flours 
92.01 1,665 057 Fruits & nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried 
91.79 1,645 697 Household equipment of base metals, n.e.s. 
88.02 334 724 Textile & leather machinery and parts 
86.41 3,856 892 Printed matter 
 8.36 Percent of total CACM trade by value – 1980 
    
1997 Costa Rica Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
98.14 6,130 054 Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen: roots, tubers 
98.04 153 726 Printing & bookbinding machinery and parts 
97.97 345 784 Parts and accessories [of tractors, cars, and trucks] 
97.39 115 786 Trailers & other vehicles, not motorized 
97.04 1,014 847 Clothing accessories of textile fabrics 
95.83 336 874 Measuring, checking, analyzing instruments 
92.91 127 742 Pumps for liquid, liquid elevators and parts 
91.55 970 662 Clay construction materials & refractory construction 
materials 
91.33 1,741 562 Fertilizers, manufactured 
91.25 320 335 Residual petroleum products, n.e.s. & related materials 
 1.69 Percent of total CACM trade by value - 1997 
 
† Thousands of U.S. dollars 
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Table C.2: El Salvador’s Intra-Industry Trade with the Remaining CACM 
Countries – Industries with the Ten Highest Grubel-Lloyd Indexes 
 
1980 El Salvador Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
99.23 3,519 899 Other miscellaneous manufactured articles 
98.40 2,567 898 Musical instruments, parts and accessories 
96.53 1,038 657 Special textile fabrics and related products 
96.29 15,330 893 Articles of materials described in Division 58 
95.73 117 742 Pumps for liquids, liquid elevators and parts 
95.69 209 512 Alcohols, phenols, phenol-alcohols & their derivatives 
95.35 172 047 Other cereals, meals and flours 
95.00 6,817 652 Cotton fabrics, woven 
94.42 2,885 697 Household equipment of base material, n.e.s. 
94.12 17 266 Synthetic fibers suitable for spinning 
 5.80 Percent of total CACM trade by value – 1980 
    
1997 El Salvador Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
98.75 13,446 778 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. 
98.24 794 744 Mechanical handling equipment and parts 
97.58 19,822 591 Disinfectants, insecticides, fungicides and weed killers 
97.06 7,305 892 Printed matter 
96.77 6,442 598 Miscellaneous chemical products, n.e.s. 
96.22 27,038 893 Articles of materials described in Division 58 
95.75 3,177 657 Special textile fabrics and related products 
95.26 13,657 673 Iron and steel bars, rods, angles, shapes, & sections 
95.00 3,577 592 Starches, inulin & wheat gluten; albuminoidal substances 
93.33 15 666 Pottery 
 8.60 Percent of total CACM trade by value - 1997 
 
† Thousands of U.S. dollars 
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Table C.3: Guatemala’s Intra-Industry Trade with the Remaining CACM 
Countries – Industries with the Ten Highest Grubel-Lloyd Indexes 
 
1980 Guatemala Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
99.53 1,921 001 Live animals chiefly for food 
99.25 33,810 554 Soap, cleansing and polishing preparations 
99.22 1,276 654 Textiles, fabrics, woven, other than cotton or man-made 
fibers 
98.85 433 672 Ingots and other primary forms of iron or steel 
98.72 16,744 048 Cereal preparations & preparations of flour of fruits or 
vegetables 
98.02 11,061 658 Made-up articles, wholly/chiefly of textile materials 
96.08 20,355 851 Footwear 
95.94 1,995 612 Manufactures of leather/of composition leather, n.e.s. 
93.75 29,098 653 Fabrics, woven, of man-made materials 
91.26 8,043 845 Outer garments and other articles, knitted 
 17.41 Percent of total CACM trade by value – 1980 
    
1997 Guatemala Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
100.00 30 683 Nickel 
99.68 4,356 657 Special textile fabrics and related products 
99.53 858 744 Mechanical handling equipment and parts 
98.77 243 726 Printing & bookbinding machinery and parts 
98.58 4,875 842 Outer garments, mens, of textile fabrics 
98.57 7,473 091 Margarine and shortening 
98.25 57 023 Butter 
98.16 1,031 677 Iron/steel wire/wheth/not coated, but not insulated 
96.40 139 266 Synthetic fibers suitable for spinning 
96.22 6,818 892 Printed matter 
 2.36 Percent of total CACM trade by value - 1997 
 
† Thousands of U.S. dollars 
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Table C.4: Honduras’ Intra-Industry Trade with the Remaining CACM Countries 
– Industries with the Ten Highest Grubel-Lloyd Indexes 
 
1980 Honduras Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
99.79 1,429 592 Starches, inulin & wheat gluten; albuminoidal substances 
99.71 1,017 121 Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse  
99.63 267 522 Inorganic chemical elements, oxides & halogen salts 
98.90 1,454 533 Pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials 
97.92 768 851 Footwear 
95.73 819 056 Vegetables, roots & tubers, prepared/preserved, n.e.s. 
94.99 5,723 642 Paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape 
94.77 7,952 048 Cereal preparations & preparations of flour of fruits or 
vegetables 
93.54 2,044 634 Veneers, plywood, improved or reconstituted wood 
90.16 193 232 Natural rubber latex; natural rubber & simulated natural 
gums 
 11.33 Percent of total CACM trade by value – 1980 
    
1997 Honduras Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
97.67 2,146 022 Milk and cream 
97.44 39 713 Internal combustion piston engines and parts 
95.22 1,758 657 Special textile fabrics and related products 
94.74 19 843 Outer garments, womens, of textile fabrics 
85.51 276 211 Hides and skins (except furskins), raw 
85.27 2,200 073 Chocolate & other food preparations containing cocoa 
84.22 4,080 892 Printed matter 
82.96 1,256 693 Wire products and fencing grills 
82.41 449 612 Manufactures of leather/of composition leather, n.e.s. 
80.00 1,590 263 Cotton 
 3.07 Percent of total CACM trade by value – 1997 
 
† Thousands of U.S. dollars 
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Table C.5: Nicaragua’s Intra-Industry Trade with the Remaining CACM 
Countries – Industries with the Ten Highest Grubel-Lloyd Indexes 
 
1980 Nicaragua Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
96.97 33 511 Hydrocarbons n.e.s. & their halogen & etc. derivatives 
95.11 1,220 741 Heating and cooling equipment and parts 
94.91 1,374 693 Wire products and fencing grills 
93.83 1,524 656 Tulle, lace, embroidery, ribbons, & other small wares 
89.66 29 251 Pulp and waste paper 
85.26 251 654 Nails, screws, nuts, bolts, etc. of iron, steel, copper 
84.73 786 121 Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse 
83.51 2,098 592 Starches, inulin & wheat gluten; albuminoidal substances 
83.02 995 694 Machinery & equipment specialized for a particular 
industry 
82.43 444 728 Sanitary, plumbing, heating, lighting fixtures 
 2.11 Percent of total CACM trade by value – 1980 
    
1997 Nicaragua Grubel-Lloyd Index with the Remaining CACM Countries 
G-L Index Value† SITC Description 
99.64 281 786 Trailers & other vehicles, not motorized 
98.67 8,679 081 Feedstuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) 
97.01 1,373 112 Alcoholic beverages 
95.18 2,822 812 Sanitary, plumbing, heating, lighting fixtures 
91.59 1,498 057 Fruit & nuts (not including oil nuts) fresh or dried 
88.64 1,717 635 Wood manufactures, n.e.s. 
87.12 427 014 Meat & edible offals, preparations; fish extracts 
83.91 379 335 Residual petroleum products 
83.72 43 666 Pottery 
81.65 4,157 042 Rice 
 5.14 Percent of total CACM trade by value – 1997 
 
† Thousands of U.S. dollars 
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APPENDIX D 
 
CROSS-SECTIONAL DATASET GRAVITY MODEL 
RESULTS, 2-DIGIT ANALYSES 
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Table D.1:  Specification 1 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 4 5702 0.1355 1.04826 0.11274 9.30 <0.0001 
1981 4 5722 0.1089 0.70844 0.11244 6.30 <0.0001 
1982 4 5535 0.1153 0.77087 0.11270 6.84 <0.0001 
1983 4 5507 0.0974 0.54563 0.11780 4.63 <0.0001 
1984 4 5468 0.0957 0.51597 0.12017 4.29 <0.0001 
1985 4 5652 0.0827 0.57778 0.12144 4.76 <0.0001 
1986 4 5707 0.0957 0.33474 0.11753 2.85 0.0044 
1987 4 5946 0.1045 0.32906 0.11711 2.81 0.0050 
1988 4 6440 0.0877 0.18969 0.10901 1.74 0.0819 
1989 4 6557 0.1140 0.34944 0.10801 3.24 0.0012 
1990 4 6807 0.1353 0.48503 0.10351 4.69 <0.0001 
1991 4 6883 0.1356 0.47039 0.10402 4.52 <0.0001 
1992 4 7313 0.1522 0.68737 0.10174 6.76 <0.0001 
1993 4 7762 0.1493 0.59190 0.09850 6.01 <0.0001 
1994 4 8026 0.1623 0.55440 0.09766 5.68 <0.0001 
1995 4 8286 0.1597 0.57609 0.09813 5.87 <0.0001 
1996 4 8769 0.1607 0.43960 0.09391 4.68 <0.0001 
1997 4 8796 0.1788 0.43969 0.09562 4.60 <0.0001 
 
 
Table D.2:  Specification 2 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 68 5702 0.2469 1.14164 0.10630 10.74 <0.0001 
1981 68 5722 0.2194 0.73984 0.10621 6.97 <0.0001 
1982 69 5535 0.2211 0.80588 0.10687 7.54 <0.0001 
1983 69 5507 0.2258 0.58839 0.11001 5.35 <0.0001 
1984 69 5468 0.2356 0.54635 0.11151 4.90 <0.0001 
1985 69 5652 0.2009 0.62019 0.00427 5.43 <0.0001 
1986 68 5707 0.1981 0.35585 0.11152 2.65 0.0080 
1987 69 5946 0.2036 0.36340 0.11120 3.27 0.0011 
1988 69 6440 0.1816 0.22515 0.10390 2.17 0.0303 
1989 69 6557 0.2155 0.38981 0.10243 3.81 0.0001 
1990 69 6807 0.2297 0.53579 0.09835 5.45 <0.0001 
1991 69 6883 0.2322 0.52523 0.09881 5.32 <0.0001 
1992 68 7313 0.2374 0.79811 0.09718 8.21 <0.0001 
1993 69 7762 0.2429 0.69513 0.09355 7.43 <0.0001 
1994 69 8026 0.2580 0.67876 0.09269 7.32 <0.0001 
1995 68 8286 0.2483 0.73039 0.09359 7.80 <0.0001 
1996 69 8769 0.2534 0.60286 0.08930 6.75 <0.0001 
1997 69 8796 0.2715 0.59051 0.09073 6.51 <0.0001 
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Table D.3:  Specification 3 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 8 5702 0.1378 0.96819 0.11753 8.24 <.0001 
1981 8 5722 0.1101 0.66372 0.11719 5.66 <.0001 
1982 8 5535 0.1159 0.76910 0.11648 6.60 <.0001 
1983 8 5507 0.1022 0.45177 0.12258 3.69 0.0002 
1984 8 5468 0.0990 0.36402 0.12544 2.90 0.0037 
1985 8 5652 0.0863 0.46401 0.12600 3.68 0.0002 
1986 8 5707 0.0957 0.29720 0.12247 2.43 0.0153 
1987 8 5946 0.1082 0.31083 0.12162 2.56 0.0106 
1988 8 6440 0.0918 0.04586 0.11400 0.40 0.6875 
1989 8 6557 0.1183 0.31021 0.11178 2.78 0.0055 
1990 8 6807 0.1379 0.55587 0.10830 5.13 <.0001 
1991 8 6883 0.1374 0.55217 0.10861 5.08 <.0001 
1992 8 7313 0.1568 0.83714 0.10593 7.90 <.0001 
1993 8 7762 0.1516 0.73185 0.10256 7.14 <.0001 
1994 8 8026 0.1634 0.62852 0.10145 6.20 <.0001 
1995 8 8286 0.1623 0.68773 0.10171 6.76 <.0001 
1996 8 8769 0.1625 0.54522 0.09733 5.60 <.0001 
1997 8 8796 0.1794 0.47319 0.09816 4.82 <.0001 
 
 
Table D.4:  Specification 4 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 72 5702 0.2492 1.12497 0.11077 10.16 <.0001 
1981 72 5722 0.2207 0.77921 0.11075 7.04 <.0001 
1982 73 5535 0.2220 0.87164 0.11057 7.88 <.0001 
1983 73 5507 0.2281 0.57311 0.11482 4.99 <.0001 
1984 73 5468 0.2373 0.46342 0.11685 3.97 <.0001 
1985 73 5652 0.2033 0.55969 0.11879 4.71 <.0001 
1986 72 5707 0.1982 0.37892 0.11641 3.26 0.0011 
1987 73 5946 0.2064 0.38400 0.11562 3.32 0.0009 
1988 73 6440 0.1855 0.11738 0.10856 1.08 0.2797 
1989 73 6557 0.2210 0.38266 0.10579 3.62 0.0003 
1990 73 6807 0.2341 0.64484 0.10279 6.27 <.0001 
1991 73 6883 0.2348 0.63768 0.10311 6.18 <.0001 
1992 72 7313 0.2427 0.95971 0.10112 9.49 <.0001 
1993 73 7762 0.2461 0.85989 0.09740 8.83 <.0001 
1994 73 8026 0.2595 0.75582 0.09625 7.85 <.0001 
1995 72 8286 0.2518 0.84337 0.09691 8.70 <.0001 
1996 73 8769 0.2566 0.72606 0.09240 7.86 <.0001 
1997 73 8796 0.2734 0.65351 0.09307 7.02 <.0001 
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Table D.5:  Specification 5 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 129 5702 0.2902 1.54197 0.63080 2.44 0.0145 
1981 126 5722 0.2545 0.56297 0.65349 0.86 0.3890 
1982 127 5535 0.2505 1.00856 0.65988 1.53 0.1265 
1983 126 5507 0.2560 1.40537 0.65838 2.13 0.0328 
1984 124 5468 0.2662 1.29658 0.68277 1.90 0.0576 
1985 127 5652 0.2213 1.01384 0.71137 1.43 0.1542 
1986 127 5707 0.2194 0.28193 0.61028 0.46 0.6441 
1987 129 5946 0.2244 0.88836 0.66805 1.33 0.1836 
1988 129 6440 0.2023 0.35534 0.68056 0.52 0.6016 
1989 129 6557 0.2366 0.34636 0.53875 0.64 0.5203 
1990 127 6807 0.2496 0.46358 0.60532 0.77 0.4438 
1991 129 6883 0.2494 0.75143 0.55865 1.35 0.1786 
1992 128 7313 0.2602 2.39159 0.56426 4.24 <0.0001 
1993 133 7762 0.2757 2.08299 0.54337 3.83 0.0001 
1994 130 8026 0.2834 1.80303 0.56039 3.22 0.0013 
1995 129 8286 0.2729 1.96110 0.56082 3.50 0.0005 
1996 131 8769 0.2752 1.53929 0.55913 2.75 0.0059 
1997 131 8796 0.2934 1.32906 0.55606 2.39 0.0169 
 
 
Table D.6:  Specification 6 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 133 5702 0.2924 1.48666 0.63090 2.36 0.0185 
1981 130 5722 0.2559 0.68805 0.65481 1.05 0.2934 
1982 131 5535 0.2520 1.17341 0.66145 1.77 0.0761 
1983 130 5507 0.2581 1.47608 0.65984 2.24 0.0253 
1984 128 5468 0.2674 1.22899 0.68604 1.79 0.0733 
1985 131 5652 0.2229 0.98041 0.71311 1.37 0.1692 
1986 131 5707 0.2195 0.22297 0.61247 0.36 0.7158 
1987 133 5946 0.2275 0.91678 0.66834 1.37 0.1702 
1988 133 6440 0.2060 0.22150 0.68129 0.33 0.7451 
1989 133 6557 0.2411 0.39437 0.53841 0.73 0.4639 
1990 131 6807 0.2543 0.63512 0.60454 1.05 0.2935 
1991 133 6883 0.2525 0.90907 0.55862 1.63 0.1037 
1992 132 7313 0.2664 2.60469 0.56291 4.63 <.0001 
1993 137 7762 0.2793 2.31984 0.54333 4.27 <.0001 
1994 134 8026 0.2854 1.90931 0.56064 3.41 0.0007 
1995 133 8286 0.2772 2.13617 0.56012 3.81 0.0001 
1996 135 8769 0.2786 1.71077 0.55877 3.06 0.0022 
1997 135 8796 0.2952 1.43053 0.55616 2.57 0.0101 
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Table D.7:  Specification 7 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 278 5702 0.2975 1.37961 0.11150 12.37 <.0001 
1981 275 5722 0.2682 1.11100 0.11191 9.93 <.0001 
1982 272 5535 0.2614 1.10948 0.11205 9.90 <.0001 
1983 272 5507 0.2782 0.89042 0.11490 7.75 <.0001 
1984 265 5468 0.2838 0.82746 0.11794 7.02 <.0001 
1985 260 5652 0.2457 0.88017 0.12029 7.32 <.0001 
1986 259 5707 0.2490 0.69105 0.11715 5.90 <.0001 
1987 288 5946 0.2593 0.65299 0.11633 5.61 <.0001 
1988 276 6440 0.2381 0.40037 0.10901 3.67 0.0002 
1989 290 6557 0.2642 0.61775 0.10653 5.80 <.0001 
1990 291 6807 0.2794 0.89446 0.10335 8.65 <.0001 
1991 289 6883 0.2814 0.89245 0.10333 8.64 <.0001 
1992 290 7313 0.2927 1.24661 0.10061 12.39 <.0001 
1993 310 7762 0.3090 1.20239 0.09634 12.48 <.0001 
1994 303 8026 0.3139 1.02132 0.09526 10.72 <.0001 
1995 303 8286 0.3056 1.14738 0.09654 11.88 <.0001 
1996 309 8769 0.3092 0.96296 0.09209 10.46 <.0001 
1997 314 8796 0.3323 0.89253 0.09173 9.73 <.0001 
 
 
Table D.8:  Specification 8 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 334 5702 0.3410 1.60791 0.74728 2.15 0.0315 
1981 331 5722 0.3048 0.88592 0.87863 1.01 0.3134 
1982 328 5535 0.2979 0.59601 1.04876 0.57 0.5699 
1983 327 5507 0.3155 2.16961 1.05179 2.06 0.0392 
1984 318 5468 0.3236 1.37999 1.90064 0.73 0.4678 
1985 316 5652 0.2746 1.74057 1.19660 1.45 0.1458 
1986 313 5707 0.2716 0.39495 0.85059 0.46 0.6424 
1987 346 5946 0.2793 1.71596 0.80114 2.14 0.0322 
1988 336 6440 0.2632 -0.41864 1.09755 -0.38 0.7029 
1989 348 6557 0.2861 -0.22097 0.63257 -0.35 0.7269 
1990 347 6807 0.3001 -0.31015 0.74619 -0.42 0.6777 
1991 346 6883 0.3013 0.56097 0.66139 0.85 0.3964 
1992 349 7313 0.3174 1.77095 0.66080 2.68 0.0074 
1993 373 7762 0.3327 1.75127 0.76943 2.28 0.0229 
1994 361 8026 0.3365 0.94392 0.73292 1.29 0.1978 
1995 363 8286 0.3317 1.68054 0.81064 2.07 0.0382 
1996 369 8769 0.3299 1.24314 0.78288 1.59 0.1123 
1997 375 8796 0.3556 0.02103 0.79411 0.03 0.9789 
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 Table D.9:  Specification 1 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 4 1225 0.1166 2.90534 0.77136 3.77 0.0002 
1981 4 1213 0.1408 2.56113 0.84601 3.03 0.0025 
1982 4 1177 0.1528 3.39901 0.86003 3.95 <0.0001 
1983 4 1161 0.1324 3.94646 0.95096 4.15 <0.0001 
1984 4 1119 0.1367 3.04361 1.05846 2.88 0.0041 
1985 4 1065 0.1468 2.39914 0.98305 2.44 0.0148 
1986 4 1007 0.2018 -1.97877 1.19105 -1.66 0.0970 
1987 4 1056 0.2158 7.65426 1.86582 4.10 <0.0001 
1988 4 1092 0.2516 1.53355 0.61207 2.51 0.0124 
1989 4 1152 0.2816 1.53531 0.64217 2.39 0.0170 
1990 4 1230 0.2880 5.68992 0.84507 6.73 <0.0001 
1991 4 1288 0.2559 2.72604 0.64622 4.22 <0.0001 
1992 4 1326 0.2708 3.25479 0.62304 5.22 <0.0001 
1993 4 1454 0.2613 2.18394 0.57645 3.79 0.0002 
1994 4 1438 0.2819 2.48370 0.50412 4.93 <0.0001 
1995 4 1464 0.2713 1.68050 0.49929 3.37 0.0008 
1996 4 1509 0.2603 1.38107 0.49008 2.82 0.0049 
1997 4 1553 0.2780 0.85644 0.48279 1.77 0.0763 
 
 
Table D.10:  Specification 2 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 68 1225 0.3688 2.80089 0.65716 4.26 <0.0001 
1981 68 1213 0.3342 2.63712 0.74944 3.52 0.0005 
1982 69 1177 0.3491 3.72920 0.75897 4.91 <0.0001 
1983 69 1161 0.3066 4.34161 0.85783 5.06 <0.0001 
1984 69 1119 0.3257 3.45775 0.94504 3.66 0.0003 
1985 69 1065 0.2856 2.88663 0.90855 3.18 0.0015 
1986 68 1007 0.3165 -1.94579 1.11772 -1.74 0.0820 
1987 69 1056 0.3343 9.15078 1.73949 5.26 <0.0001 
1988 69 1092 0.3765 1.77135 0.56626 3.13 0.0018 
1989 69 1152 0.4168 1.63118 0.58668 2.78 0.0055 
1990 69 1230 0.4487 5.91443 0.75201 7.86 <0.0001 
1991 69 1288 0.4158 2.95601 0.57718 5.12 <0.0001 
1992 68 1326 0.4389 3.14685 0.55074 5.71 <0.0001 
1993 69 1454 0.4591 2.50047 0.49686 5.03 <0.0001 
1994 69 1438 0.4623 2.44653 0.44105 5.55 <0.0001 
1995 68 1464 0.4550 1.78022 0.43447 4.10 <0.0001 
1996 69 1509 0.4553 1.51645 0.42246 3.59 0.0003 
1997 69 1553 0.4696 0.91468 0.41603 2.20 0.0281 
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Table D.11:  Specification 3 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 8 1225 0.1167 2.34877 0.95124 2.47 0.0137 
1981 8 1213 0.1601 2.25757 1.02544 2.20 0.0279 
1982 8 1177 0.1640 3.72304 1.04481 3.56 0.0004 
1983 8 1161 0.1428 3.44872 1.15664 2.98 0.0029 
1984 8 1119 0.1482 2.22745 1.30020 1.71 0.0870 
1985 8 1065 0.1678 1.57035 1.19438 1.31 0.1889 
1986 8 1007 0.2255 -3.00545 1.48618 -2.02 0.0434 
1987 8 1056 0.2254 6.71247 2.33252 2.88 0.0041 
1988 8 1092 0.2647 1.54116 0.71093 2.17 0.0304 
1989 8 1152 0.2926 2.48560 0.76868 3.23 0.0013 
1990 8 1230 0.3003 4.57055 1.02937 4.44 <.0001 
1991 8 1288 0.2693 1.11419 0.80200 1.39 0.1650 
1992 8 1326 0.2906 1.42776 0.76868 1.86 0.0635 
1993 8 1454 0.2713 0.79242 0.72029 1.10 0.2715 
1994 8 1438 0.2901 1.57652 0.64130 2.46 0.0141 
1995 8 1464 0.2848 0.74952 0.62357 1.20 0.2296 
1996 8 1509 0.2780 -0.29466 0.61276 -0.48 0.6307 
1997 8 1553 0.2904 -0.77173 0.60483 -1.28 0.2022 
 
 
Table D.12:  Specification 4 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 72 1225 0.3703 2.18978 0.80716 2.71 0.0068 
1981 72 1213 0.3590 2.57947 0.90021 2.87 0.0042 
1982 73 1177 0.3634 4.22396 0.91779 4.60 <.0001 
1983 73 1161 0.3194 4.08272 1.03751 3.94 <.0001 
1984 73 1119 0.3399 2.82592 1.15203 2.45 0.0143 
1985 73 1065 0.3059 2.10672 1.09807 1.92 0.0553 
1986 72 1007 0.3444 -3.58426 1.37915 -2.60 0.0095 
1987 73 1056 0.3444 8.27121 2.16539 3.82 0.0001 
1988 73 1092 0.3996 2.06723 0.65217 3.17 0.0016 
1989 73 1152 0.4356 2.99689 0.69620 4.30 <.0001 
1990 73 1230 0.4670 4.75684 0.90764 5.24 <.0001 
1991 73 1288 0.4318 1.51875 0.71218 2.13 0.0332 
1992 72 1326 0.4650 1.32758 0.67203 1.98 0.0484 
1993 73 1454 0.4739 0.92070 0.61481 1.50 0.1345 
1994 73 1438 0.4762 1.42933 0.55481 2.58 0.0101 
1995 72 1464 0.4792 0.61632 0.53355 1.16 0.2482 
1996 73 1509 0.4783 -0.25557 0.52254 -0.49 0.6249 
1997 73 1553 0.4869 -0.72995 0.51605 -1.41 0.1574 
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Table D.13:  Specification 5 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 129 1225 0.4272 4.78356 1.02723 4.66 <0.0001 
1981 126 1213 0.3774 4.08838 1.17148 3.49 0.0005 
1982 127 1177 0.3966 5.47552 1.11128 4.93 <0.0001 
1983 126 1161 0.3495 6.14868 1.21744 5.05 <0.0001 
1984 124 1119 0.3721 5.28582 1.29404 4.08 <0.0001 
1985 127 1065 0.3207 4.63243 1.28109 3.62 0.0003 
1986 127 1007 0.3661 -0.80325 1.41025 -0.57 0.5691 
1987 128 1056 0.3705 12.23290 1.92182 6.37 <0.0001 
1988 128 1092 0.4178 3.35671 1.09365 3.07 0.0022 
1989 129 1152 0.4635 2.43216 0.96181 2.53 0.0116 
1990 127 1230 0.4903 7.64862 1.06497 7.18 <0.0001 
1991 129 1288 0.4645 4.95705 0.92486 5.36 <0.0001 
1992 128 1326 0.4975 5.59649 0.91345 6.13 <0.0001 
1993 132 1454 0.5289 4.95742 0.88589 5.60 <0.0001 
1994 130 1438 0.5249 5.14811 0.85618 6.01 <0.0001 
1995 129 1464 0.5145 4.44857 0.86581 5.14 <0.0001 
1996 131 1509 0.5053 3.06031 0.90604 3.38 0.0008 
1997 131 1553 0.5127 2.77718 0.91911 3.02 0.0026 
 
 
Table D.14:  Specification 6 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 133 1225 0.4323 3.81537 1.11996 3.41 0.0007 
1981 130 1213 0.4093 3.66520 1.26038 2.91 0.0037 
1982 131 1177 0.4165 5.92168 1.21243 4.88 <.0001 
1983 130 1161 0.3663 5.86336 1.34094 4.37 <.0001 
1984 128 1119 0.3912 4.71437 1.44428 3.26 0.0011 
1985 131 1065 0.3460 3.86523 1.40594 2.75 0.0061 
1986 131 1007 0.4029 -2.73133 1.57686 -1.73 0.0836 
1987 132 1056 0.3847 10.97636 2.29081 4.79 <.0001 
1988 132 1092 0.4450 3.47544 1.12448 3.09 0.0021 
1989 133 1152 0.4826 3.55937 1.01827 3.50 0.0005 
1990 131 1230 0.5109 6.08442 1.16294 5.23 <.0001 
1991 133 1288 0.4841 3.33461 0.99883 3.34 0.0009 
1992 132 1326 0.5306 3.49398 0.95653 3.65 0.0003 
1993 136 1454 0.5482 3.12329 0.93650 3.34 0.0009 
1994 134 1438 0.5412 3.90584 0.90505 4.32 <.0001 
1995 133 1464 0.5434 3.20165 0.89191 3.59 0.0003 
1996 135 1509 0.5309 1.22278 0.93512 1.31 0.1912 
1997 135 1553 0.5309 1.10343 0.95360 1.16 0.2474 
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Table D.15:  Specification 7 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 275 1225 0.4731 2.29466 0.75101 3.06 0.0023 
1981 271 1213 0.4707 3.08914 0.83904 3.68 0.0002 
1982 269 1177 0.4613 4.66981 0.86669 5.39 <.0001 
1983 265 1161 0.4130 4.49785 0.99347 4.53 <.0001 
1984 262 1119 0.4309 3.31389 1.10316 3.00 0.0027 
1985 253 1065 0.3859 2.48232 1.06624 2.33 0.0202 
1986 249 1007 0.4569 -3.85456 1.29433 -2.98 0.0030 
1987 267 1056 0.4185 10.02385 2.10903 4.75 <.0001 
1988 267 1092 0.5224 2.53457 0.59742 4.24 <.0001 
1989 280 1152 0.5537 3.77846 0.63984 5.91 <.0001 
1990 284 1230 0.5756 5.62172 0.83473 6.73 <.0001 
1991 286 1288 0.5571 1.88728 0.64577 2.92 0.0036 
1992 286 1326 0.5596 1.76109 0.62231 2.83 0.0047 
1993 307 1454 0.5956 1.07336 0.54950 1.95 0.0510 
1994 301 1438 0.5796 1.63522 0.50652 3.23 0.0013 
1995 300 1464 0.5935 0.73718 0.47865 1.54 0.1238 
1996 308 1509 0.6046 0.06633 0.46286 0.14 0.8861 
1997 311 1553 0.6100 -0.97473 0.45766 -2.13 0.0334 
 
 
Table D.16:  Specification 8 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 330 1225 0.5690 3.98437 1.17479 3.39 0.0007 
1981 326 1213 0.5735 5.55029 1.27464 4.35 <.0001 
1982 325 1177 0.5629 5.95889 1.38936 4.29 <.0001 
1983 319 1161 0.5148 6.47116 1.53785 4.21 <.0001 
1984 314 1119 0.5379 4.77031 1.21690 3.92 <.0001 
1985 309 1065 0.4653 5.86566 1.65247 3.55 0.0004 
1986 303 1007 0.5259 -3.37757 1.49501 -2.26 0.0242 
1987 324 1056 0.4789 12.69257 2.19469 5.78 <.0001 
1988 326 1092 0.5885 3.52199 1.38047 2.55 0.0109 
1989 338 1152 0.6217 3.87694 0.95892 4.04 <.0001 
1990 339 1230 0.6282 6.68539 1.14439 5.84 <.0001 
1991 341 1288 0.6248 2.95947 0.94113 3.14 0.0017 
1992 344 1326 0.6362 2.60649 0.95376 2.73 0.0064 
1993 369 1454 0.6780 2.53430 0.96042 2.64 0.0084 
1994 359 1438 0.6601 3.20845 0.90493 3.55 0.0004 
1995 359 1464 0.6841 2.36844 0.87303 2.71 0.0068 
1996 368 1509 0.6789 -0.16352 0.97678 -0.17 0.8671 
1997 371 1553 0.6742 -0.82817 1.09343 -0.76 0.4490 
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Table D.17:  Specification 1 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 4 1006 0.0705 3.83334 0.49453 7.75 <0.0001 
1981 4 1004 0.0161 2.43151 0.56949 4.27 <0.0001 
1982 4 977 0.0390 3.37234 0.54029 6.24 <0.0001 
1983 4 926 0.0466 3.71550 0.58828 6.32 <0.0001 
1984 4 881 0.0365 3.52513 0.65760 5.36 <0.0001 
1985 4 840 0.0448 3.15569 0.59677 5.29 <0.0001 
1986 4 809 0.0041 0.83222 0.63909 1.30 0.1932 
1987 4 868 0.0516 5.31673 0.93936 5.66 <0.0001 
1988 4 961 0.0666 1.87394 0.34779 5.39 <0.0001 
1989 4 1030 0.0489 1.90312 0.35883 5.30 <0.0001 
1990 4 1056 0.0791 3.94324 0.49993 7.89 <0.0001 
1991 4 1106 0.0695 2.60791 0.39787 6.55 <0.0001 
1992 4 1184 0.0804 2.83094 0.39780 7.12 <0.0001 
1993 4 1286 0.0802 2.18584 0.36763 5.95 <0.0001 
1994 4 1279 0.1148 2.33395 0.31928 7.31 <0.0001 
1995 4 1309 0.1110 2.00290 0.30230 6.63 <0.0001 
1996 4 1365 0.1316 1.74251 0.29639 5.88 <0.0001 
1997 4 1421 0.1601 1.70492 0.29762 5.73 <0.0001 
 
 
Table D.18:  Specification 2 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 66 1006 0.3685 4.70581 0.41537 11.33 <0.0001 
1981 67 1004 0.2265 3.01278 0.51219 5.88 <0.0001 
1982 66 977 0.2514 4.04727 0.48294 8.38 <0.0001 
1983 66 926 0.2697 4.12507 0.52337 7.88 <0.0001 
1984 67 881 0.2843 4.21704 0.57758 7.30 <0.0001 
1985 67 840 0.2390 3.82400 0.54244 7.05 <0.0001 
1986 65 809 0.2249 1.51834 0.57835 2.63 0.0088 
1987 67 868 0.2815 7.02849 0.83342 8.43 <0.0001 
1988 65 961 0.2694 2.21796 0.31387 7.07 <0.0001 
1989 65 1030 0.2601 2.17541 0.32195 6.76 <0.0001 
1990 67 1056 0.3428 4.40212 0.42905 10.26 <0.0001 
1991 68 1106 0.3145 2.91005 0.34558 8.42 <0.0001 
1992 65 1184 0.3440 3.12050 0.33875 9.21 <0.0001 
1993 68 1286 0.3876 2.79589 0.30274 9.24 <0.0001 
1994 67 1279 0.4058 2.58367 0.26505 9.75 <0.0001 
1995 67 1309 0.4132 2.29570 0.24771 9.27 <0.0001 
1996 67 1365 0.4242 2.07367 0.24292 8.54 <0.0001 
1997 68 1421 0.4306 1.87443 0.24708 7.59 <0.0001 
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Table D.19:  Specification 3 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 8 1006 0.0774 3.36932 0.61868 5.45 <.0001 
1981 8 1004 0.0531 1.90883 0.68950 2.77 0.0057 
1982 8 977 0.0627 3.41733 0.66378 5.15 <.0001 
1983 8 926 0.0672 3.49572 0.75412 4.64 <.0001 
1984 8 881 0.0528 3.23131 0.83153 3.89 0.0001 
1985 8 840 0.0795 3.07244 0.72228 4.25 <.0001 
1986 8 809 0.0431 0.41390 0.78914 0.52 0.6001 
1987 8 868 0.0553 5.50880 1.16405 4.73 <.0001 
1988 8 961 0.0951 2.32083 0.42115 5.51 <.0001 
1989 8 1030 0.0657 2.58890 0.44451 5.82 <.0001 
1990 8 1056 0.0997 3.50410 0.60629 5.78 <.0001 
1991 8 1106 0.0904 1.75438 0.49118 3.57 0.0004 
1992 8 1184 0.1031 1.91807 0.48838 3.93 <.0001 
1993 8 1286 0.0899 1.31489 0.45661 2.88 0.0040 
1994 8 1279 0.1299 1.79446 0.40216 4.46 <.0001 
1995 8 1309 0.1293 1.67583 0.38114 4.40 <.0001 
1996 8 1365 0.1507 1.21196 0.37085 3.27 0.0011 
1997 8 1421 0.1739 1.18287 0.37084 3.19 0.0015 
 
 
Table D.20:  Specification 4 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 70 1006 0.3819 4.18180 0.51323 8.15 <.0001 
1981 71 1004 0.2775 2.61486 0.61076 4.28 <.0001 
1982 70 977 0.2852 4.21553 0.58675 7.18 <.0001 
1983 70 926 0.3026 4.23092 0.66490 6.36 <.0001 
1984 71 881 0.3075 4.18545 0.72392 5.78 <.0001 
1985 71 840 0.2835 3.91753 0.64669 6.06 <.0001 
1986 69 809 0.2786 0.84307 0.69879 1.21 0.2280 
1987 71 868 0.2913 7.23331 1.02671 7.05 <.0001 
1988 69 961 0.3225 2.90684 0.37160 7.82 <.0001 
1989 69 1030 0.2974 3.19743 0.39197 8.16 <.0001 
1990 71 1056 0.3767 3.80463 0.51073 7.45 <.0001 
1991 72 1106 0.3447 2.10110 0.42047 5.00 <.0001 
1992 69 1184 0.3776 2.14416 0.40939 5.24 <.0001 
1993 72 1286 0.4069 1.73379 0.37099 4.67 <.0001 
1994 71 1279 0.4305 1.88478 0.32844 5.74 <.0001 
1995 71 1309 0.4487 1.91158 0.30524 6.26 <.0001 
1996 71 1365 0.4487 1.53197 0.30048 5.10 <.0001 
1997 72 1421 0.4508 1.39917 0.30440 4.60 <.0001 
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Table D.21:  Specification 5 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 119 1006 0.4602 5.84109 0.92846 6.29 <0.0001 
1981 117 1004 0.3156 2.35858 1.07692 2.19 0.0288 
1982 117 977 0.3350 3.81703 1.04655 3.65 0.0003 
1983 113 926 0.3790 5.94950 1.12256 5.30 <0.0001 
1984 114 881 0.4208 5.09719 1.13070 4.51 <0.0001 
1985 117 840 0.3489 3.74310 1.34579 2.78 0.0056 
1986 115 809 0.3099 3.31753 1.15122 2.88 0.0041 
1987 121 868 0.3815 9.43045 1.38084 6.83 <0.0001 
1988 122 961 0.3567 3.01072 1.05637 2.85 0.0045 
1989 122 1030 0.3402 2.41489 0.92733 2.60 0.0094 
1990 122 1056 0.4206 4.16600 1.18855 3.51 0.0005 
1991 126 1106 0.3552 2.85624 0.79911 3.57 0.0004 
1992 125 1184 0.4010 4.11155 0.77752 5.29 <0.0001 
1993 128 1286 0.4570 4.83700 0.72945 6.63 <0.0001 
1994 126 1279 0.4497 3.86647 0.79151 4.88 <0.0001 
1995 127 1309 0.4696 4.90804 0.75128 6.53 <0.0001 
1996 128 1365 0.4690 4.61875 0.75821 6.09 <0.0001 
1997 128 1421 0.4754 2.35073 0.77464 3.03 0.0025 
 
 
Table D.22:  Specification 6 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 123 1006 0.4765 5.09581 0.96708 5.27 <.0001 
1981 121 1004 0.3769 1.62305 1.08434 1.50 0.1348 
1982 121 977 0.3761 3.91047 1.07276 3.65 0.0003 
1983 117 926 0.4130 5.97679 1.14897 5.20 <.0001 
1984 118 881 0.4334 4.90145 1.16945 4.19 <.0001 
1985 121 840 0.3985 3.77196 1.33790 2.82 0.0049 
1986 119 809 0.3691 2.54209 1.18660 2.14 0.0325 
1987 125 868 0.3966 9.60556 1.48250 6.48 <.0001 
1988 126 961 0.4241 3.70065 1.01800 3.64 0.0003 
1989 126 1030 0.3786 3.32622 0.92014 3.61 0.0003 
1990 126 1056 0.4617 3.61274 1.18018 3.06 0.0023 
1991 130 1106 0.3900 2.20409 0.81554 2.70 0.0070 
1992 129 1184 0.4418 3.12637 0.78322 3.99 <.0001 
1993 132 1286 0.4796 3.67748 0.74575 4.93 <.0001 
1994 130 1279 0.4793 3.11160 0.79263 3.93 <.0001 
1995 131 1309 0.5092 4.41778 0.74736 5.91 <.0001 
1996 132 1365 0.4945 4.08077 0.75728 5.39 <.0001 
1997 132 1421 0.4965 1.79832 0.77466 2.32 0.0204 
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Table D.23:  Specification 7 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 202 1006 0.4825 4.22043 0.47684 8.85 <.0001 
1981 199 1004 0.3694 2.83449 0.58064 4.88 <.0001 
1982 203 977 0.3782 4.59601 0.56242 8.17 <.0001 
1983 192 926 0.4239 4.92880 0.63474 7.77 <.0001 
1984 198 881 0.3973 4.78349 0.70422 6.79 <.0001 
1985 183 840 0.3526 4.11212 0.63629 6.46 <.0001 
1986 187 809 0.3406 0.88101 0.68733 1.28 0.2004 
1987 206 868 0.3881 8.40855 0.98894 8.50 <.0001 
1988 211 961 0.4441 3.25391 0.34627 9.40 <.0001 
1989 222 1030 0.4584 3.78787 0.35579 10.65 <.0001 
1990 265 1056 0.5227 4.70753 0.46588 10.10 <.0001 
1991 268 1106 0.4790 2.61906 0.38724 6.76 <.0001 
1992 272 1184 0.4924 2.52990 0.38130 6.63 <.0001 
1993 295 1286 0.5549 2.15480 0.32997 6.53 <.0001 
1994 291 1279 0.5666 2.12156 0.29370 7.22 <.0001 
1995 290 1309 0.5978 2.19108 0.26706 8.20 <.0001 
1996 296 1365 0.5950 1.90891 0.26498 7.20 <.0001 
1997 302 1421 0.6183 1.49422 0.25937 5.76 <.0001 
 
 
Table D.24:  Specification 8 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Cross-Sectional 
Regression Analysis 
 
Degrees of Freedom 
 
CACM Dummy Variable 
Year Model Total Adjusted 
R2 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value p-value 
1980 308 1006 0.6333 4.53621 0.93390 4.86 <.0001 
1981 309 1004 0.5338 0.94661 1.09637 0.86 0.3882 
1982 307 977 0.5514 1.31916 1.16708 1.13 0.2588 
1983 294 926 0.5818 6.05908 1.17608 5.15 <.0001 
1984 292 881 0.5822 3.82036 1.52890 2.50 0.0127 
1985 279 840 0.5145 3.31107 1.35981 2.43 0.0152 
1986 275 809 0.4691 2.03012 1.24823 1.63 0.1045 
1987 299 868 0.4998 10.45451 1.49117 7.01 <.0001 
1988 307 961 0.5815 2.90653 0.99307 2.93 0.0035 
1989 319 1030 0.5581 2.56687 0.87081 2.95 0.0033 
1990 318 1056 0.6131 3.91974 1.07569 3.64 0.0003 
1991 322 1106 0.5520 1.29984 0.76781 1.69 0.0909 
1992 331 1184 0.5635 2.21899 0.74498 2.98 0.0030 
1993 353 1286 0.6216 1.90861 0.80034 2.38 0.0173 
1994 347 1279 0.6391 1.32245 0.75524 1.75 0.0803 
1995 348 1309 0.6739 3.42940 0.72202 4.75 <.0001 
1996 354 1365 0.6645 3.39726 0.67704 5.02 <.0001 
1997 359 1421 0.6767 0.46471 0.66432 0.70 0.4844 
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Table E.1:  Specification 1 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.1280 CACM 0.53705 0.02523 21.29 <0.0001 
  dum81 0.01464 0.03670 0.40 0.6899 
  dum82 -0.08010 0.03701 -2.16 0.0304 
  dum83 -0.05161 0.03705 -1.39 0.1636 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.01475 0.03712 -0.40 0.6910 
Model 21 dum85 -0.05808 0.03682 -1.58 0.1147 
Total 120895 dum86 -0.13484 0.03674 -3.67 0.0002 
  dum87 -0.18310 0.03637 -5.03 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.05251 0.03567 -1.47 0.1410 
  dum89 -0.12180 0.03553 -3.43 0.0006 
  dum90 -0.19881 0.03524 -5.64 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.23116 0.03516 -6.57 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.21485 0.03471 -6.19 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.17884 0.03429 -5.22 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.21358 0.03409 -6.27 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.21649 0.03391 -6.38 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.22243 0.03356 -6.63 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.28856 0.03360 -8.59 <0.0001 
 
 
Table E.2:  Specification 2 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.2254 CACM 0.60437 0.02390 25.29 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.00017 0.03459 -0.00 0.9961 
  dum82 -0.11078 0.03488 -3.18 0.0015 
  dum83 -0.09228 0.03493 -2.64 0.0082 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.05447 0.03500 -1.56 0.1196 
Model 86 dum85 -0.10017 0.03471 -2.89 0.0039 
Total 120895 dum86 -0.17258 0.03464 -4.98 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.21457 0.03429 -6.26 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.08642 0.03363 -2.57 0.0102 
  dum89 -0.14830 0.03350 -4.43 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.23019 0.03322 -6.93 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.25683 0.03315 -7.75 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.24306 0.03273 -7.43 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.20417 0.03234 -6.31 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.23837 0.03215 -7.42 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.25147 0.03198 -7.86 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.25938 0.03166 -8.19 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.31361 0.03169 -9.90 <0.0001 
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 Table E.3:  Specification 3 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.1288 CACM 0.55284 0.02621 21.09 <0.0001 
  dum81 0.01338 0.03668 0.36 0.7153 
  dum82 -0.08204 0.03699 -2.22 0.0266 
  dum83 -0.04933 0.03704 -1.33 0.1829 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.01567 0.03711 -0.42 0.6729 
Model 25 dum85 -0.05803 0.03681 -1.58 0.1149 
Total 120895 dum86 -0.13756 0.03673 -3.75 0.0002 
  dum87 -0.18406 0.03636 -5.06 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.05578 0.03565 -1.56 0.1177 
  dum89 -0.12296 0.03552 -3.46 0.0005 
  dum90 -0.20020 0.03522 -5.68 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.23268 0.03515 -6.62 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.21268 0.03470 -6.13 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.17876 0.03428 -5.21 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.21304 0.03407 -6.25 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.21579 0.03390 -6.37 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.22385 0.03355 -6.67 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.28840 0.03359 -8.59 <0.0001 
 
 
Table E.4:  Specification 4 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.2265 CACM 0.65265 0.02483 26.28 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.00146 0.03457 -0.04 0.9663 
  dum82 -0.11253 0.03486 -3.23 0.0012 
  dum83 -0.09008 0.03491 -2.58 0.0099 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.05738 0.03498 -1.64 0.1009 
Model 90 dum85 -0.10266 0.03469 -2.96 0.0031 
Total 120895 dum86 -0.17744 0.03462 -5.13 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.21815 0.03427 -6.37 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.09015 0.03361 -2.68 0.0073 
  dum89 -0.15098 0.03348 -4.51 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.23266 0.03320 -7.01 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.25883 0.03313 -7.81 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.24171 0.03271 -7.39 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.20563 0.03232 -6.36 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.23988 0.03213 -7.47 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.25386 0.03196 -7.94 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.26331 0.03164 -8.32 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.31668 0.03167 -10.00 <0.0001 
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Table E.5:  Specification 5 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.2509 CACM 1.19865 0.14278 8.40 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.00772 0.03402 -0.23 0.8205 
  dum82 -0.12084 0.03431 -3.52 0.0004 
  dum83 -0.10707 0.03436 -3.12 0.0018 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.06755 0.03442 -1.96 0.0497 
Model 150 dum85 -0.11732 0.03414 -3.44 0.0006 
Total 120895 dum86 -0.18188 0.03407 -5.34 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.22402 0.03373 -6.64 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.09609 0.03308 -2.91 0.0037 
  dum89 -0.14935 0.03295 -4.53 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.23165 0.03268 -7.09 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.25954 0.03261 -7.96 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.24021 0.03219 -7.46 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.19166 0.03181 -6.03 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.22780 0.03162 -7.20 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.23631 0.03146 -7.51 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.24013 0.03114 -7.71 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.29582 0.03117 -9.49 <0.0001 
 
 
Table E.6:  Specification 6 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.2521 CACM 1.29138 0.14296 9.03 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.00890 0.03399 -0.26 0.7936 
  dum82 -0.12264 0.03428 -3.58 0.0003 
  dum83 -0.10518 0.03433 -3.06 0.0022 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.07096 0.03440 -2.06 0.0391 
Model 154 dum85 -0.12094 0.03412 -3.54 0.0004 
Total 120895 dum86 -0.18772 0.03405 -5.51 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.22777 0.03370 -6.76 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.10051 0.03305 -3.04 0.0024 
  dum89 -0.15183 0.03292 -4.61 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.23458 0.03265 -7.18 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.26156 0.03258 -8.03 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.23960 0.03217 -7.45 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.19329 0.03178 -6.08 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.22936 0.03160 -7.26 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.23921 0.03144 -7.61 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.24382 0.03112 -7.83 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.29887 0.03115 -9.59 <0.0001 
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Table E.7:  Specification 7 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.2786 CACM 0.87232 0.02441 35.73 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.01394 0.03339 -0.42 0.6763 
  dum82 -0.13059 0.03368 -3.88 0.0001 
  dum83 -0.11783 0.03374 -3.49 0.0005 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.09878 0.03380 -2.92 0.0035 
Model 345 dum85 -0.14492 0.03353 -4.32 <0.0001 
Total 120895 dum86 -0.20666 0.03347 -6.17 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.23469 0.03314 -7.08 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.10683 0.03249 -3.29 0.0010 
  dum89 -0.16429 0.03237 -5.07 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.23833 0.03210 -7.43 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.27067 0.03203 -8.45 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.25081 0.03163 -7.93 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.19769 0.03124 -6.33 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.22878 0.03107 -7.36 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.24282 0.03091 -7.86 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.23055 0.03061 -7.53 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.28955 0.03064 -9.45 <0.0001 
 
 
Table E.8:  Specification 8 - CACM-World 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.3054 CACM 0.85076 0.17906 4.75 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.02167 0.03277 -0.66 0.5086 
  dum82 -0.13969 0.03306 -4.23 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.12823 0.03312 -3.87 0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.11020 0.03318 -3.32 0.0009 
Model 409 dum85 -0.15634 0.03291 -4.75 <0.0001 
Total 120895 dum86 -0.21404 0.03285 -6.52 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.24074 0.03253 -7.40 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.11198 0.03189 -3.51 0.0004 
  dum89 -0.15938 0.03177 -5.02 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.23339 0.03151 -7.41 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.26456 0.03144 -8.41 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.23783 0.03104 -7.66 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.17903 0.03067 -5.84 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.21149 0.03050 -6.93 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.22118 0.03035 -7.29 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.20612 0.03005 -6.86 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.26365 0.03008 -8.76 <0.0001 
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 Table E.9:  Specification 1 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.2276 CACM 2.42154 0.15420 15.70 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.14683 0.08342 -1.76 0.0784 
  dum82 -0.31391 0.08404 -3.74 0.0002 
  dum83 -0.44402 0.08445 -5.26 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.58887 0.08567 -6.87 <0.0001 
Model 21 dum85 -0.79368 0.08735 -9.09 <0.0001 
Total 22546 dum86 -0.74419 0.08856 -8.40 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.71277 0.08723 -8.17 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.51313 0.08601 -5.97 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.55674 0.08537 -6.52 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.52645 0.08369 -6.29 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.48118 0.08285 -5.81 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.43208 0.08275 -5.22 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.53659 0.08184 -6.56 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.48078 0.08253 -5.83 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.49045 0.08338 -5.88 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.46256 0.08350 -5.54 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.47672 0.08400 -5.68 <0.0001 
 
 
Table E.10:  Specification 2 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.3978 CACM 2.44696 0.13654 17.92 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.18812 0.07367 -2.55 0.0107 
  dum82 -0.37011 0.07423 -4.99 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.50568 0.07459 -6.78 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.66781 0.07568 -8.82 <0.0001 
Model 86 dum85 -0.93925 0.07719 -12.17 <0.0001 
Total 22456 dum86 -0.89101 0.07826 -11.39 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.79453 0.07708 -10.31 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.57247 0.07599 -7.53 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.60951 0.07542 -8.08 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.56515 0.07394 -7.64 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.51063 0.07320 -6.98 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.45828 0.07310 -6.27 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.51994 0.07230 -7.19 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.48103 0.07294 -6.60 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.49084 0.07369 -6.66 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.44603 0.07380 -6.04 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.44925 0.07425 -6.05 <0.0001 
 267
Table E.11:  Specification 3 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.2395 CACM 1.28228 0.17983 7.13 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.15719 0.08278 -1.90 0.0576 
  dum82 -0.32350 0.08340 -3.88 0.0001 
  dum83 -0.43016 0.08382 -5.13 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.55542 0.08513 -6.52 <0.0001 
Model 25 dum85 -0.74194 0.08695 -8.53 <0.0001 
Total 22546 dum86 -0.70675 0.08802 -8.03 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.68244 0.08670 -7.87 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.50622 0.08538 -5.93 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.50724 0.08496 -5.97 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.47896 0.08321 -5.76 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.42600 0.08243 -5.17 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.35354 0.08253 -4.28 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.43002 0.08194 -5.25 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.36114 0.08286 -4.36 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.34823 0.08412 -4.14 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.30276 0.08452 -3.58 0.0003 
  dum97 -0.29824 0.08550 -3.49 0.0005 
 
 
Table E.12:  Specification 4 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.4120 CACM 1.28729 0.15843 8.13 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.19721 0.07281 -2.71 0.0068 
  dum82 -0.37923 0.07336 -5.17 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.49124 0.07374 -6.66 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.63594 0.07489 -8.49 <0.0001 
Model 90 dum85 -0.89090 0.07652 -11.64 <0.0001 
Total 22456 dum86 -0.85477 0.07746 -11.04 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.76505 0.07629 -10.03 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.56696 0.07512 -7.55 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.56100 0.07475 -7.51 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.51814 0.07321 -7.08 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.45699 0.07252 -6.30 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.37989 0.07260 -5.23 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.41233 0.07210 -5.72 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.36124 0.07294 -4.95 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.34897 0.07404 -4.71 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.28498 0.07439 -3.83 0.0001 
  dum97 -0.27067 0.07526 -3.60 0.0003 
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Table E.13:  Specification 5 - CACM-U.S 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.4535 CACM 4.20484 0.23276 18.07 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.19836 0.07021 -2.83 0.0047 
  dum82 -0.38998 0.07074 -5.51 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.53192 0.07110 -7.48 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.69122 0.07215 -9.58 <0.0001 
Model 149 dum85 -0.97477 0.07359 -13.25 <0.0001 
Total 22546 dum86 -0.91243 0.07460 -12.23 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.82794 0.07348 -11.27 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.60309 0.07243 -8.33 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.63178 0.07190 -8.79 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.59935 0.07050 -8.50 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.53934 0.06978 -7.73 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.48385 0.06986 -6.94 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.51381 0.06892 -7.46 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.49479 0.06954 -7.12 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.49517 0.07026 -7.05 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.43940 0.07036 -6.24 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.45253 0.07081 -6.39 <0.0001 
 
 
Table E.14:  Specification 6 - CACM-U.S 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.4705 CACM 2.89387 0.24286 11.92 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.21054 0.06912 -3.05 0.0023 
  dum82 -0.40258 0.06965 -5.78 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.51856 0.07001 -7.41 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.65643 0.07111 -9.23 <0.0001 
Model 153 dum85 -0.91957 0.07266 -12.66 <0.0001 
Total 22546 dum86 -0.87128 0.07355 -11.85 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.79377 0.07244 -10.96 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.59724 0.07131 -8.37 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.57495 0.07097 -8.10 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.54540 0.06952 -7.84 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.47750 0.06887 -6.93 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.39292 0.06894 -5.70 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.38731 0.06846 -5.66 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.35410 0.06926 -5.11 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.32810 0.07031 -4.67 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.25031 0.07065 -3.54 0.0004 
  dum97 -0.24169 0.07149 -3.38 0.0007 
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Table E.15:  Specification 7 - CACM-U.S 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.5330 CACM 1.50753 0.14204 10.61 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.20036 0.06496 -3.08 0.0020 
  dum82 -0.41949 0.06548 -6.41 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.55082 0.06585 -8.36 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.71434 0.06688 -10.68 <0.0001 
Model 343 dum85 -0.99643 0.06836 -14.58 <0.0001 
Total 22546 dum86 -0.92758 0.06921 -13.40 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.84002 0.06816 -12.32 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.64704 0.06708 -9.65 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.64324 0.06680 -9.63 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.58658 0.06545 -8.96 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.52303 0.06482 -8.07 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.45384 0.06490 -6.99 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.42459 0.06447 -6.59 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.39200 0.06528 -6.00 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.37479 0.06628 -5.65 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.29377 0.06660 -4.41 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.28988 0.06747 -4.30 <0.0001 
 
 
Table E.16:  Specification 8 - CACM-U.S. 2-Digit SITC Panel Data Regression 
Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.5939 CACM 2.52393 0.24941 10.12 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.20349 0.06059 -3.36 0.0008 
  dum82 -0.44039 0.06108 -7.21 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.57179 0.06143 -9.31 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.72176 0.06240 -11.57 <0.0001 
Model 410 dum85 -1.01703 0.06378 -15.95 <0.0001 
Total 22546 dum86 -0.94245 0.06457 -14.6 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.86525 0.06359 -13.61 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.65154 0.06259 -10.41 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.64296 0.06232 -10.32 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.60006 0.06106 -9.83 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.52844 0.06048 -8.74 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.45246 0.06054 -7.47 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.39979 0.06016 -6.65 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.38235 0.06090 -6.28 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.35522 0.06184 -5.74 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.26629 0.06215 -4.28 <0.0001 
  dum97 -0.26949 0.06296 -4.28 <0.0001 
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 Table E.17:  Specification 1 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Panel Data 
Regression Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.0812 CACM 2.39519 0.09331 25.67 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.14584 0.08596 -1.70 0.0898 
  dum82 -0.25685 0.08657 -2.97 0.0030 
  dum83 -0.24227 0.08776 -2.76 0.0058 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.41311 0.08914 -4.63 <0.0001 
Model 21 dum85 -0.70741 0.09068 -7.80 <0.0001 
Total 19325 dum86 -0.73701 0.09131 -8.07 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.61559 0.08941 -6.88 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.42851 0.08692 -4.93 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.56888 0.08559 -6.65 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.49915 0.08506 -5.87 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.42567 0.08425 -5.05 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.43227 0.08334 -5.19 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.48947 0.08247 -5.94 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.41512 0.08297 -5.00 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.38601 0.08295 -4.65 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.31557 0.08286 -3.81 0.0001 
  dum97 -0.39559 0.08323 -4.75 <0.0001 
 
 
Table E.18:  Specification 2 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Panel Data 
Regression Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.3184 CACM 2.66213 0.08073 32.98 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.19282 0.07407 -2.60 0.0092 
  dum82 -0.32729 0.07461 -4.39 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.31328 0.07562 -4.14 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.50911 0.07684 -6.63 <0.0001 
Model 85 dum85 -0.86984 0.07820 -11.12 <0.0001 
Total 19325 dum86 -0.86998 0.07873 -11.05 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.69868 0.07709 -9.06 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.47296 0.07494 -6.31 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.61992 0.07380 -8.40 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.53642 0.07333 -7.31 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.47138 0.07264 -6.49 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.45714 0.07184 -6.36 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.47220 0.07110 -6.64 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.40960 0.07156 -5.72 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.35863 0.07155 -5.01 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.26807 0.07149 -3.75 0.0002 
  dum97 -0.33887 0.07183 -4.72 <0.0001 
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Table E.19:  Specification 3 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Panel Data 
Regression Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.0989 CACM 1.74969 0.10824 16.17 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.16071 0.08515 -1.89 0.0591 
  dum82 -0.27693 0.08578 -3.23 0.0012 
  dum83 -0.23338 0.08693 -2.68 0.0073 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.37969 0.08836 -4.30 <0.0001 
Model 25 dum85 -0.66057 0.08998 -7.34 <0.0001 
Total 19325 dum86 -0.71964 0.09047 -7.95 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.61164 0.08858 -6.90 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.45524 0.08612 -5.29 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.54853 0.08482 -6.47 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.47563 0.08427 -5.64 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.38163 0.08352 -4.57 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.35600 0.08280 -4.30 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.37568 0.08226 -4.57 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.28802 0.08296 -3.47 0.0005 
  dum95 -0.24757 0.08313 -2.98 0.0029 
  dum96 -0.15263 0.08331 -1.83 0.0670 
  dum97 -0.20703 0.08422 -2.46 0.0140 
 
 
Table E.20:  Specification 4 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Panel Data 
Regression Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.3427 CACM 1.97566 0.09274 21.30 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.20704 0.07275 -2.85 0.0044 
  dum82 -0.34862 0.07330 -4.76 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.30450 0.07428 -4.10 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.47768 0.07553 -6.32 <0.0001 
Model 89 dum85 -0.82474 0.07693 -10.72 <0.0001 
Total 19325 dum86 -0.85604 0.07734 -11.07 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.69802 0.07573 -9.22 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.50370 0.07363 -6.84 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.60102 0.07251 -8.29 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.51346 0.07204 -7.13 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.42636 0.07140 -5.97 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.37602 0.07077 -5.31 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.34930 0.07032 -4.97 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.27266 0.07094 -3.84 0.0001 
  dum95 -0.21086 0.07109 -2.97 0.0030 
  dum96 -0.09305 0.07126 -1.31 0.1916 
  dum97 -0.13757 0.07205 -1.91 0.0562 
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Table E.21:  Specification 5 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Panel Data 
Regression Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.3826 CACM 3.68008 0.21941 16.77 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.19737 0.07053 -2.80 0.0051 
  dum82 -0.34256 0.07105 -4.82 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.33356 0.07203 -4.63 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.53378 0.07319 -7.29 <0.0001 
Model 148 dum85 -0.91736 0.07449 -12.32 <0.0001 
Total 19325 dum86 -0.91220 0.07499 -12.16 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.72698 0.07343 -9.90 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.48492 0.07137 -6.79 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.61942 0.07028 -8.81 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.54485 0.06987 -7.80 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.47325 0.06923 -6.84 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.43162 0.06845 -6.31 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.44048 0.06774 -6.50 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.38667 0.06818 -5.67 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.32614 0.06818 -4.78 <0.0001 
  dum96 -0.22681 0.06812 -3.33 0.0009 
  dum97 -0.29994 0.06846 -4.38 <0.0001 
 
 
Table E.22:  Specification 6 – CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Panel Data 
Regression Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.4096 CACM 2.92374 0.21937 13.33 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.21555 0.06899 -3.12 0.0018 
  dum82 -0.36887 0.06952 -5.31 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.32820 0.07046 -4.66 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.50155 0.07163 -7.00 <0.0001 
Model 152 dum85 -0.87077 0.07296 -11.93 <0.0001 
Total 19325 dum86 -0.89827 0.07336 -12.24 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.72705 0.07183 -10.12 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.52078 0.06982 -7.46 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.59844 0.06877 -8.70 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.52139 0.06835 -7.63 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.42626 0.06776 -6.29 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.34366 0.06714 -5.12 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.30502 0.06672 -4.57 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.23615 0.06732 -3.51 0.0005 
  dum95 -0.16181 0.06747 -2.40 0.0165 
  dum96 -0.03258 0.06764 -0.48 0.6300 
  dum97 -0.07654 0.06841 -1.12 0.2632 
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Table E.23:  Specification 7 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Panel Data 
Regression Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.4631 CACM 2.18511 0.08467 25.81 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.21563 0.06587 -3.27 0.0011 
  dum82 -0.37939 0.06640 -5.71 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.36213 0.06729 -5.38 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.55957 0.06843 -8.18 <0.0001 
Model 332 dum85 -0.92615 0.06975 -13.28 <0.0001 
Total 19325 dum86 -0.93741 0.07012 -13.37 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.78258 0.06863 -11.40 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.56459 0.06671 -8.46 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.66409 0.06574 -10.10 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.58475 0.06534 -8.95 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.49786 0.06476 -7.69 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.41992 0.06420 -6.54 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.36221 0.06378 -5.68 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.29941 0.06441 -4.65 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.21781 0.06455 -3.37 0.0007 
  dum96 -0.09583 0.06475 -1.48 0.1389 
  dum97 -0.13233 0.06558 -2.02 0.0436 
 
 
Table E.24:  Specification 8 - CACM-Mexico 2-Digit SITC Panel Data 
Regression Analysis 
 
  CACM Dummy Variable 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Adjusted R2 0.5283 CACM 2.22405 0.21288 10.45 <0.0001 
  dum81 -0.21375 0.06176 -3.46 0.0005 
  dum82 -0.39712 0.06226 -6.38 <0.0001 
  dum83 -0.38193 0.06310 -6.05 <0.0001 
Degrees of Freedom dum84 -0.57950 0.06417 -9.03 <0.0001 
Model 395 dum85 -0.95317 0.06540 -14.57 <0.0001 
Total 19325 dum86 -0.98620 0.06576 -15.00 <0.0001 
  dum87 -0.80919 0.06436 -12.57 <0.0001 
  dum88 -0.56702 0.06257 -9.06 <0.0001 
  dum89 -0.65885 0.06164 -10.69 <0.0001 
  dum90 -0.59591 0.06130 -9.72 <0.0001 
  dum91 -0.50550 0.06076 -8.32 <0.0001 
  dum92 -0.40614 0.06021 -6.74 <0.0001 
  dum93 -0.34129 0.05983 -5.70 <0.0001 
  dum94 -0.27547 0.06043 -4.56 <0.0001 
  dum95 -0.19437 0.06057 -3.21 0.0013 
  dum96 -0.06604 0.06076 -1.09 0.2770 
  dum97 -0.10038 0.06154 -1.63 0.1029 
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APPENDIX F 
RECENT CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE PATTERNS,      
1998-2002 
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RECENT CACM TRADE PATTERNS, 1998-2002 
 
 Table F.1 provides recent data on the total value of intra-regional and 
extra-regional exports and imports between 1998 and 2002.  In 2002, the five 
Central American countries exported approximately $10.4 billion worth of goods, 
down from $11.0 billion in 1998.  More recently, low coffee prices have had a 
significant effect on stifling the growth of the region’s exports (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2002a: 10), as did the slow growth in the U.S. economy during 
2002.  The region’s total imports, on the other hand, increased during this four-
year period from $17.7 billion in 1998 to approximately $21.7 billion in 2002.  
The total value of Central America’s exports was less than one-half of the total 
value of its imports for 2002, creating a trade imbalance of approximately $11.2 
billion.  Intra-regional trade continued to play an important role in Central 
America and, in 2002, approximately 27.5 percent of its total exports stayed 
within the region, up from the 21.0 percent in 1998.  Intra-regional import trade, 
on the other hand, grew more slowly.  In 2002, the CACM imported 14.2 percent 
of its total imports from Central America, compared to 13.3 percent in 1998.     
 
 276
Table F.1:  Total CACM Trade (Thousands of U.S. $), 1998-2002 
 
 Exports Imports 
 
CACM 
Rest of the 
World Total CACM 
Rest of 
the World Total 
1998 2,316,352 8,704,439 11,020,791 2,370,838 15,363,710 17,734,548 
1999 2,449,513 9,177,454 11,626,967 2,406,800 15,704,653 18,111,453 
2000† 2,616,798 8,894,927 11,511,725 2,739,479 16,061,441 18,800,920 
2001† 2,829,179 7,356,127 10,185,305 2,935,744 17,582,376 20,518,120 
2002‡ 2,883,872 7,608,607 10,492,479 3,087,527 18,637,899 21,725,426 
 
† Preliminary figures ‡ Estimates 
 
Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Exportaciónes Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003; SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Importaciónes 
Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  www.sieca.org.gt.  2003; SIECA, Centroamerica: 
Evolución de las Exportaciónes al Resto del Mundo, 1960-2002.  www.sieca.org.gt.  
2003; SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Importaciónes al Resto del Mundo, 1960-
2002.  www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
 
 The majority of the CACM countries’ trade has been with countries in 
North and South America, which accounted for more than three-quarters of all 
Central American imports and exports in 2001 (See Table F.2).  However, while 
Central America’s exports to the Western Hemisphere have grown between 1998 
and 2001, its export trade to Europe has declined.  In 1998, European countries 
purchased 21.2 percent of Central America’s export products, but in 2001, they 
only purchased 15.2 percent of them.  The value of imports from Europe 
fluctuated modestly during this period and accounted for roughly 10 percent of 
the region’s total imports each year.  Asian goods made up approximately 6 
percent of Central America’s export market and provided almost 10 percent of its 
imports in 2001.  The remainder of the world made up less than 1.0 percent of the 
CACM’s total export or import trade. 
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Table F.2: CACM’s Trade with the Rest of the World by Region in 1998-2001 
 
Total Trade – Thousands of U.S. $ 
Region 
1998 
Exports 
1999 
Exports 
2000 
Exports 
2001 
Exports 
1998 
Imports 
1999 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
2001 
Imports 
North and South America 8,031,035 8,666,227 8,791,362 7,977,222 14,075,145 14,248,063 15,029,490 16,220,148 
Europe 2,332,475 2,253,899 2,097,689 1,549,699 1,854,091 1,728,544 1,830,909 2,140,669 
Asia 607,199 661,817 569,614  632,738 1,732,949 2,060,976 1,863,158 2,026,234 
Africa 35,436 17,990 40,504  11,629 14,990 9,322 11,161 17,040 
Oceania 12,019 26,590 11,338  5,623 53,011 54,923 52,129 93,038 
Rest of World 2,626 444 1,218  8,395 4,363 9,625 14,073 20,991 
Total Exports 11,020,791 11,626,967 11,511,726 10,185,305 17,734,549 18,111,453 18,800,920 20,518,120 
Percentage of Total Trade 
Region 
1998 
Exports 
1999 
Exports 
2000 
Exports 
2001 
Exports 
1998 
Imports 
1999 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
2001 
Imports 
North and South America 72.87% 74.54% 76.37% 78.32% 79.37% 78.67% 79.94% 79.05% 
Europe 21.16% 19.39% 18.22% 15.22% 10.45% 9.54% 9.74% 10.43% 
Asia 5.51% 5.69% 4.95% 6.21% 9.77% 11.38% 9.91% 9.88% 
Africa 0.32% 0.15% 0.35% 0.11% 0.08% 0.05% 0.06% 0.08% 
Oceania 0.11% 0.23% 0.10% 0.06% 0.30% 0.30% 0.28% 0.45% 
Rest of World 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.08% 0.02% 0.05% 0.07% 0.10% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Change From Previous Year – Thousands of U.S. $ 
Region 
1998 
Exports 
1999 
Exports 
2000 
Exports 
2001 
Exports 
1998 
Imports 
1999 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
2001 
Imports 
North and South America … 635,192 125,135 -814,140 … 172,918 781,427 1,190,658 
Europe … -78,576 -156,210 -547,990 … -125,547 102,365 309,760 
Asia … 54,618 -92,203 63,124 … 328,027 -197,818 163,076 
Africa … -17,446 22,514 -28,875 … -5,668 1,839 5,879 
Oceania … 14,571 -15,252 -5,715 … 1,912 -2,794 40,909 
Rest of World … -2,182 774 7,177 … 5,262 4,448 6,918 
Total … 606,176 -115,241 -1,326,421 … 376,904 689,467 1,717,200 
Source:  SIECA.  Central America: Trade Balance by Geographic Partner Group.  http://www.sieca.org.gt.  2002. 
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From the perspective of major regional trade blocs, in 2001, the NAFTA 
countries received more than 42 percent of the CACM’s exports, while they sent 
almost 50 percent of the CACM’s imports (See Table F.3).  As implied earlier, 
the value of Central American goods that were purchased by countries in the 
European Union has declined, between 1998 and 2002, and the value of Central 
American imports from the European Union has remained about the same.  Most 
of the other major regional trading blocs in the world, which have an economic 
relationship with the Central America, have had a fairly minor role in its total 
trade, with the exception of the Andean Community.  Central America engages in 
a considerable amount of trade with Colombia and imports a substantial part of its 
petroleum needs from Venezuela. 
 
 
 279
Table F.3: CACM’s Trade with the Rest of the World by Trade Bloc in 1998-2001 
Total Trade – Thousands of U.S. $ 
Bloc 
1998 
Exports 
1999 
Exports 
2000 
Exports 
2001 
Exports 
1998 
Imports 
1999 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
2001 
Imports 
NAFTA 4,773,261 5,380,283 5,343,649 4,305,521 9,466,984 9,274,129 9,360,933 10,136,835 
European Union 2,090,635 2,104,726 1,928,627 1,347,607 1,580,198 1,499,783 1,556,934 1,769,248 
ASEAN 172,042 191,384 154,530 237,312 74,972 306,452 163,171 103,659 
Andean Community 196,603 107,518 108,465 107,981 917,740 1,069,223 1,166,173 1,481,025 
MERCOSUR 21,396 20,709 23,971 28,472 325,522 325,758 344,123 429,596 
CARICOM 99,902 94,538 120,917 111,353 96,851 162,257 117,826 170,559 
Total 11,020,791 11,626,967 11,511,726 10,185,305 17,734,549 18,111,453 18,800,920 20,518,120 
Percentage of Total Trade 
Bloc 
1998 
Exports 
1999 
Exports 
2000 
Exports 
2001 
Exports 
1998 
Imports 
1999 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
2001 
Imports 
NAFTA 43.31% 46.27% 46.42% 42.27% 53.38% 51.21% 49.79% 49.40% 
European Union 18.97% 18.10% 16.75% 13.23% 8.91% 8.28% 8.28% 8.62% 
ASEAN 1.56% 1.65% 1.34% 2.33% 0.42% 1.69% 0.87% 0.51% 
Andean Community 1.78% 0.92% 0.94% 1.06% 5.17% 5.90% 6.20% 7.22% 
MERCOSUR 0.19% 0.18% 0.21% 0.28% 1.84% 1.80% 1.83% 2.09% 
CARICOM 0.91% 0.81% 1.05% 1.09% 0.55% 0.90% 0.63% 0.83% 
Total 66.73% 67.94% 66.72% 60.27% 70.27% 69.78% 67.60% 68.68% 
Change From Previous Year – Thousands of U.S. $ 
Bloc 
1998 
Exports 
1999 
Exports 
2000 
Exports 
2001 
Exports 
1998 
Imports 
1999 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
2001 
Imports 
NAFTA … 607,022 -36,634 -1,038,128 … -192,855 86,804 775,902 
European Union … 14,091 -176,099 -581,020 … -80,415 57,151 212,314 
ASEAN … 19,342 -36,854 82,782 … 231,480 -143,281 -59,512 
Andean Community … -89,085 947 -484 … 151,483 96,950 314,852 
MERCOSUR … -687 3,262 4,501 … 236 18,365 85,473 
CARICOM … -5,364 26,379 -9,564 … 65,406 -44,431 52,733 
Total … 607,022 -36,634 -1,038,128 … -192,855 86,804 775,902 
Source:  SIECA.  Centroamericano: Valor y Volumen del la Exportación, Segun Bloques Económicos y Países, 1998-2001.  
http://www.sieca.org.gt. 2002; and SIECA.  Centroamericano: Valor y Volumen del la Importación, Segun Bloques Económicos y 
Países, 1998-2001.  http://www.sieca.org.gt. 2002. 
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Within North America and the world, Central America’s single largest 
trading partner is the United States (See Table F.4).  The United States bought 
almost 39 percent of Central America’s exports in 2001, while sending the region 
more than 40 percent of its imports.  Mexico’s trade relationship with Central 
America has shown some recent improvement, since signing a free-trade 
agreement with Costa Rica, and the other Central American countries are also in 
the process of negotiating a similar trade agreement.  However, the primary 
beneficiary in this relationship, in terms of export trade, has been Mexico.  Given 
that Mexico and Central America produce many of the same agricultural 
commodities, a substantial portion of the trade between the country and the region 
has been in manufactured goods, and Mexican manufacturers tend to be much 
more efficient than their Central American counterparts.  In addition to the higher 
levels of labor productivity, Mexico still maintains the advantage of relatively low 
labor costs.  As a result, Mexican producers have been growing their market share 
in the region, often at the detriment of Central American manufacturers.  The 
value of Canada’s trade with Central America is still very small even though 
Costa Rica and Canada have signed a free-trade agreement and the other countries 
of Central America would like to grow their exports to the country. 
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Table F.4: CACM’s Trade with North America in 1998-2001 
 
Total Trade – Thousands of U.S. $ 
NAFTA Bloc 
1998 
Exports 
1999 
Exports 
2000 
Exports 
2001 
Exports 
1998 
Imports 
1999 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
2001 
Imports 
United States 4,390,927 5,015,753 4,944,520 3,964,983 8,025,829 7,679,450 7,675,985 8,265,114 
Mexico 225,933 271,226 266,994 220,422 1,243,342 1,326,474 1,431,613 1,576,073 
Canada 156,400 93,304 132,134 120,116 197,813 268,204 253,335 295,647 
Percentage of Total Trade 
NAFTA Bloc 
1998 
Exports 
1999 
Exports 
2000 
Exports 
2001 
Exports 
1998 
Imports 
1999 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
2001 
Imports 
United States 39.84% 43.14% 42.95% 38.93% 45.26% 42.40% 40.83% 40.28% 
Mexico 2.05% 2.33% 2.32% 2.16% 7.01% 7.32% 7.61% 7.68% 
Canada 1.42% 0.80% 1.15% 1.18% 1.12% 1.48% 1.35% 1.44% 
Total 43.31% 46.27% 46.42% 42.27% 53.38% 51.21% 49.79% 49.40% 
Change From Previous Year – Thousands of U.S. $ 
NAFTA Bloc 
1998 
Exports 
1999 
Exports 
2000 
Exports 
2001 
Exports 
1998 
Imports 
1999 
Imports 
2000 
Imports 
2001 
Imports 
United States … 624,826 -71,233 -979,537 … -346,379 -3,465 589,129 
Mexico … 45,293 -4,232 -46,572 … 83,132 105,139 144,460 
Canada … -63,096 38,830 -12,018 … 70,391 -14,869 42,312 
 
Source:  SIECA.  Centroamericano: Valor y Volumen del la Exportación, Segun Bloques Económicos y Países, 1998-2001.  
http://www.sieca.org.gt. 2002; and SIECA.  Centroamericano: Valor y Volumen del la Importación, Segun Bloques Económicos y 
Países, 1998-2001.  http://www.sieca.org.gt. 2002. 
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Agricultural commodities made up the majority of the ten highest-valued 
export goods from Central America in 2001, but manufactured products also 
played an important role.  In 2001, the region’s highest-valued export products 
were fruits and melons worth $1.24 billion (which includes bananas, pineapples 
and melons), followed by coffee (also tea and spices) worth $959.4 million (See 
Table F.5).  Other major agricultural exports from the region were sugar and 
seafood (fish, shrimp, and mollusks).  Important manufactured exports for Central 
America were machinery, mechanical parts and appliances, medical instruments, 
and medicines.  Combined, these ten categories were worth $5.76 billion or more 
than 55 percent of the total value of the goods exported from Central America.  
Electrical machinery and equipment, petroleum products, machinery and 
mechanical parts and appliances made up the majority of the ten highest-valued 
products imported by Central America.  Other categories of goods that were 
significant in value were plastics, paper and paperboard, medicines, iron and steel.  
These ten categories of products were worth $12.94 billion in 2001 or more than 
60 percent of the total goods imported into the region. 
Central America’s intra-regional exports in 2001 were composed primarily 
of manufactured and prepared food products (See Table F.6).  Interestingly, the 
highest valued intra-regional export (and, subsequently, the highest valued intra-
regional import) was paper and paperboard.  Other important items traded within 
Central America were plastics, metals, and pharmaceutical products.  The total 
value of these top ten intra-regional exports and imports in 2001 was 
approximately $1.4 billion or almost 50 percent of the total intra-regional exports. 
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Table F.5: Ten Highest-Valued Central American Exports and Imports, 2001 
(Thousands of U.S. $) 
 
Rank Central American Exports 2001 Value 
1 Edible fruit and nuts, peel of citrus fruit or melons 1,241,288 
2 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; 
parts thereof 
982,625 
3 Coffee, tea, mate, and spices 959,455 
4 Sugars and sugar confectionery 473,880 
5 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof 469,581 
6 Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates 419,904 
7 Medical or surgical instruments or apparatus 335,642 
8 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted 298,046 
9 Pharmaceutical products 295,653 
10 Plastics and articles thereof 290,166 
 Total 5,766,239 
 Remainder of Exports 4,419,068 
 Total Central American Exports 2001 10,185,307 
   
Rank Central American Imports 2001 Value 
1 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof 2,566,544 
2 Minerals fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances 
2,448,873 
3 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; 
parts thereof 
2,008,684 
4 Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and 
accessories thereof 
1,634,540 
5 Plastics and articles thereof 1,037,884 
6 Paper and paperboard 876,057 
7 Pharmaceutical products 868,531 
8 Iron and steel 632,491 
9 Cereals 481,088 
10 Miscellaneous edible preparations 393,072 
 Total 12,947,795 
 Remainder of Imports 7,570,324 
 Total Central American Imports 2001 20,518,119 
Note: All trade amounts from SIECA are preliminary and the totals do not necessarily reconcile. 
 
Source: SIECA, 2001 Top Products: by Economic Partner Group – All Countries.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
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Table F.6: Ten Highest-Valued Intra-Regional Exports and Imports, 2001 
(Thousands of U.S. $) 
 
Rank Intra-Regional Exports 2001 Value 
1 Paper and paperboard 185,032 
2 Plastics and articles thereof 179,200 
3 Iron and steel 174,309 
4 Pharmaceutical products 172,386 
5 Soaps, waxes, and polishes 159,411 
6 Miscellaneous edible preparations 158,131 
7 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk 111,692 
8 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof 88,675 
9 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances;  
parts thereof 
84,871 
10 Minerals fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; 
bituminous substances 
83,675 
 Total 1,397,382 
 Remainder of Exports 1,431,797 
 Total Central American Exports 2001 2,829,179 
   
Rank Intra-Regional Imports 2001 Value 
1 Paper and paperboard 204,129 
2 Iron and steel 201,264 
3 Plastics and articles thereof 181,565 
4 Miscellaneous edible preparations 169,885 
5 Soaps, waxes, and polishes 165,318 
6 Pharmaceutical products 141,668 
7 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk 129,748 
8 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof 96,548 
9 Animal or vegetable fats 86,385 
10 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances, 
parts thereof 
84,944 
 Total 1,461,453 
 Remainder of Imports 1,474,291 
 Total Intra-Regional Imports 2001 2,935,744 
Note: All trade amounts from SIECA are preliminary and the totals do not necessarily reconcile. 
 
Source: SIECA, 2001 Top Products: by Economic Partner Group – Central American Common 
Market.  www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
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Balance of Trade 
As a region, Central America has significantly increased its trade deficit 
between 1998 and 2002.  In 1998, the region’s trade deficit was $6.71 billion, 
rising by more than 65 percent to $11.2 billion in 2002 (See Table F.7).  With the 
exception of Costa Rica, in 1999 and 2000, all of the Central America countries 
carried a trade deficit between 1998 and 2002.  In 2002, Guatemala had the 
highest trade deficit at almost $3.7 billion, followed El Salvador and Costa Rica 
with trade deficits of $2.7 and $2.1 billion, respectively.  During the same year, 
Honduras had a trade deficit of $1.6 billion, while Nicaragua had a trade deficit of 
more than $1.1 billion. 
 
Table F.7:  Total Balance of Trade, 1998-2002 (Thousands of U.S. $) 
 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Costa Rica -796,302 304,043 299,503 -1,557,996 -2,089,628 
El Salvador -1,864,983 -1,963,373 -2,462,457 -2,652,280 -2,702,507 
Guatemala -2,069,173 -2,099,533 -2,472,370 -3,194,041 -3,693,241 
Honduras -1,002,030 -1,511,701 -1,562,594 -1,685,892 -1,584,630 
Nicaragua -981,269 -1,213,920 -1,091,278 -1,242,603 -1,162,941 
CACM Region -6,713,758 -6,484,483 -7,289,196 -10,332,812 -11,232,947 
 
Source:  SIECA.  Centroamerica: Balanza de Comercio Total, 1998-2002.  
http://www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
 
Within the CACM trade bloc, Honduras had the largest trade deficit of the 
Central American countries at more than $500 million in 2002, followed by 
Nicaragua at slightly more than $200 million and El Salvador with $64 million 
(Table F.8).  The other two countries were able to produce an intra-regional trade 
surplus; Costa Rica had the largest surplus with almost $350 million in 2002, 
followed by Guatemala with $222 million.   
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Table F.8:  Balance of Trade within the CACM, 1998-2002 (Thousands of U.S. $) 
 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Costa Rica 209,358 277,558 302,055 354,865 348,124 
El Salvador 15,169 -14,245 -74,027 -100,211 -64,503 
Guatemala 140,327 304,270 199,613 282,339 222,547 
Honduras -123,879 -150,707 -223,848 -350,771 -507,017 
Nicaragua -295,661 -374,161 -326,475 -292,785 -202,806 
CACM Region -54,687 42,715 -122,682 -106,563 -203,655 
Source: SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Exportaciónes Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  
www.sieca.org.gt.  2003; and SIECA, Centroamerica: Evolución de las Importaciónes 
Intracentramericanas, 1960-2002.  www.sieca.org.gt.  2003. 
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GLOSSARY 
AVES   Salvadoran Association of Poultry Growers 
CA-4 Central American Intra-Regional Immigration Agreement 
(El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua only) 
CABEI Central American Bank of Economic Integration 
CACM  Central American Common Market 
CAFTA  Central American Free Trade Agreement 
CBI Caribbean Basin Initiative 
CCE Economic Cooperation Committee of the Central American 
Isthmus 
CCJ   Central American Court of Justice 
CEPAL Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
CMCA  Central American Monetary Council 
ECLA United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
FIDE   Foundation for Investment and the Development of Exports 
   (Honduras) 
FMLN   Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front 
FSLN   Sandinsta National Liberation Front 
IIT   Intra-Industry Trade 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 
OAS   Organization of American States 
ODECA  Organization of Central American States 
PARLACEN  Central American Parliament 
SG-SICA Secretary General – System of Central American 
Integration 
SICA   System of Central American Integration 
SIECA Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration 
SITC   Standard Industrial Trade Classification 
TNC   Transnational Corporation 
UN   United Nations 
UNDP   United Nations Development Program 
UNO   National Opposition Union 
WTA   World Trade Analyzer (database) 
WTO   World Trade Organization 
 288
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
XI Reunión de Presidentes Centroamericanos.  Protocolo de Tegucigalpa a la 
Carta de la Organización de Estados Centroamericanos.  Tegucigalpa, 
1991. 
Aguilar, Eloy O.  “Mexico, Central America seek economic integration, 
development.  The Associated Press.  29 June 2002. 
Alonso, Irma T. de.  “A Macroeconomic Assessment of Central America” in 
Trade, Industrialization, and Integration in Twentieth-Century Central 
America.  Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994. 
Ancel, Jacques.  Les frontières.  Paris, 1938.  Cited from Prescott, J. R. V.  
Boundaries and Frontiers.  Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1978. 
Anderson, James E. and van Wincoop, Eric.  “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution 
to the Border Puzzle.”  American Economic Review 93(2003), 170-192. 
Anderson, Malcolm.  Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern 
World.  Cambridge (UK): Polity Press, 1996. 
Aquino, Antonio.  “Intra-Industry Trade and Inter-Industry Specialization as 
Concurrent Sources of International Trade in Manufactures.  
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 114(1978), 275-295.  Cited in Nilsson, Lars.  
“Two-Way Trade between Unequal Partners: The EU and the Developing 
Countries.”  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 135(1999), 102-127. 
Arnon, A. and Weinblatt J.  “Sovereignty and Economic Development: The Case 
of Israel and Palestine.”  The Economic Journal 111(2001): F291-F308. 
Balassa, Bela.  “Tariff Reductions and Trade in Manufactures among the 
Industrial Countries.”  The American Economic Review 56 (1966), 466-
473.  Cited in Bano, Sayeeda S.  Intra-Industry International Trade: The 
Canadian Experience.  Brookfield, Vermont:Avebury, 1991. 
Bano, Sayeeda S.  Intra-Industry International Trade: The Canadian Experience.  
Brookfield, Vermont:Avebury, 1991. 
 289
Barfield, Claude E.  Free Trade, Sovereignty, and Democracy: The Future of the 
World Trade Organization.  Washington D.C.: The AEI Press, 2001. 
Bergsten, Fred C.  “The Threat from the Third World.”  Foreign Policy 11(1973).  
Cited from Biersteker, Thomas J.  “The Limits of State Power in the 
Contemporary World Economy.”  In Boundaries: National Autonomy and 
Its Limits.  Tontowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981. 
______.  “Coming Investment Wars?”  Foreign Affairs 53(1974), 135-152.  Cited 
in Biersteker, Thomas J.  “The Limits of State Power in the Contemporary 
World Economy.”  In Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits.  
Tontowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981. 
Bergstrand, Jeffrey H.  “The Gravity Equation in International Trade: Some 
Microeconomic Foundations and Empirical Evidence.”  Review of 
Economics and Statistics 67(1985), 474-481. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish and Donald R. Davis.  “Intra-Industry Trade Issues and 
Theory.”  Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper No. 
1695.  1994.  Cited in Havrylyshyn, Oleh and Peter Kunzel.  “Intra-
Industry Trade of Arab Countries: An Indicator of Potential 
Competitiveness.  Working Paper.  International Monetary Fund, 1997 
Biersteker, Thomas J.  “The Limits of State Power in the Contemporary World 
Economy.”  In Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits.  Tontowa, 
New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981. 
Black, Jan Knippers and Needler, Martin C.  “Historical Setting.”  In Guatemala: 
a country study, 2d ed.  Area Handbook Series.  Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1984. 
Boggs, Whittemore.  International Boundaries: a study of boundary functions and 
problems.  Columbia University Press: New York, 1940.  Cited from 
Minghi, Julian V.  “Boundary Studies in Political Geography.”  in The 
Structure of Political Geography.  Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 
1969. 
Brás, Marisabel.  “Historical Setting.”  In Nicaragua: a country study, 3d ed. Area 
Handbook Series.  Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994. 
 290
Bryan, Lowell and Farrell, Diane.  Market Unbound: Unleashing Global 
Capitalism.  New York: John Wiley, 1996.  Cited in Veseth, Michael.  
Selling Globalization: The Myth of the Global Economy.  Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor.  “The Central American Common Market: From Closed 
to Open Regionalism.”  World Development 26(1998), 313-322. 
Burtless, Gary; Lawrence, Robert Z.; Litan, Robert E.; and Shapiro, Robert. J.  
Globaphobia: Confronting Fears about Open Trade.  Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1998. 
Business International Corporation.  The Central American Common Market: 
profits & problems in an integrating economy.  New York: Business 
International Corporation, 1969. 
Caballeros, Rómulo.  “Central America’s External Debt: Past Growth and 
Projected Burden.”  In Central America: The Future of Economic 
Integration.  Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989. 
CABEI - Central American Bank for Economic Integration.  Fostering 
Development.  Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration, 2001. 
Calvo-Drago, Jorge D.  “Regional Integration of Central American Countries and 
Opportunities for Internetworking.”  1997.   
http://www.isoc.org/isoc/whatis/conferences/inet/97/proceedings/E5/E5_1
.HTM#s2.  Accessed 15 May 2003. 
Ceglowski, Janet.  “Has Globalization Created a Borderless World?”  Business 
Review: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  March-April 1998, 17-27 
______.  “Has the border narrowed?”  North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance 11(2000), 61-75. 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.  “First Part – Natural 
Disasters in Central America and the Caribbean: Consequences and 
Risks.”  http://www.cred.be/centre/publi/142e/ch3.htm.  Accessed 12 July 
2003. 
 291
Chemical Bank New York Trust Company.  International Economic Survey: The 
Central American Common Market.  New York: Chemical Bank New 
York Trust Company, 1968. 
Cochrane, James D.  The Politics of Regional Integration: The Central American 
Case.  Tulane Studies in Political Science, vol. xii.  New Orleans: Tulane 
University, 1969. 
Consejo Monetario Centroamericano.  “Información acerca de la Secretaría 
Ejecutiva de Consejo Monetario Centroamericano”.  2001.  
http://secmca.or.cr/cmca.asp.  Accessed 17 May 2003. 
Corte Centroamericana de Justicia.  “Organization de la Corte Centroamericana 
de Justicia.”  http://www.ccj.org.ni.  Accessed 17 May 2003. 
Courant, Paul N. and Deardorff, Alan V.  “International Trade with Lumpy 
Countries.  Journal of Political Economy 100(1992), 198-210. 
Dandamaev, Muhammad A. and Vladimir G. Lukonin (translated by Philip L. 
Kohl and D.J. Dadson).  The Cultures and Social Institutions of Ancient 
Iran.  Cambridge University Press: New York, 1989. 
Deardorff, Alan V.  “Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a 
Neoclassical World?” in The Regionalization of the World Economy.  
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
Degerlund, Jane, ed.  Containerization Yearbook 2002.  London: Informa Group 
pic, 2002. 
Dicken, P.  Global Shift: The Internationalisation of Economic Activity, 2d ed.  
London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd., 1992.  Cited from Jeffrey, Ramon 
J.  The Impact of State Sovereignty on Global Trade and International 
Taxation.  Series on International Taxation, no. 23.  Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999. 
Dunning, J. H.  Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy.  International 
Business Series.  Reading, Mass.  Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1993.  Quoted in Jeffrey, Ramon J.  The Impact of State Sovereignty on 
Global Trade and International Taxation.  Series on International 
Taxation, no. 23.  Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999. 
 292
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL).  
Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean.  Santiago, 
Chile: United Nations, 2001. 
Economist Intelligence Unit.  Costa Rica: Country Report September 2002.  
London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002. 
______.  El Salvador: Country Report August 2002.  London: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2002a. 
______.  Honduras: Country Report July 2002.  London: Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2002b. 
______.  Nicaragua: Country Report July 2002.  London: Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2002c. 
Embassy of Nicaragua.  “Application of the Republic of Nicaragua.”  
International Court of Justice.  6 December 2001.  http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/inicol/inicolorder/inicol_iapplication_20011206.ht
ml.  Accessed 19 August 2003. 
Engel, Charles and Rogers, John H.  “How Wide is the Border?” American 
Economic Review 86(1996), 1112-1125. 
Echeverri-Gent, Elisavinda.  “The Society and Its Environment.”  In Honduras: a 
country study, 3d ed.  Area Handbook Series.  Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1995. 
Evenett, Simon J. And Wolfgang Keller.  “On Theories Explaining the Success of 
the Gravity Equation.”  Journal of Political Economy 110(1998), 281-316. 
Fawcett, Charles B.  Frontiers: A Study in Political Geography.  Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1918.  Cited in Prescott, J. R. V.  Boundaries and Frontiers.  
Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1978. 
Feenstra, Robert.  World Trade Flows, 1980-1997 – World Trade Analyzer 
Database.  Center for International Data, Institute of Governmental 
Affairs, University of California at Davis. 2000. 
 293
Finer, S. E.  “State- and nation-building in Europe: the role of the military.” In 
The Formation of National Sates in Western Europe.  Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975.  Cited from Johnston, R. J.  
Geography and the State: An Essay in Political Geography.  New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1982. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Economic and Social 
Department, Commodities and Trade Division.  “Coffee Projections to 
2005.”  2000.  http://www.fao.org/es/ESC/esce/escr/coffee/coffeePe.htm.  
Accessed 10 May 2003. 
Frankel, Jeffrey; Stein, Ernesto; and Wei, Shang-jin.  “Trading blocs and the 
Americas: The natural, the unnatural, and the supra-natural.”  Journal of 
Development Economics 47(1995), 61-95. 
“Frontier dispute settled by reference to colonial boundaries.”  Times (London), 8 
October 1992. 
Giammattei Avilés, Jorge Antonio.  Guia Concentrade de la Integración de 
Centroamerica.  Managua: Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sección de 
Publicaciones, 1999. 
Gilbert, Dennis.  “The Society and Its Environment.”  In Nicaragua: a country 
study, 3d ed.  Area Handbook Series.  Washington, D.C.: GPO,1994. 
Gómez-Buendía, Hernando.  The Limits of the Global Village: Globalization, 
Nations and the State.  World Development Studies, no. 5.  Helsinki: 
United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics 
Research, 1995. 
Gray, Peter.  “Intra-Industry Trade: The effects of different levels of data 
aggregation.”  On the Economics of Intra-Industry Trade: Symposium 
(Mohr, Tuebingen), Herbert Girsch ed. 1978, 87-110.  Cited in 
Havrylyshyn, Oleh and Peter Kunzel.  “Intra-Industry Trade of Arab 
Countries: An Indicator of Potential Competitiveness.”  Working Paper.  
International Monetary Fund, 1997 
Greenaway, David and Chris Milner.  “Trade Imbalance Effects in the 
Measurement of Intra-Industry Trade.  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 
117(1981), 756-762.  Cited in Nilsson, Lars.  “Two-Way Trade between 
Unequal Partners: The EU and the Developing Countries.”  
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 135(1999), 102-127. 
 294
Grubel, H.G. and P.J. Lloyd.  Intra-Industry Trade: The Theory and Measurement 
of International Trade in Differentiated Products.  John Wiley & Sons, 
New York, 1975.  Cited in Bano, Sayeeda S.  Intra-Industry International 
Trade: The Canadian Experience.  Avebury: Brookfield, VT, 1991. 
Guéhenno, Jean-Marie.  The End of the Nation-State.  Translated Victoria Elliot.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 
Haggerty, Richard.  “Historical Setting.”  In El Salvador: a country study, 2d ed.  
Area Handbook Series.  Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990. 
Haggerty, Richard and Millet, Richard.  “Historical Setting” In Honduras: a 
country study, 3d ed.  Area Handbook Series.  Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1995. 
Havrylyshyn, Oleh and Civan, Engin.  “Intra-Industry Trade and the Stage of 
Development: A Regression Analysis of Industrial and Developing 
Countries.”  In Intra-Industry Trade, Empirical and Methodological spects.  
New York : North Holland, 1983.  Cited in Lee, Hyun-Hoon and Young-
Youn Lee.  “Intra-Industry Trade in Manufactures: The Case of Korea.”  
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 129 (1993) 159-171. 
Havrylyshyn, Oleh and Peter Kunzel.  “Intra-Industry Trade of Arab Countries: 
An Indicator of Potential Competitiveness.  Working Paper.  International 
Monetary Fund, 1997 
Held, David.  Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to 
Cosmopolitan Governance.  Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1995. 
Helliwell, John.  “Do National Borders Matter for Quebec’s Trade?”  Canadian 
Journal of Economics 29(1996), 507-522. 
______.  How Much Do National Borders Matter?  Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998. 
Helliwell, John F. and McCallum, John.  “National borders still matter for trade.”  
Policy Option/Options Politiques 16(1995), 44-48. 
Helms, Mary W.  “The Society and Its Environment.”  In El Salvador: a country 
study, 2d ed.  Area Handbooks Series.  Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990. 
 295
Hirst, Paul and Thompson, Grahame.  Globalization in Question: The 
International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance.  Oxford: 
Polity Press, 1996. 
Holbrick, Karel and Swan, Philip L.  Trade and Industrialization in the Central 
American Common Market: The First Decade.  Studies in Latin American 
Business, no. 13.  Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business Research, University 
of Texas at Austin, 1972. 
“Honduran navy to patrol coastal waters to guard against fishermen being 
detained by Nicaragua.”  Associated Press Worldstream.  8 March 2002. 
Hoover, Edgar M.  The Location of Economic Activity.  New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company Inc., 1948. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística – Republica de Guatemala.  X Censo Nacional 
de Población Y V de Habitación.  Guatemala City: Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, 1996. 
Isard, Walter.  Methods of Regional Analysis.  Regional Science Studies Series 
No. 4.  Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1960.  
______.  Introduction to Regional Science.  Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1975. 
Inter-American Development Bank.  “Plan Puebla-Panama”.  26 June 2001.  
PowerPoint presentation. 
Jeffrey, Ramon J.  The Impact of State Sovereignty on Global Trade and 
International Taxation.  Series on International Taxation, no. 23.  Boston: 
Kluwer Law International, 1999. 
Johnston, R. J.  Geography and the State: An Essay in Political Geography.  New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982. 
Kaplan, Iriving.  “The Society and Its Environment.”  In Costa Rica: a country 
study, 2d ed.  Area Handbook Series.  Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984. 
Kennedy, Dennis, ed.  The Atlas of Central America and the Caribbean.  New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985. 
 296
Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J.S.  Power and Interdependence.  Glenview, Ill.: Scott 
Foresman & Company, 1989.  Quoted from Kobrin, Stephen J. “The 
Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a Networked Global 
Economy.” In Governments, Globalization, and International Business.  
New York: Oxford Press, 1997. 
Kluck, P. A.  “The Society and Its Environment.”  In Guatemala: a country study, 
2d ed.  Area Handbook Series.  Washington, D.C.: 1984. 
Kobrin, Stephen J. “The Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a 
Networked Global Economy.” In Governments, Globalization, and 
International Business.  New York: Oxford Press, 1997. 
Kristof, Ladis K. D.  “The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries.”  in The Structure 
of Political Geography.  Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. 
Krugman, Paul.  Geography and Trade.  Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991. 
Krugman, Paul and Maurice Obstfeld.  International Economics: theory and 
policy, 4th  ed.  Addison-Wesley: Reading, Mass., 1997. 
Lee, Hyun-Hoon and Young-Youn Lee.  “Intra-Industry Trade in Manufactures: 
The Case of Korea.”  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 129 (1993) 159-171. 
Lee, Young Sun.  “A Study of the Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade among 
the Pacific Basin Countries.  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 125 (1989) 346-
358. Cited in Lee, Hyun-Hoon and Young-Youn Lee.  “Intra-Industry 
Trade in Manufactures: The Case of Korea.”  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 
129 (1993) 159-171. 
Lizano, Eduardo and Salazar-Xirinach, José M.  “The Central American Common 
Market and Hemispheric Free Trade.”  In Integrating the Hemisphere: 
Perspectives from Latin America and the Caribbean.  Washington, D.C.: 
Inter-American Dialogue, 1997. 
McCallum, John.  “National borders matter: Canada-U.S. regional trade patterns.”  
American Economic Review 85(1995), 615-623. 
Makler, Harry M and Ness Jr., Walter L.  “How financial intermediation 
challenges national sovereignty in emerging markets.”  The Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance 42(2002): 827-851. 
 297
Mineral Revenue Management, Mineral Management Service.  “Posted price per 
barrel for West Texas Intermediate crude base oil, 1970-2000.”  20 July 
2001.  http://www.mrm.mms.gov/Stats/pdfdocs/w_texas.pdf.  Accessed 30 
May 2003. 
Minghi, Julian V.  “Boundary Studies in Political Geography.”  in The Structure 
of Political Geography.  Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. 
Moodie, A. E.  The Geography Behind Politics.  London: Hutchinson’s 
University Library 1957.  Cited from Minghi, Julian V.  “Boundary 
Studies in Political Geography.”  in The Structure of Political Geography.  
Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. 
Moreno, Dario.  The Struggle for Peace in Central America.  Gainsville, Florida: 
University Press of Florida, 1994. 
Muir, R.  Political Geography: A New Introduction.  Basingstoke: Macillan, 1997.  
Cited in  Storey, David.  Territory: The Claiming of Space.  New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 2001. 
Muoz, Nfer.  “Politics: Central American Parliament Seeks More Powers.”  Inter 
Press Service.  24 October 2001. 
Murshed, S. Mansoob and David Noonan.  “The Quality and the Pattern of Intra-
Industry Trade between the Geographically Proximate Regions of 
Northern-Southern Ireland and Southern Ireland-Great Britain.  The 
Economic and Social Review.  Vol. 27 (1996), No. 3, 187-203. 
National Climatic Data Center – National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration.  “Mitch: The Deadliest Atlantic Hurricane Since 1780.”  
25 January 1999.  http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/mitch/mitch.html.  
Accessed 26 May 2002. 
National Earthquake Information Center – United States Geological Survey.  
“Earthquakes with 1,000 or More Deaths from 1900.”  7 April 2003.  
http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/eqsmajr.html.  Accessed 17 August 2003. 
Newman, Michael.  Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union.  London: 
Hurst & Company, 1996. 
“Nicaragua warns Honduran navy not to enter Nicaraguan territorial waters.”  
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.  20 March 2001. 
 298
Nilsson, Lars.  “Two-Way Trade between Unequal Partners: The EU and the 
Developing Countries.”  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 135(1999), 102-127. 
Nugent, Jeffrey B.  Economic Integration in Central America: empirical 
investigations.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 
Odendahl, Teresa and Aileen M. Shaw.  “Interviewing Elites.” 299-316. in 
Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method.  Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage Publications, 2002. 
O’Dowd, Liam; Corrigan, James; and Moore, Tim.   “Borders, National 
Sovereignty and European Integration: The British-Irish Case. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 19(1995): 272-
285. 
Ohmae, Kenichi.  The End of the Nation State: the rise of regional economies.  
Free Press: New York, 1995.  Cited in Veseth, Michael.  Selling 
Globalization: The Myth of the Global Economy.  Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
Parlamento Centroamericano.  “Información General del Parlamento 
Centroamericano – Competencias y Atribuciones.”  Presentation.  
http://www.parlacen.org.gt/principal.asp.  Accessed 17 May 2003. 
______.  “Estados Miembros.”  Presentation.  
http://www.parlacen.org.gt/principal.asp.  Accessed 17 May 2003a. 
Parsley, David C. and Wei, Shang-Jin.  “Explaining the border effect: the role of 
exchange rate variability, shipping costs, and geography.”  Journal of 
International Economics 55(2001), 87-105. 
Poland, Blake D.  “Transcription Quality.”  629-650. in Handbook of Interview 
Research: Context and Method.  Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications, 2002. 
Prescott, J. R. V.  Boundaries and Frontiers.  Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1978. 
Railroad Development Corporation.  “Guatemala: Ferrovías Guatemala.”  
http://www.rrdc.com/op_guatemla.html.  2001.  Accessed 25 May 2002. 
 299
Ratzel, Friedrich.  Anthropogeographie.  Stuttgart, 1897.  Cited in Prescott, J. R. 
V.  Boundaries and Frontiers.  Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1978. 
Reinicke, Wolfgang H.  Global Public Policy: Governing without Government?  
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. 
Rinehart, Robert.  “Historical Setting.”  In Costa Rica: a country study, 2d ed.  
Area Handbook Series.  Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984. 
Rodas-Martini, Pablo.  “Intra-Industry Trade and Revealed Comparative 
Advantage in the Central American Common Market.”  World 
Development.  Vol. 26(1998), No. 2, pp. 337-344. 
Rogers, John and Jenkins, Michael.  “Haircuts or Hysteresis?  Sources of 
Movements in Real Exchange Rates.”  Journal of International 
Economics, 38(1995), 339-360. 
Secretaría General del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericano.  
“Misón/Visón.”  2003.  http://www.sgsica.org/sica/misionvision.php.  
Accessed 17 May 2003. 
______.  “Organización SG-SICA.”  2003a.  
http://www.sgsica.org/sica/misionvision.php.  Accessed 17 May 2003. 
Secretaría de Integración Económico Centroamericano.  “Estrategias de Acción, 
Unidad de Transporte, SIECA – Resumen Ejecutivo”  15 June 2001.  
http://www.sieca.org.gt.  Accessed 20 May 2002. 
______.  “¿Qué es SIECA?”  2003.  http://www.sieca.org.gt.  Accessed 17 May 
2003. 
______.  “Marco Legal”  2003a.  http://www.sieca.org.gt.  Accessed 17 May 
2003. 
______.  “Organigramo Administrativo de la Secretaría de Integración Economica 
Centroamericano”  2003b.  http://www.sieca.org.gt.  Accessed 17 May 
2003. 
 300
Semple, Ellen Churchill.  Influences of Geographic Environment.  Holt: New 
York, 1911.  Cited in Minghi, Julian V.  “Boundary Studies in Political 
Geography.”  in The Structure of Political Geography.  Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Company, 1969. 
Sigurdsson, Haraldur, ed.  Encyclopedia of Volacanoes.  New York: Academic 
Press, 2000. 
Silver, Sara.  “Mexico joins plan for regional development.”  Financial Times 
(London).  1 July 2002, p. 5. 
Spykman, Nicholas John.  “Geography and Foreign Policy.”  American Political 
Science Review.  Vol. 32 (1938).  Cited from Minghi, Julian V.  
“Boundary Studies in Political Geography.”  in The Structure of Political 
Geography.  Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. 
______.  “Frontiers, Security and International Organization.”  Geographical 
Review.  Vol. 32 (July 1942).  Cited from Minghi, Julian V.  “Boundary 
Studies in Political Geography.”  in The Structure of Political Geography.  
Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. 
Storey, David.  Territory: The Claiming of Space.  New York: Prentice-Hall, 
2001. 
Suárez, Jorge A.  The Mesoamerican Indian Languages.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983. 
Suarez-Villa, Luis, Maria Giaoutzi, and Anastasia Strateigea.  “Territorial and 
Border Barriers in Information and Communication Networks: A 
Conceptual Exploration.”  Tifdschrift voor Econ. En Soc. Geografie.  83:2 
(1992): 93-104. 
Tharakan, P. K. Matthew.  “Intra-Industry Trade Between the Industrial Countries 
and the Developing World.”  European Economic Review 26(1984) 213-
227. Cited in Nilsson, Lars.  “Two-Way Trade between Unequal Partners: 
The EU and the Developing Countries.”  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 
135(1999), 102-127. 
______.  “The Intra-Industry Trade of Benelux with the Developing World.  
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 122(1986) 131-149.  Cited in Nilsson, Lars.  
“Two-Way Trade between Unequal Partners: The EU and the Developing 
Countries.”  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 135(1999), 102-127. 
 301
United Nations.  Statistical Yearbook, 46th Edition.  CD-ROM.  New York: 
United Nations, 2002.  
U.S. Department of State, Office of External Research.  Achievements and 
Problems of the Central American Common Market.  Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1969. 
Veseth, Michael.  Selling Globalization: The Myth of the Global Economy.  
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
Vivó Escoto, Jorge A.  “Weather and Climate of Mexico and Central America.” 
In Natural Environment and Early Cultures.  Handbook of Middle 
American Indians, Volume 1.  Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 
1964. 
Vona, Stefano.  “On the Measurements of Intra-Industry Trade: Some Further 
Thoughts.”  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 127(1991), 678-699.  Cited in 
Lee, Hyun-Hoon and Young-Youn Lee.  “Intra-Industry Trade in 
Manufactures: The Case of Korea.”  Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 129 
(1993) 159-171. 
Wardlaw, Andrew.  The Operations of the Central American Common Market.  
1966. 
Weigert, Hans W. et al.  Principles of Political Geography.  Appleton-Century-
Crofts: New York, 1957.  Cited from Minghi, Julian V.  “Boundary 
Studies in Political Geography.”  In The Structure of Political Geography.  
Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. 
Weyl, Richard.  Geology of Central America, 2d ed.  Berlin: Gebrüder 
Borntraeger, 1980. 
Wilford, W.T.  “The Central American Common Market: Trade Patterns after a 
Decade of Union.”  Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business 12, no. 
3 (1973): 3-22. 
Woodward Jr., Ralph Lee.  Central America: A nation divided, 3d ed.  New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999. 
World Atlas.  CD-ROM.  Rancho Dominguez, California: Cosmi Corporation, 
1999. 
 302
“World Court Settles a Latin Border Dispute.”  New York Times. 13 September 
1992, sec. 1, p. 10. 
World Bank.  World Development Indicators.  CD-ROM.  Washington D.C.: 
World Bank,  2002. 
Wyzan, Michael L.  “Macedonian and Slovenian Trade: Contrasting Patterns and 
Focus on the European Union.”  Post-Soviet Geography and Economics.  
Vol. 40 (1999), No. 5.  309-334. 
 303
VITA 
 
Michael Stephen Bomba was born in Victoria, Texas on July 10, 1968, the 
son of Dorothy Mae Bomba and Alvin James Bomba.  After completing his work 
at Stroman High School, Victoria, Texas in 1986, he entered Victoria College in 
Victoria, Texas.  In 1988, he entered the University of Texas at Austin and 
received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1991.  In 1993, he entered the Graduate 
School at the University of Texas at Austin and received the degree of Master of 
Science in Community and Regional Planning in 1995.  During the following 
years, he worked as a planner for an environmental consulting firm in Austin.  In 
September 1997, he once again entered the Graduate School at the University of 
Texas at Austin to pursue a doctoral degree in Public Policy at the Lyndon B. 
Johnson School of Public Affairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Permanent Address: 5903 Marilyn Drive, Austin, Texas 78757 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was typed by the author. 
 
